Sarah N. Stern is the founder and president of the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET), a think tank that specializes in the Middle East. She is the author of Saudi Arabia and the Global Terrorist Network (2011).
(Oct. 20, 2026 / JNS)
Tehran sent a message this week to the Lebanese terror proxy Hezbollah: “We estimate that an American attack is a matter of time. You should be prepared.”
Iran has concluded that another U.S. strike will be headed toward it and wants its Lebanese terror proxies to be ready, if that does happen. Two diplomatic sources said as much to The Jerusalem Post, and one told Axios. Lebanese security forces, speaking on the United Arab Emirates’ site Erem News, warned the terrorist group that they should raise their readiness to “advanced levels.”
All of Hezbollah’s full-time members were informed. These sources stated that “There are steps for a possible near-term preparation for was. This is not a final decision to go to war” (as reported in Israel Hayom).
Beneath the affability on the streets, most Israelis have been walking around with the genuine fear that a fresh round of attacks might break out.
The ceasefire did not end the war with Iran. It just hit the “pause” button. The Islamic Republic is using this hudna, or temporary respite, to reload. And it is counting on the fact that its most valued and oldest proxy, Hezbollah, will be on the front lines of the fire.
Hezbollah is not simply a military terrorist group loosely associated with Iran. It is the forward division of the Islamic Republic, and Tehran is making every effort to use it again. The question is whether the United States, under U.S. President Donald Trump, has the resolve to engage in another, and perhaps even deadlier round, and whether that will occur before or after the November midterms.
The timeline is fairly certain. Trump had said on Oct. 8 that the United States “will not be attacking Iran at any time prior to the midterm elections.”
Hostility toward Beirut, Damascus and Washington has become indisputable. The message comes directly from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to leaders of its proxy networks across the Middle East. They reportedly include plans for multiple, simultaneous attacks utilizing various fronts.
Hezbollah appears to be reorganizing itself into a highly operational entity. The terrorist organization steeped in Lebanon is now using the “Iranian Mosaic Defense,” which was invented in 2025 by the IRGC Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari. This divides Hezbollah into 31 autonomous provisional command centers—one for Tehran and 30 for the other provinces. It is designed so that if the central leadership in Iran breaks down or top commanders are killed or injured, there is still some structure to the organization and methods of communication.
Hostility toward Beirut, Damascus and Washington has become indisputable.
According to Israel’s i24News, Hezbollah is recalling its salaried fighters to new posts, and Iran is directly supervising the overhaul. This is a doctrine designed by Tehran, implemented under Tehran’s supervision, for a war it expects to engage in.
The official word from the Iranian Supreme National Security Council came on Oct. 18. Its secretary, Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, a former commander of the IRGC, posted on X that “Iran’s Armed Forces have prepared a more devastating plan for a new adventure than the 12-day and 40-day wars.”
He added that “Iran’s new operational plan will not proceed according to the rules they know” (as reported by Iran’s Tasnim News agency). To understand what that threat means, it’s worth looking at the rooms where such decisions are made.
At the top sits Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, chosen by the Assembly of Experts in March after his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Feb. 28.
Under Iran’s constitution, the supreme leader is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the final word on war and peace. Yet he has not been seen in public since his appointment. He was reportedly wounded in the same strikes that killed his father and since then has communicated mainly through written statements and, according to anonymous sources, by joining meetings with senior officials over audio links.
Established under Article 176 of the constitution, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is the formal chamber for questions of defense, national security and foreign policy. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian chairs it. Its members include the heads of the judiciary and parliament; the senior commanders of the armed forces and the IRGC; the foreign, intelligence and interior ministers; and two representatives of the supreme leader. Its decisions take effect only once the supreme leader approves them.
In August, Khamenei first named Rezaei as one of his representatives on the council, and only then did Pezeshkian appoint him secretary. That reversal of the usual order was widely read as the president deferring to the new leader.
Created in August 2025, after the 12-day war with Israel exposed how slowly the full SNSC could respond in wartime, the Defense Council is a smaller war room. Alongside the president and the heads of the judiciary and parliament, it permanently seats the commanders of the IRGC, the regular army and the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, which runs joint military operations.
In January, it declared that Iran “does not consider itself limited to reaction after an action” and would treat “objective signs of threat” as grounds to act. That wording edges toward a doctrine of pre-emption.
Many analysts now see the IRGC as Iran’s real center of power. With much of the old leadership killed in this year’s war, commander Maj. General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle are widely described as the main decision-makers. The IRGC also runs Iran’s network of proxies, which is why a message to Hezbollah to raise its readiness would most likely travel through Guard Corps channels rather than through the elected government.
On paper, these Iranian chambers form a clear chain of command. In practice, the lines have blurred. According to five Iranian officials and two IRGC members cited in reports in September, a hardline faction attacked three commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz in July without the knowledge of Pezeshkian, Vahidi or the SNSC. Those attacks helped derail a U.S.-Iran understanding reached weeks earlier. With a supreme leader who remains unseen, rival factions now invoke his name to justify their own agendas.
And civilians are afraid to go out into the street.
This is the real danger behind Tehran’s message to its people and to Hezbollah. The instruction to prepare may have come from the IRGC, been endorsed by the SNSC or been issued in the name of a leader few have seen in seven months.
For Israel, the question is not only whether Iran decides to go to war, but which of these rooms makes the decision and whether the others will even know.
The Jewish state has no other choice but to be prepared.