We Have Not Identified the Problem Correctly; We Have Mistaken the Consequence for the Root
Afghanistan faces numerous problems and crises, and there is no clear consensus not only on how to resolve them, but even on their nature, their roots, and their order of priority. One of the central debates is the type of political system. Some consider a federal system to be the solution, others defend a decentralized parliamentary system, some emphasize a centralized republic, and a number propose other models. Each of these views rests on particular assumptions and arguments. The fundamental question, however, is this: have we correctly identified Afghanistan’s main problem? And can changing the type of political system, on its own, bring the country out of its current situation?
Many advocates of these models, relying on political literature common in the West or on the experience of other countries, present their preferred system as the solution to Afghanistan’s crisis. Yet before prescribing any solution, the problem must be carefully defined, its roots must be understood, and the suitability of the proposed solution must then be weighed against the country’s historical, social, economic and cultural conditions. No political system, merely because it has succeeded in one society, will necessarily produce the same results in a different one.
From the perspective of development management, my argument is that Afghanistan’s central problem is structural underdevelopment, particularly economic underdevelopment. Chronic poverty, widespread unemployment, low production capacity, economic dependency, migration, weak state institutions, and recurring political crises are among the most important manifestations of this situation. These phenomena, of course, have a reciprocal relationship with one another, and some of them can be both cause and effect at the same time. But to find a lasting solution, we must also examine their structural roots.
The problem begins when we confuse the symptoms of a crisis with its roots and then prescribe a remedy that may have no clear connection to the underlying cause. If we regard poverty and unemployment merely as the consequence of the type of political system, without examining the country’s production structure, state capacity, institutional quality, human capital, and economic relations, we have in effect oversimplified the problem.
As a doctoral student in development management, I disagree with the notion that changing the type of political system alone is the solution to Afghanistan’s national problem. The debate over political structure is important and cannot be ignored. But this debate concludes only when we clarify how the desired political structure can create the conditions for economic development, institutional strengthening, job creation, and improvements in people’s lives. The fundamental issue is not simply choosing a political label, but building an order that has the capacity to solve society’s problems.
Why is a wrong definition of the problem so costly? Because Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment is not a static condition. It is a crisis that, in the absence of effective policies, can deepen over time. When economic growth cannot keep pace with population growth and society’s needs, pressure increases on the labor market, public resources, the education system, and social services. The result can be spreading poverty, fewer job opportunities, intensified migration and growing social discontent.
Therefore, if today a large part of the country’s intellectual, human, and financial capacity is spent on political disputes without a clear development agenda, we may face higher costs tomorrow. Afghanistan needs political dialogue, but this dialogue must be tied to a practical strategy for economic and social development. Prioritizing development does not mean setting politics aside. It means evaluating policies by their ability to solve people’s real problems.
The Developmental State, Not a Ready-Made Political Prescription
From the perspective of development studies, one important point is that many of the countries that have achieved remarkable economic transformation have benefited from the state’s capacity to steer the development process. In development literature, this approach is known as the concept of the “developmental state”: a state that plans for long-term economic and social goals, has relatively effective executive institutions, makes policy to strengthen production and investment, and directs public resources toward development priorities.
The developmental state should not be confused with any particular type of political system. This concept refers less to the outward form of government than to its capacities, priorities and performance. A state may be called a republic, a monarchy, a parliamentary system or have another structure, but if it cannot formulate and implement coherent economic policies, build effective institutions and provide productive opportunities for citizens, its name and form alone are no guarantee of development.
Moreover, a developmental state does not necessarily mean an authoritarian state. A developmental state must be able to plan for the future, but at the same time it must also pay attention to the quality of governance, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, and the public interest. Administrative authority and the ability to implement policies are not the same as political despotism. To advance development, a state needs decision-making capacity, but this capacity will be sustainable and effective only when it is accompanied by mechanisms of oversight, accountability and anti-corruption.
The experience of East Asian countries, including Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and China, offers examples worth studying of the role of the state in economic transformation. These countries differed significantly from one another in political structure, historical path and style of governance. Nevertheless, their experience shows that long-term policymaking, investment in education and infrastructure, targeted support for production, development of administrative capacity and attention to the competitiveness of the economy can play a fundamental role in the development process.
Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, with a state of high executive capacity, targeted economic policies and relative continuity in planning, was transformed from a small economy with limited resources into one of the most advanced economies in the world. The country’s political system had its own particular features and came with restrictions on political competition. However, explaining its progress solely through authoritarianism gives an incomplete picture of reality. The quality of state administration, investment in education, infrastructure development, attraction of capital, and integration with the global economy were also important factors in this transformation.
China is also an important example for studying the relationship between the state and development. While preserving its single-party political structure, particularly after the start of economic reforms and the opening-up policy in the late 1970s, the country experienced a sweeping transformation in production, trade, infrastructure, and poverty reduction. However, this transformation cannot be attributed solely to its political structure. Economic reforms, the expansion of market relations, extensive investment, the development of export-oriented industries and the use of local capacities also played an important role in this process. Alongside these achievements, China continues to face challenges such as inequality, environmental pressures and the need to increase productivity.
These examples carry one important conclusion: the path to development does not necessarily pass through a single form of political system in every country. But from these experiences it cannot be concluded that democracy and political freedoms are unimportant for development, or that authoritarianism by itself brings development. What must be examined is the set of factors that enable a state to act in the public interest and to be accountable for the outcomes of its decisions.
Therefore, the main lesson from the experience of developed countries is not that Afghanistan should adopt, without examination, a particular authoritarian or democratic model. The more important lesson is that the type of political system must be examined in connection with state capacity, institutional quality and the ability to advance development. Focusing on the name and appearance of a system, without regard to the substance of its governance and its economic performance, distracts us from the main problem.
Two fundamental points arise here. First, political systems take shape within the context of history, social relations, political struggles and institutional experience. These systems cannot be chosen like a ready-made prescription from books or from cyberspace, with the expectation that a society’s problems will be solved by transferring them in form alone. Studying global experiences is necessary, but they should be used to understand the options and weigh the consequences, not to replace independent thinking and an understanding of domestic conditions.
Second, if our main goal is development, we need to discuss the characteristics of a developmental state in Afghanistan. What capacities should such a state have? How can it direct the country’s limited resources toward fundamental priorities? What policies are needed for the development of agriculture, industry, trade, infrastructure, and human capital? How can corruption, arbitrary decision-making and the waste of resources be prevented? And what mechanisms must exist so that development policies endure through political changes and factional disputes?
Answering these questions is far more practical than deciding in advance that a particular political system is the definitive solution to all problems. Afghanistan needs a state that, in addition to having executive capacity, can win public trust, use national resources responsibly, create the conditions for the participation of social and economic forces, and have a clear and measurable program for improving citizens’ lives.
From this perspective, we must first understand underdevelopment in all its economic, social and institutional dimensions, and only then discuss the political structure and style of governance suited to the country’s conditions. Every political solution must explain how it helps solve Afghanistan’s real problems. If the relationship between the problem and the solution is unclear, even a model that appears modern, attractive or advanced may in practice fail to deliver the desired result.
Afghanistan’s current situation also cannot be explained merely by imitation of Eastern or Western models. The country’s historical experience, political developments, weak institutions, economic limitations and inability to form a lasting consensus on national interests all play a role in the existing situation. The issue is not that we should set foreign experiences aside entirely. Rather, we must avoid blind imitation and evaluate each experience in light of the context in which it arose, the conditions of its success and its potential costs.
In its search for a development path, Afghanistan can shape a model suited to its own historical, cultural, economic and social conditions: a model that has the capacity for sustained movement toward development while also taking into account the rights of citizens, the social and Islamic values of society, justice and the public interest. Such a model is neither built in advance solely in the mind of one individual or group, nor achieved merely by transferring a foreign experience. It requires research, national dialogue, testing of policies and continuous evaluation of results.
It cannot be denied, of course, that the debate over the type of political system sometimes becomes intertwined with the competition of groups and elites for access to power. Some factions may prefer their desired model on the basis of their own political interests rather than evaluating it according to the country’s development needs. Nevertheless, attributing such a motive to all supporters of a particular system is itself a form of oversimplification. Serious criticism should be directed at the arguments, evidence and consequences of proposals, not at sweeping speculation about the intentions of individuals and groups.
The reality is that in a society with extensive needs, economic opportunity, employment, income, access to education and basic services, and a clear outlook for the future must be placed at the center of the national agenda. These needs do not mean that political freedoms, citizen participation, or the structure of the system are unimportant. Rather, they show that political disputes acquire practical value only when they are tied to improving people’s lives and strengthening the country’s capacities.
Conclusion: The Priority of Development, Not Fruitless Conflict Over Power
If we regard economic and institutional underdevelopment as one of Afghanistan’s most fundamental national problems, our first task is to understand this situation and its roots precisely. It is not to search for a ready-made political prescription or to assume that changing the name or form of the system will automatically solve the other problems. The development path must rest on a realistic understanding of Afghanistan’s capacities and limitations. This path requires an effective state, accountable institutions, sound economic policies, investment in education and skills, infrastructure development, stronger production, the creation of job opportunities and the responsible use of resources. Moreover, for such a path to be sustainable, public trust, social participation and effective mechanisms of oversight and accountability are of fundamental importance.
The type of political system should also be examined within this same framework: which structure can, in Afghanistan’s conditions, contribute to institutional stability, meaningful participation, better management of resources, reduced corruption and the implementation of development policies? Posing this question is more precise and constructive than declaring one model superior before examining it.
As long as we define the country’s problem solely on the basis of subjective impressions, factional inclinations or imported models, even the most attractive proposals may fail at the implementation stage. We must first know where we stand, what capacities we have, what limitations we face and what kind of economic and social transformation we need. Only after that can we decide, with greater understanding and responsibility, on the appropriate political structure and how to reform it.
Rather than an endless dispute over the name and form of the political system, Afghanistan needs a national agreement on development priorities, on building an effective state and on improving the lives of its citizens. Politics can be a guide only when it becomes a tool for solving the country’s problems, rather than itself turning into a permanent problem.
You can read the Persian version of this analysis article here:
مساله افغانستان چیست: نظام سیاسی یا توسعهنیافتهگی؟
The post Afghanistan’s Core Problem: Political System or Underdevelopment? appeared first on Hasht-e Subh.