Turkey’s imports from Russia nosedived in August and September, according to official data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK, or TurkStat) and Ministry of Trade.
Sales of gas, oil, coal, grain and metals have made Russia Turkey’s second-largest supplier of goods after China, and only China can claim a larger trade surplus with Turkey than Russia. Yet Turkey’s imports from its northern neighbour across the Black Sea in August were 41% lower than a year earlier at $1.9bn, while in September they dropped 79% to just $681mn.
This summer slump can safely be attributed to a perfect storm of rock-bottom demand for gas, Russia’s ban on diesel exports and disruption caused by the increasing targeting of Black Sea ports and shipping in the Russo-Ukrainian war.
Figures from the Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority show that Turkey imported only 723mn cubic metres of gas from Russia in August – some 61% less than in August 2025. Gas imports from Russia also trailed those from both Iran and Azerbaijan, the two other suppliers connected by pipeline to Turkey. Total gas imports including liquefied natural gas (LNG) were down by 30% in volume terms.
The storm that sank the summer’s imports will pass. It nevertheless symptomises the ongoing malaise in bilateral business as Ankara seeks to reduce its dependence on imported energy while repositioning itself in the Western camp and avoiding sanctions for its dealings with Moscow.
Heydays
Four decades ago, a liberalising Turkey under then prime minister Turgut Ozal signed off on the first pipeline for the import of Russian gas, intended to replace lignite as a household heating fuel and alleviate a pressing problem of urban air pollution. To offset the bill, construction tenders in the Soviet Union of the day were awarded to Turkish firms like ENKA, which began by building barracks for soldiers displaced from the Eastern bloc and ended up with an impressive portfolio of Moscow real estate.
A raft of Turkish investors followed the builders into Russia, including Anadolu Efes in brewing, Sise Cam in glass and Hayat Holding in personal and domestic hygiene products. In Turkey, Russian gas was put to use for power generation as well as heating.
Turkey, though a Nato member, in 2017 bought an S-400 air defence missile system from the Kremlin. It now wants to offload it to a third country to meet a US condition for the puchase of American warplanes (Credit:Vitaly V. Kuzmin, cc-by-sa 4.0).
Years later, another conservative leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saw Moscow and Beijing as potential cures for his disappointment with Brussels and Washington. In 2017, he went so far as to purchase a Russian S-400 air defence missile system, notwithstanding Turkey’s longstanding membership of Nato. In 2018, the foundations were finally laid for a nuclear power plant to be built by Russia’s Rosatom at Akkuyu on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.
Upon the invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Ankara refused to participate in Western sanctions against Russia, despite selling drones to Kyiv. Instead, Turkish companies including Arcelik in household appliances, Fiba Holding in banking and a string of fashion chains moved in to fill the void left by their European counterparts.
Struggling for top 10
Much of that has now changed. Historically, Russia has been Turkey’s largest overseas contracting market, with a cumulative 2,190 projects worth a total of $103.3bn since 1972. In 2024 and 2025, however, Russia did not even make the top 10. In the first six months of 2026 it crept in at ninth, just ahead of Gabon, with deals worth a mere $24.4mn – less than 1% of the total.
Greater use of solar power in Turkey and continued burning of local coal have contributed to the periodic mothballing of gas-fired electricity generation capacity, including three pioneering plants ironically owned by ENKA. In addition, Turkish Petroleum (TPAO) is now producing some 3bn cubic metres of gas annually from Turkey’s first offshore gas field in the Black Sea, with much larger volumes anticipated in the months and years to come.
Cutting the energy bill is key to Ankara’s drive to reduce its perennial current account deficit. Sınce early 2025, weather conditions have been favourable: stronger rainfall has boosted hydroelectric power generation, a relatively mild winter in 2025-2026 tempered heating fuel needs, and a cool summer in 2026 capped power demand for air conditioning.
Turkey has diversified its oil imports too, taking more crude from Kazakhstan, the US and Iraq while reducing purchases from Russia, especially after US President Trump threatened Russian oil importers with sanctions in September 2025.
Offloading the S-400s
Of the Turkish retailers that flooded into the Russian market in 2022, Mudo, Beymen Club, Madame Coco, Karaca Home and several others are pulling out due to low demand. LC Waikiki, Koton and Kolin’s, with their longer track records and hıgher brand recognition, are staying put.
Meanwhile, Turkey’s relatively meagre exports to Russia have been hit by the Black Sea attacks on merchant shipping and the difficulties of transferring funds to Turkey while banks face secondary sanctions.
In return for granting Turkey permission to sell its Russian S-400 missile system, Moscow is said to want a new long-term deal on gas deliveries to Turkey via the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines that run under the Black Sea (Credit: Gazprom).
As for the S-400s, the Erdogan administration is now eager to offload them to a third country – perhaps the United Arab Emirates – in order to meet a US condition for fighter jet sales. This will require Russian approval. In return, Moscow is reportedly demanding a new long-term agreement for continuing Turkish gas purchases via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines under the Black Sea.
In December 2025, Turkey extended the duration of its two main gas import contracts with Russia, covering some 22bn cubic metres annually – but only for a period of one year. The TurkStream pipeline also carries gas to southeastern Europe. The original overland pipeline, via Ukraine, is closed.
Nukes and holiday-makers
A gas deal may be vital for the Akkuyu nuclear plant as well. The commissioning of the first of four planned 1.2-gigawatt reactors has been set back two years by the German government’s refusal to approve the sale of Siemens Energy equipment to Rosatom. Even if the first unit comes on stream, using alternative Chinese parts, further progress faces financing problems.
Erdogan and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear energy collaboration during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek in September. However, no Turkish entity, public or private, has yet agreed to buy a stake in the Akkuyu plant, nor has there been any breakthrough regarding the re-routing of payments for Russian gas to fund further investment.
One bright spot in Turco-Russian relations is sun, sea and sand. Russia has long outstripped Germany as Turkey’s largest single tourism market. It was the source of 6.9mn arrivals in 2025. Along with Egypt, Turkey has been benefitting from Western antipathy to Russians and this year’s security concerns in the UAE. In the first eight months of 2026, Russian visitor numbers rose by a further 3.6% to 4.7mn.
Nevertheless, memories linger of 2015, when Ankara and Moscow were at odds over Syria, and edgy Turkish forces shot down a Russian fighter jet. Package tours to Turkey were banned, and the number of Russian visitors plummeted by 75% the next year. If Moscow’s recent anger over proposed US/Turkish artillery and ammunition sales to Ukraine were to prompt a similar response – the Russian foreign ministry spoke in August of a “Pandora’s box” and a “severe blow to relations” – the malaise would spread to the beaches.