The Houthis and the Red Sea Explained in 2026

Horn of Africa · Explainer

The Houthis have turned the Red Sea into a war zone twice since 2023, first over the war in Gaza and in 2026 against Saudi Arabia. The Suez route they threaten normally carries about 15% of global maritime trade by volume, the IMF said in March 2024.

In September 2026 the Iran-backed movement seized the port of Mocha and Perim Island beside the Bab el-Mandeb strait, the southern gate to the Red Sea. For US readers the stakes are freight rates, oil prices and American forces in nearby Djibouti.

Who the Houthis Are

The Houthis call themselves Ansar Allah, Arabic for Supporters of God, and take their popular name from the family of their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. The US State Department designated Ansarallah, as it spells the name, a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2025.

The movement has held Sanaa, Yemen’s capital, since 2014 and controls most of the northwest, says Security Council Report, an independent group that tracks the Council. Its forces also hold the Red Sea port of Hodeidah.

Facing them is Yemen’s internationally recognised government, led by Rashad al-Alimi as head of the Presidential Leadership Council and based in Aden. Saudi Arabia leads the military coalition that backs it, formally the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen.

A UN Panel of Experts reported in October 2024 that the Houthis received training, weapons and financial support from Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The UN has kept a targeted arms embargo on the group since resolution 2216 of April 2015.

UN sanctions experts appear to have told the Council in August 2026 that Houthi capabilities had grown as more arms were made in Yemen, Security Council Report said. Media reports, it added, placed advisers from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards beside Houthi fighters during the September offensive.

The movement is one of five overlapping conflicts in our pillar guide to Horn of Africa geopolitics. Its grip on the Red Sea coast is why it matters to Africa, Europe and American shippers.

Why They Attack Shipping

The campaign began in November 2023, and on 19 November Houthi forces seized the Galaxy Leader, a cargo ship linked to an Israeli businessman, and held its crew. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi said in April 2024 that attacks would continue until Israel halted its offensive in Gaza.

The US State Department counted hundreds of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden between 2023 and March 2025. The UN Security Council demanded an end to them in resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024.

Attacks ran on into late 2025, including strikes on the Liberia-flagged Scarlet Ray on 31 August and the Dutch-flagged Minervagracht on 29 September. The Houthis then stopped targeting merchant ships and Israel after the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire of October 2025.

The pause broke in 2026, after the US-Israeli war with Iran began on 28 February and the Houthis threatened in June to resume their campaign. In July, the Saudi-led coalition moved to stop an Iranian aircraft, unauthorised by Yemen’s government, from landing in Sanaa, and the Houthis answered with strikes on Saudi Arabia.

The group then declared a naval blockade of Saudi-linked shipping and struck vessels in the strait, as our report on Brent crude at US$100 describes. Strikes on Saudi energy sites followed, as told in our report on the Houthi attack on a Saudi refinery.

On 11 August the Houthis struck the Tanzania-flagged cargo ship Tihamah and killed four seafarers, the UN Secretary-General told the Security Council. On 8 September they fired missiles and drones at southern Saudi Arabia, reportedly injuring 73 people and setting fires at the Jazan refinery.

Houthi strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and on Abha airport on 7 October 2026 reportedly killed three people and wounded 36, Security Council Report noted. Two days earlier, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye agreed to put their Mecca Defense Alliance into practice, including the rapid deployment of agreed forces.

What It Has Done to Trade

Ships sailing between Asia and the Suez Canal must pass the Bab el-Mandeb, the strait between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Our Bab el-Mandeb analysis explains why rival powers crowd around it.

The IMF’s PortWatch ship-tracking data showed Suez Canal trade volume down 50% year on year in the first two months of 2024. Traffic around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope surged by an estimated 74% over the same period.

PortWatch data show the slump has lasted, with Suez transits averaging about 74 ships a day in 2023 but only about 41 a day in 2026. Daily passages around the Cape of Good Hope rose from about 49 to about 91, with 2026 counted through 11 October.

Egypt pays the price, because canal tolls are one of its main sources of hard currency. Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly said in October 2026 that canal revenue fell from about US$10 billion a year to US$3.3 billion, before recovering to about US$4.4 billion.

Sailing round Africa adds days and fuel to every voyage between Asia and Europe. The World Container Index of Drewry, a shipping consultancy, stood at US$4,351 per 40-foot container on 8 October 2026, with Shanghai to Rotterdam at US$3,337.

The route matters more in 2026 because fighting has disrupted the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf’s main oil exit. Saudi Arabia has grown more reliant on the Red Sea to ship its oil, Security Council Report noted in September 2026.

Who Patrols the Strait

The United States moved first, setting up Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition of more than 20 countries, in December 2023. US and British forces began striking Houthi targets in Yemen in January 2024, calling it self-defence under the UN Charter.

On 6 May 2025 Washington halted a bombing campaign against the Houthis, and Oman said it had brokered a truce covering attacks on ships. The Houthis said the deal did not cover their attacks on Israel.

The European Union runs Aspides, a naval operation commanded from Larissa in Greece by Rear Admiral Vasileios Gryparis. The EU’s foreign service calls its mandate defensive: it escorts merchant ships and protects them at sea rather than striking Yemen.

Saudi Arabia leads the coalition fighting the Houthis, and its spokesman, Major General Turki Al-Malki, pledged in September 2026 to take all necessary operational measures. Yemen’s government said on 5 October that it had retaken Mocha and positions near the strait with coalition air support.

Our report on how the Saudi-led coalition moved to secure Bab el-Mandeb traces that naval build-up from July 2026. On the African shore, Djibouti hosts the US base at Camp Lemonnier, home to the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.

The Africa Link

Across the Gulf of Aden, the Houthis have built ties with al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate fighting the government of Somalia. More than 100 al-Shabaab fighters have travelled to Yemen for training in drones, weapons and explosives, Garowe Online reported in September 2026, relaying US and regional officials.

The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen reported in October 2024 increased smuggling of small arms between the Houthis and al-Shabaab. Both held weapons from the same production batches, pointing to transfers between them, a common supplier or both.

Houthi trainers have also reportedly gone to Somalia, and a Houthi delegation reportedly visited Jilib, an al-Shabaab stronghold in the south. There is no confirmed evidence that the Houthis have handed over their most advanced missiles or drones, as our report on al-Shabaab fighters trained in Yemen notes.

Perim Island, also called Mayyun, sits in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb, facing Djibouti. The Houthis captured it on 11 September 2026, a day after taking Mocha, gaining Yemen’s west coast on the Red Sea, Security Council Report said.

That hold soon looked shaky, as government forces pushed back towards the strait in early October. Security Council Report judged that the Houthis seemed to have lost the chokepoint, though control of Perim itself has not been confirmed.

The fighting also pushes people toward Africa, and about 3,000 have crossed the strait to seek refuge in Djibouti, according to the UN refugee agency. UN human rights chief Volker Türk said on 24 September 2026 that 125,000 people had been displaced since early August.

Eritrea, whose ports of Assab and Massawa sit on the Red Sea, watches the same waters. Ethiopia’s bid for its own outlet to the sea, set out in our explainer on Ethiopia’s Red Sea demand, adds a further rivalry on the African shore.

What the Markets Say

Why we show this: prediction markets turn real-money bets into a live probability that moves within minutes of the news, which is why investors, campaigns and newsrooms in the United States now follow them closely. We show them next to polls and official results, never instead of them.

Polymarket bets put a 30.5% chance on a Saudi-Houthi ceasefire agreement by 31 December 2026, against 4.5% by 31 October (15 October, 6:50 a.m. ET). A separate Polymarket market on the Bab el-Mandeb being effectively closed by 31 December traded at 15.5%.

Polymarket’s market on Perim Island no longer being under Houthi control stood at 17.2% for 31 October and 34% for 31 December. On Kalshi, a CFTC-regulated US exchange, traders gave a 60% chance that over 300 ships would cross the Suez Canal in the week to 18 October.

What It Means for US Readers

Freight is the first channel for American importers, and Drewry put the rate from Shanghai to New York at US$10,220 per 40-foot container on 8 October 2026. Higher shipping costs add upward pressure on inflation, the IMF warned in March 2024.

Oil is the second channel: Red Sea routes carried about 12% of seaborne oil in the first half of 2023, the US Energy Information Administration found. With Hormuz disrupted, threats by the Houthis to Saudi Red Sea exports can move the price of gasoline in the United States.

US forces at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and US Navy ships in the region operate close to the fighting. Washington lists the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, so any business dealing with the group risks US penalties.

What Is Not Known

It is not clear who now holds Perim Island, or whether Yemen’s government can keep the ground it says it retook near the strait in October 2026. Nor is it known whether UN envoy Hans Grundberg, who met Saudi, Omani, Yemeni and Houthi representatives in September, can broker a truce.

Iran’s full role, including the reported Revolutionary Guard advisers in the September offensive, has not been shown in public. How far al-Shabaab has gained Houthi drone skills is known only from officials’ accounts relayed by Garowe Online.

War-risk insurance for the strait is priced voyage by voyage and has no single public index, so the full cost to shippers is hard to measure. A return to the Suez route depends on a lasting halt to attacks, which our Horn of Africa hub tracks alongside Sudan and the rest of the coast.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why are the Houthis attacking ships in the Red Sea?

The Houthis began attacking ships in the Red Sea in November 2023, saying they acted against Israel over the war in Gaza. In 2026 they turned on Saudi-linked shipping after clashes with the Saudi-led coalition and during the US-Israeli war with Iran.

Who supports the Houthis?

Iran backs the Houthis, and UN experts reported in 2024 that the group received training, weapons and money from Iran, Iraqi armed groups and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. The UN has kept an arms embargo on the Houthis since 2015.

Is it safe for ships to sail through the Red Sea now?

Not fully, because the Houthis attacked three commercial vessels between 9 August and 9 September 2026, according to the UN Secretary-General. Security Council Report warned in October 2026 that the Houthis can still hit ships from Yemen’s northern Red Sea coast.

Do the Houthis control the Bab el-Mandeb strait?

The Houthis seized the port of Mocha and Perim Island beside the strait in September 2026. Yemen’s government said in October that it had retaken Mocha and nearby positions, but control of Perim is unconfirmed.

Sources: Security Council Report, Yemen, October 2026 Monthly Forecast, 1 October 2026; Security Council Report, Yemen: Briefing and Consultations, 8 October 2026; Security Council Report, Yemen: Emergency Briefing, 10 September 2026; Security Council Report, The Red Sea: Vote on a Draft Resolution, 12 July 2026; Security Council Report, Yemen monthly forecast, February 2024; Security Council Report, Yemen monthly forecast, 30 April 2024; US State Department, Designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, 4 March 2025; IMF Blog, Red Sea Attacks Disrupt Global Trade (PortWatch data), 7 March 2024; Masrawy, Madbouly on Suez Canal revenue, 4 October 2026; Drewry, World Container Index, 8 October 2026; US Energy Information Administration, Red Sea chokepoints, 4 December 2023; EEAS, EUNAVFOR Aspides, accessed 15 October 2026; US Africa Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, accessed October 2026; Garowe Online, Houthi and al-Shabaab ties, 8 September 2026; UN Panel of Experts on Yemen, final report (2024), 11 October 2024; IMF PortWatch, daily chokepoint transit data, data to 11 October 2026; Security Council Report, Yemen: Monthly Briefing and Consultations, 13 May 2025.

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