Madagascar marks one year on Saturday since military leader Michael Randrianirina took power following weeks of youth-led protests that brought down elected president Andry Rajoelina. Over the past year, Russian influence has grown through closer military ties and weapons deliveries, while researchers have identified Moscow’s interest in a strategic Indian Ocean port. Many of the political reforms demanded by protesters, however, remain unfinished.
Randrianirina was sworn in as president of the Refoundation of Madagascar on 17 October 2025, after a month of Gen Z protests demanding water, electricity, justice and transparency culminated in the ousting of Rajoelina.
Russia was quick to engage with the new leadership. Just four days after taking office, Randrianirina met the Russian ambassador in the Malagasy capital, Antananarivo.
What followed was a rapid expansion of Moscow’s presence on the island, researchers say.
An investigation published last month by All Eyes On Wagner, a project that tracks Russian influence and security operations, traced the development of military, political and economic networks in Madagascar in the months after Randrianirina’s inauguration.
“Madagascar has historical ties with Russia,” explained Lou Osborn, co-author of the report.
“And Russia has had a discreet foothold on the island since the 2018 elections. But what is very striking is the speed with which the GRU [Russian military intelligence] has extended its networks in the country, through Africa Corps, African Initiative and various other activities.”
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A lightning offensive
The Russian presence soon became more concrete.
On 20 December 2025, two months after Randrianirina took office, a flight carrying 40 men led by Russian intelligence general Andrey Averyanov landed in Madagascar.
The investigation cites information collected by the Russian investigative unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Averyanov is described by the researchers as the suspected supervisor of Africa Corps, the Russian paramilitary organisation that succeeded the Wagner group.
Malagasy authorities confirmed that same month that Africa Corps instructors were in the country training its military.
Then came the equipment. Helicopters, tanks, trucks, drones and rifles arrived in multiple shipments presented as donations, with deliveries continuing until April, the researchers said.
Averyanov also appeared at increasingly senior levels of the relationship.
In February, he was seen at a meeting in Moscow between Russia’s deputy prime minister and Madagascar’s armed forces minister. Two weeks later, he was part of the delegation that welcomed Randrianirina on an official visit to the Russian capital.
The push has gone beyond military cooperation. Alongside Africa Corps, the researchers point to African Initiative, a Russian news agency with links to the state, as a key part of Moscow’s influence campaign in Madagascar.
The agency has sought to reach young people through prizes and sporting events. It has also supported local media in exchange for coverage of Russian-Malagasy relations and organised trips to Moscow for media figures and influencers.
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Influence at the top
Russia has also developed ties with senior Malagasy figures, including members of the political establishment who have remained influential despite last year’s change of power, the investigation found.
“We are seeing figures from the old guard return,” Osborn said. “These people have gained influence. And for some of them there is a kind of opportunism in playing the Russian card.”
Among them is National Assembly speaker Siteny Randrianasoloniaiko, whom the investigation identifies as Moscow’s most prominent supporter in Madagascar.
His connections with Russia have been fostered through his role as president of the African Judo Union. He confirmed the arrival of Africa Corps personnel and has spoken frequently about cooperation between the two countries.
Prime Minister Mamitiana Rajaonarison is also described as pro-Russian. A former head of Samifin, Madagascar’s financial intelligence unit, he was involved in negotiations with Sber, Russia’s main bank, which is under international sanctions, the investigation said.
Ny Hasina Andriamanjato, meanwhile, is a Russian-speaking former foreign minister whom the investigation places in former president Rajoelina’s circle. He was appointed Madagascar’s ambassador to Russia in May.
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Gateway to the Indian Ocean
Sitting at the entrance to the Mozambique Channel, Madagascar offers access to shipping routes linking southern Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.
“Madagascar can give the Russians a sought-after access point to the Indian Ocean,” Osborn said. “Potential access for their shadow fleet [of ships used to evade Western sanctions].”
Much of the attention has centred on the port of Antsiranana, also known as Diego-Suarez, at Madagascar’s northern tip. A Russian delegation visited in April, and the following month Madagascar and Russia announced a joint economic zone, with fuel storage as its first project.
The authors of the investigation say the port’s potential goes much further. They compare Diego-Suarez with Tartus, Russia’s naval base in Syria, arguing that its location could eventually make it a major military and economic logistics hub.
But the interest is not only military. “They are building a logistics platform and an information platform in Madagascar, but also setting up financial infrastructure, which is developing as in Togo, with the A7 system,” Osborn said.
A7 is a Russian cross-border payments network designed to allow international transactions outside conventional Western banking channels. The investigation says such a system could be used in Madagascar to finance arms deliveries, economic projects, security services and other areas of Russian cooperation.
Osborn sees a pattern in which Africa Corps and Russian military intelligence establish a foothold first, with the financial infrastructure following close behind to support business, potential arms sales and payments to Russian personnel.
“It didn’t happen like that in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger,” she said. “In fact, we hadn’t seen Russia so firmly rooted since the Central African Republic.”
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New words, old practices
Meanwhile, questions remain over how much has changed for the people of Madagascar. The authorities that emerged from last year’s uprising have themselves faced accusations of repressing Gen Z activists, six of whom were arrested in April.
“There has certainly been a political break since the previous regime fell,” political scientist Ketakandriana Rafitoson, vice-chair of anti-corruption organisation Transparency International, told RFI. “But I would say the vocabulary has changed more than the practices.”
Randrianirina’s administration has promised to overhaul the state, strengthen national sovereignty and forge a new relationship with citizens. But Rafitoson argues that the concentration of power, weak checks and balances, impunity and a lack of transparency persist.
“That is why today I would speak of a real political revolution, but an institutional 'refoundation' that remains largely unfinished.”
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While changing political practices built up over decades can take time, Rafitoson said this could not justify a lack of progress. “The victims of last year’s violence are still waiting for justice,” she said.
For the young people who drove the protests, there has been one significant shift. Gen Z has established itself as a political force capable of mobilising, shaping its own message and putting issues on the national agenda, Rafitoson said.
“But being heard does not yet mean having power.”
Some young activists now speak of betrayal as they see practices they fought against beginning to reappear. That frustration is also rooted in how little influence they have gained since helping force political change, Rafitoson said.
“They were powerful enough to help bring down a regime, but they have not gained the same influence over decision-making in the transition.”
This article draws on reporting from this story and this interview by RFI's French service.