TEHRAN – Iran’s Shahed suicide drones are exposing surprising weakness in Western sanctions as some of their most critical components are cheaper, older and less sophisticated than the electronics inside an ordinary smartphone. Yet these relatively simple weapons have become a major challenge on modern battlefields, especially in Gulf.
Despite years of sanctions, military strikes and restrictions on tech exports, Tehran continued producing Shahed-series kamikaze drones, relying on a combination of domestic manufacturing, foreign electronics and international procurement networks.
Shahed-136, extensively deployed by Russia against Ukraine, illustrates how relatively inexpensive commercial technology can be transformed into a deadly long-range weapon. The surprising secret behind Iran’s drone programme is not cutting-edge technology but its dependence on widely available commercial components.
Shahed drones contain basic microprocessors manufactured by US company Texas Instruments, with designs dating back to 2008. A basic smartphone or laptop contains more advanced electronics than Shahed drone. Yet these older components remain effective for the drones’ intended functions and are difficult to restrict because similar electronics are used in toys, industrial machinery and recreational drones.
In September 2023, the US Treasury revealed that investigators had identified a small servo motor in the wreckage of a Shahed-136 used by Russia in Ukraine.
American authorities alleged that an Iranian company got thousands of these motors for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force through businesses in Hong Kong, Turkey and the UAE. Further US sanctions in April 2025 and April–May 2026 targeted individuals and companies accused of supplying Iran’s military industry with components, equipment and raw materials.
Despite Tehran’s claims of military self-sufficiency, research indicates that Iranian drones still depend on imported microchips, navigation sensors, engine components and manufacturing equipment.
US investigations have identified procurement networks involving companies in China, Hong Kong, Turkey and the UAE. According to defence expert Damien Spleeters, intermediaries can purchase equipment, process payments and conceal the identity of military end users. When Washington sanctions one network, new intermediaries may emerge, allowing procurement attempts to continue.
However, Spleeters warns that continued production does not prove sanctions are ineffective. Existing inventories can sustain manufacturing temporarily, while restrictions increase costs, create delays and complicate access to genuine components.
Russia demonstrated that certain Iranian-designed drone systems can be modified using Chinese and Russian alternatives. The critical unknown is how many Shahed drones Iran can currently manufacture, how extensive its remaining stockpiles are and whether foreign suppliers can support sustained production.
Four drones destroyed near Madinah, Eastern regions: Saudi coalition forces