As the U.S. midterms approach, headlines regarding the Ukraine war are emerging at breakneck pace. But amid the noise and recurring outrage, the fundamental dilemma has not changed: how can the United States build up a self-sustaining European equilibrium that maximizes Washington’s room for maneuver in an increasingly multipolar world?
Achieving a comprehensive settlement to the war in Ukraine is a necessary, albeit insufficient, part of the answer. European leaders perceive Russia’s war of aggression not just as a security threat but as a fundamental breach of the post-Cold War continental compact. It will not soon be forgotten. As long as the fighting continues — and even in the event of a ceasefire that leaves deeper political cleavages unaddressed — Europe and Russia will not arrive at a stable balance of power on their own.
Time is running out to settle the war on terms that would be broadly acceptable to current European sensibilities. We must not lose sight of this bigger picture before it is too late.
Recent days have been chock full of developments, not to mention speculation. Among them is a recently announced deal to lift U.S. sanctions on Russian diesel. The agreement, ostensibly designed to ease pressure on fuel markets ahead of the U.S. midterms, will ultimately have limited impact on American consumption and global prices. More importantly, the deal’s ramifications for war termination negotiations are also unclear.
On the one hand, those arguing that the deal represents an unacceptable lifting of pressure on Russia have little evidence to back up their contention that tightening the screws on Moscow will bear fruit. Nearly five years into a devastating war of attrition that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives, Russia still does not appear on the verge of a full-blown economic collapse. Those who hoped sanctions would eventually compel Moscow to change course must finally realize that hope is not a strategy. Increasing pressure on Russia is not a panacea when it comes to ending the war.
On the other hand, just because pressure has not yielded the desired results does not mean that agreements such as the diesel deal will, on their own, succeed in reinvigorating the diplomatic track. The Trump administration likes to speak the language of economic deals, but these are not a substitute for addressing the longstanding political and security issues that led to war in the first place.
If the administration hoped that the diesel deal would buy enough goodwill for the implementation of an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, it appears to have been mistaken. Moscow has clearly interpreted Ukrainian President Zelensky’s declared openness to an energy ceasefire as a sign of weakness — signaling to the Kremlin that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure are exacting a greater price than Kyiv’s attacks on Russian oil refineries. It is possible that Moscow would agree to an energy ceasefire in exchange for substantially more sanctions relief, but Ukraine would see this as a wrongheaded concession that fills up Russia’s war chest.
Instead, recent reporting suggests that the administration understands the need to enlarge the pie to discuss broader security issues, rather than just trying to de-escalate a conflict where Moscow sees itself as having greater leverage. This is a sound approach. The war itself is rooted in decades of clashing visions over who gets to set the rules of European security and how. And beyond this, enlarging the pie makes it easier for everyone to get a piece.
For now, we should suspend judgment on the proposals allegedly being discussed between American, European and Ukrainian interlocutors. The exact details remain uncertain. Some reported aspects, such as releasing some of Russia’s frozen assets or building new pipeline infrastructure from Russia to Europe, would be very difficult for Europeans to swallow. Others, such as freezing the conflict along the current frontline, clash with Russia’s declared position. Reacting to every piece of news only encourages officials to miss the bigger picture, namely the urgency of reaching a settlement.
While several months remain before the French presidential elections, recent polls show hard-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon moving into second place. Such an eventuality would virtually guarantee Marine Le Pen’s victory in the second round, throwing Kyiv’s European Union membership bid into disarray and putting the future of European assistance to Ukraine in question. The consequences for Ukraine’s war effort could be devastating.
Many recall former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley’s comment in late 2022 that Ukraine should negotiate peace while it remained in a position of strength. His words were not heeded, and Kyiv’s leverage has gradually shrunk ever since. By now, it should be clear that recent months did not see the tide of the war turn in Ukraine’s favor — and that this was merely a narrative designed once again to put off making difficult decisions.
There are good reasons to doubt whether U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have the wherewithal to negotiate the complex issues involved in building a new European security order. And completely apart from Ukraine’s legitimate right to defend itself against aggression, there is also reason to believe that Zelensky has a personal stake in the war continuing, for fear of what may befall him once out of power.
Europeans cannot sacrifice what may be Ukraine’s last chance at a decent outcome. Being a “geopolitical actor” means knowing how and when to use both incentive and coercive leverage to shape one’s security environment. This inevitably applies to both belligerents in this conflict, since any settlement will require compromises from both sides, irrespective of who is morally in the right.
It is long past the point where the perfect can be made the enemy of the good. Without determined action, the good may also soon be out of reach.