The Supreme Court reportedly pronounced that: “A person who converts from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order cannot claim affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution merely on the basis of social backwardness associated with their pre-conversion status.”
The Supreme Court upheld the Madras High Court order on Thursday, observing that social backwardness of a person can't be transferred from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order after he converts to another religion.
A bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar made the statement while dismissing the Tamil Nadu government's plea against the Madras High Court order.
The Madras High Court held earlier that a person converting to Islam can't claim reservation under Backward Class (Muslim) category solely on the basis of conversion.
The high court had quashed the Tamil Nadu government's notification to grant reservation to converted Muslims.
What did the Supreme Court rule?
While upholding the high court order, the Supreme Court dismissed the Tamil Nadu government's challenge and ordered: “A person who converts to Islam by that act alone doesn't become a member of one of the seven notified backward class social communities in the State.”
“His former caste status can't be transposed to the Muslim backward class category, nor can his private religious body conclusively determine such status entitlement,” the Supreme Court said, as per Live Law.
According to Live Law, the bench pronounced the following conclusions:
- A person who converts from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order cannot claim affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution merely on the basis of social backwardness associated with their pre-conversion status.
- Backwardness suffered on account of an antecedent social order cannot, by itself, be carried forward so as to confer upon a person the status of a backward class in the social order to which they have converted.
- By virtue of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, a person who professes a religion other than Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism cannot be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. Consequently, upon conversion to a religion not specified therein, such person ceases to possess Scheduled Caste status and cannot claim affirmative action or benefits under Article 16(4) that are dependent on membership of a Scheduled Caste.
- Conversion to a non-Hindu social order does not, by itself, confer membership of any particular backward caste community. A person's pre-conversion caste or community status cannot, merely by reason of conversion, be transposed into a notified backward class community in the post-conversion social order.
- The social backwardness that forms the basis of a person's pre-conversion status cannot, by itself, constitute the legal foundation for conferring membership of a different notified backward class community after conversion.
- Where a person converts from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order and subsequently reconverts to the Hindu social order, their entitlement to affirmative action cannot be determined merely by reference to their antecedent status. Such determination requires an independent, fact-specific assessment of whether the original caste or social identity has genuinely revived upon reconversion and whether the person has satisfied the applicable constitutional and legal requirements.
- No statutory benefit, protection, reservation or other entitlement under Article 16(4), the enjoyment of which is dependent on a particular social order, can be claimed merely on the basis of antecedent membership after a person has converted to Islam, Christianity or any other non-Hindu social order. Such conversion severs the legal foundation of an entitlement conditioned upon membership of the Hindu social order.:
On August 7, the Supreme Court had reserved its decision on the plea moved by the state government against the high court verdict.
The state government's appeal said the impugned judgment gives rise to substantial questions concerning the permissible scope of interference with executive policy framed pursuant to the recommendation of an expert statutory commission.
(With inputs from Live Law)