Thailand’s air force monitors a new Chinese-backed base in Laos, 50km from Vientiane. Satellite images show eight aircraft. Meanwhile, Beijing’s Cambodian naval base, arms deliveries and billions in Lao debt stir Bangkok’s regional security concerns.
Thailand’s military is on alert over a new Chinese-backed airbase in Laos, 50 kilometres north of Vientiane. On Monday, Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal Seksan Khantha confirmed close surveillance. Satellite images reveal eight Chinese-designed aircraft and extensive military infrastructure. Meanwhile, Beijing’s $5.9 billion railway and $5.1 billion in Lao debt reinforce its influence. The development follows China’s expansion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base and controversial arms deliveries after deadly border fighting. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has already challenged Beijing over the weapons. Now, Thailand faces growing Chinese military access in neighbouring countries, although permanent combat basing rights remain unconfirmed.
Thailand’s military is monitoring a new Chinese-backed airbase in Laos, just 50 kilometres north of Vientiane. The facility opened on September 29, bringing Chinese military cooperation closer to Thailand’s borders.
On Monday, Royal Thai Air Force Commander-in-Chief Air Chief Marshal Seksan Khantha confirmed that Bangkok was assessing the development. Meanwhile, China’s expanding military presence in Cambodia has already caused friction with Thailand.
Beijing has financed a naval base on the Gulf of Thailand and supplied tanks to Cambodian forces. In Laos, its influence is reinforced by a $5.9 billion railway and billions in outstanding government debt.
Satellite images reveal eight Chinese aircraft at Laos base as Bangkok reviews Cambodia arms deliveries
The Ban Keun aviation facility includes a new runway, military aircraft, support vehicles and extensive infrastructure. Satellite images examined by Reuters reveal the scale of construction completed within approximately one year.
Notably, eight Chinese-designed military training aircraft were visible at the installation in early October. More than two dozen support vehicles were also identified. Beijing insists the facility is intended for joint training and logistical support. However, its longer-term operational role remains undisclosed, including whether Chinese forces possess permanent basing rights.
The development comes as Thailand assesses China’s expanding defence relationships with two neighbouring countries. Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base was upgraded with Chinese financing and reopened in April 2025.
Subsequently, deliveries of Chinese tanks and other military equipment became a diplomatic issue following the deadly Thai-Cambodian border fighting. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul raised the matter directly with Chinese President Xi Jinping in July. Beijing responded with assurances that its equipment would not be used against Thailand.
Thai air force chief warns of major-power influence while pledging close scrutiny of the Laos facility
On Monday, Air Chief Marshal Seksan addressed the Laos development while presenting his 2027–2028 policy priorities. The event took place at the Navaminda Kasatriyadhiraj Royal Air Force Academy. He identified Ban Keun as an example of major powers extending their influence into neighbouring countries.
In particular, he stressed the need to examine projects with economic, political and military dimensions. The air force would monitor developments and assess the intentions behind foreign-backed installations.
“We will observe developments from the outside and analyse the various signals,” Seksan said. He explained that major-power projects could serve several purposes simultaneously. These included economic development, political influence and military cooperation. Furthermore, regional geopolitics had changed significantly over the previous five to ten years. Thailand therefore needed to examine developments carefully while maintaining relations with neighbouring governments.
Seksan described Laos as a friendly, peace-loving neighbour with legitimate economic development needs. Nevertheless, he warned that economic, political and military influence could expand together.
Thailand would continue assessing the facility without disrupting its relationship with Vientiane. He also stressed coordination with the government, Foreign Ministry and other security agencies. In addition, the commander warned against excessive dependence on any single major power. Military cooperation must serve national interests and deliver mutual benefits.
Thailand balances military diplomacy as satellite evidence reveals rapid construction at Ban Keun
“In seeking intelligence cooperation, we must be allies without being dominated, competitors without becoming adversaries, and friends who show sincerity,” Seksan said. He added that Thailand sometimes needed compromises and negotiated exchanges to secure national benefits. However, military diplomacy must remain aligned with government foreign policy. Earlier, Defence Ministry spokesman Rear Admiral Surasant Kongsiri had also addressed the installation.
He recognised Laos’s sovereign right to cooperate militarily with China. Nevertheless, Thailand would monitor developments and assess their implications for regional relations and mutual trust.
The military’s response follows extensive construction at Ban Keun during the previous year. Commercial satellite imagery examined by Reuters indicates that work began in late 2025. Within approximately 12 months, agricultural land and a rudimentary airstrip had become a modern aviation complex.
The installation now includes a paved runway, parallel taxiway, aircraft parking areas and several buildings. Further construction was visible after the official opening. The rapid transformation has attracted international attention to China’s military cooperation with Laos.
Satellite images obtained in early October showed eight aircraft identified as Chinese-designed Hongdu JL-8 trainers. These aircraft are also known as K-8s and possess light attack capabilities.
Chinese and Lao forces operate training aircraft as Beijing leaves permanent basing rights undisclosed
Separately, more than two dozen military support vehicles were visible at the site. Both China and Laos operate the K-8 aircraft. Consequently, their presence does not establish that Beijing has permanently deployed combat aircraft to the installation. Nor has China announced plans to station an operational fighter squadron there.
China’s Ministry of National Defence says Chinese and Lao personnel will jointly operate and maintain the facility. Its declared functions include pilot training, logistical support and closer bilateral defence cooperation.
Beijing also insists the installation is not directed against any third country. Yet the full terms of China’s access arrangements remain undisclosed. Neither government has confirmed whether Chinese forces possess permanent military basing rights. The installation’s longer-term operational capabilities therefore remain an open question.
The site also has a history linked to earlier regional conflicts. The surrounding area was reportedly used by the United States during military operations in Laos and neighbouring countries. Those operations took place during the wars in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s.
Now, the location has been redeveloped under a Chinese-Lao military cooperation agreement. The project accompanies Beijing’s extensive economic involvement in Laos, particularly its railway investments and government lending.
China’s $5.9 billion Laos railway deepens economic ties while Beijing remains the largest creditor
The largest Chinese-backed infrastructure project is the $5.9 billion China-Laos railway. Opened in December 2021, the 414-kilometre line connects Vientiane with Boten on the Chinese border. It forms part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Moreover, the railway links Laos with China’s extensive rail network. The project has improved passenger services, freight movement and access to Chinese markets. It has also supported tourism, logistics and trade between the two countries.
The railway’s financing arrangements demonstrate the depth of Chinese involvement. China holds a 70% stake in the operating joint venture, while Laos owns the remaining 30%.
According to the World Bank, borrowing by the joint venture financed approximately 60% of construction costs. Equity investment provided the remaining 40%. Significantly, Laos also borrowed from Chinese lenders to finance part of its own contribution. The project therefore created substantial financial commitments alongside its transport and commercial benefits.
China’s lending relationship with Laos extends far beyond the railway. The International Monetary Fund’s February 2026 debt sustainability analysis identified extensive outstanding public obligations.
At the end of 2024, Laos had approximately $14.8 billion in public and publicly guaranteed debt. External debt accounted for around $13.4 billion. Of this, approximately $5.1 billion was owed to Chinese mainland creditors. Beijing was therefore Laos’s largest individual creditor, according to the IMF figures.
IMF details billions in deferred Lao debt payments to China but finds no link to military access
The Fund also identified substantial repayment deferrals involving Chinese lenders between 2020 and 2024. In 2020, Laos deferred approximately $222 million in principal repayments. That figure increased to $454 million in 2021 and $609 million in 2022.
Subsequently, another $486 million was deferred in 2023, followed by $427 million in 2024. Together, the principal deferrals reached approximately $2.2 billion over five years. Additionally, cumulative deferred interest had reached approximately $470 million by the end of 2024.
These arrangements reduced immediate repayment pressures on the Lao government. However, substantial financial obligations remained outstanding. The IMF also identified refinancing risks and vulnerability to external economic shocks.
Consequently, Chinese lending remains important to Laos’s management of its public finances. Beijing’s position as the country’s largest individual creditor gives the two governments an extensive financial relationship. Nevertheless, no verified public evidence links the Ban Keun agreement to debt relief. Nor has any arrangement connecting railway financing directly with military basing rights been established.
China’s upgraded Ream Naval Base in Cambodia raises questions over privileged Chinese military access
Cambodia provides another example of China’s growing military involvement in mainland Southeast Asia. Beijing financed extensive improvements to Ream Naval Base in Sihanoukville province, on the Gulf of Thailand.
The upgraded installation officially opened in April 2025. It includes modern naval piers and supporting infrastructure capable of accommodating larger military vessels. As part of the project, China and Cambodia established a joint training and support centre. The facility has attracted attention from Thai defence officials and international security researchers.
Cambodia maintains that Ream is not an exclusive Chinese military base. Phnom Penh says naval vessels from other countries can also visit. However, independent assessments have questioned the extent of China’s access.
In May 2025, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies examined the installation. Its assessment suggested Chinese forces retained privileged access to parts of the base. These included the largest pier. The analysis also raised questions about a nearby air-defence installation.
Thailand examines Chinese naval influence as tank deliveries to Cambodia spark diplomatic tensions
Thailand had already examined Ream’s possible security implications before its reopening. In September 2022, Thailand’s National Security Council published an analysis addressing the project’s strategic significance.
The assessment raised concerns about China’s ability to project maritime power in the Gulf of Thailand. It also examined implications for Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor, maritime security and relations with the United States. Against that background, Ban Keun adds another Chinese-backed military facility to Thailand’s regional defence considerations.
Chinese military supplies to Cambodia have meanwhile created direct diplomatic friction with Bangkok. Those concerns became particularly sensitive following the deadly Thai-Cambodian border fighting in 2025.
In June 2026, Thai Defence Minister Lt Gen Adul Boonthamcharoen addressed the delivery of 39 Chinese-made T-59D tanks to Cambodia. He confirmed that Thai forces were monitoring the equipment. However, the military had found no evidence that the tanks had moved to the border. The deliveries subsequently became a subject of high-level diplomatic discussions.
On July 17, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul raised Chinese arms supplies during talks with President Xi Jinping in Shanghai. According to Anutin, Chinese representatives explained that the tank agreement predated the recent border tensions.
Chinese missile finds and reported ammunition shipments sharpen Thai concerns over Cambodia’s arms
They also said deliveries had been delayed during the fighting. In response, Beijing provided assurances that the equipment would not be used to harm Thailand. Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow subsequently confirmed Bangkok’s concerns over Chinese military supplies. The issue remained sensitive following the 2025 fighting and subsequent ceasefire.
Thai forces had also recovered Chinese-manufactured anti-tank missiles during the border conflict. The weapons were discovered in the Chong An Ma area of Ubon Ratchathani province.
Subsequently, Thailand’s Public Relations Department issued a technical clarification identifying the weapon as the GAM-102. The government distinguished it from the newer GAM-102LR variant.
The GAM-102 is a short- to medium-range guided missile designed to engage armoured vehicles. According to the Thai government, the recovered weapon came from an older production lot.
Chinese officials also confirmed that the newer GAM-102LR variant had not been delivered to Cambodia. Nevertheless, the recovery established the presence of Chinese-manufactured anti-tank weaponry during the border conflict.
Separately, reporting in September 2025 raised questions about Chinese ammunition deliveries before the fighting. The report cited Thai intelligence documents examined by The New York Times. According to those documents, Chinese Y-20 military transport aircraft delivered rockets, artillery ammunition and mortar rounds to Cambodia in June 2025.
Thai intelligence reports on Chinese ammunition precede fresh scrutiny of the new Laos air facility
The supplies were reportedly held temporarily at Ream Naval Base. Afterwards, they were moved towards Cambodia’s northern frontier before the July fighting. However, the reported deliveries did not establish that Beijing intended those weapons to be used against Thailand.
The intelligence documents nevertheless added to Bangkok’s concerns about Chinese military assistance to Cambodia. The deliveries also became part of the wider security discussion surrounding China’s growing defence relationship with Phnom Penh.
The opening of Ban Keun now introduces another Chinese-backed installation into Thailand’s regional security calculations. However, its present capabilities differ substantially from those of a major combat airbase.
China already maintains extensive military aviation infrastructure in its southern provinces, particularly Yunnan. Aircraft operating from Chinese territory can reach large parts of mainland Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the additional operational advantages provided by Ban Keun remain subject to assessment.
Rachel Vandenbrink of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has questioned what additional military power China could project from Laos. Her assessment focused on capabilities already available from Chinese bases in Yunnan.
Other analysts have examined the importance of logistical support, military training and longer-term access. The installation provides a location for bilateral aviation training and technical cooperation inside Laos. It also offers facilities for aircraft maintenance and military support activities. However, more extensive combat operations would require suitable infrastructure, equipment and operational arrangements.
Experts question Chinese combat capabilities at base as surveillance and expansion are unproven
The possible development of electronic-surveillance facilities has attracted separate attention. Such equipment could provide additional intelligence-gathering capabilities.
Nevertheless, there is no established public evidence that Ban Keun currently possesses specialised Chinese surveillance systems. On October 9, defence researcher Olli Pekka Suorsa challenged some interpretations of the facility in The Diplomat. He questioned whether its existing infrastructure supported descriptions of a major Chinese combat airbase.
The eight K-8 aircraft identified in satellite imagery are principally trainers, although they can carry weapons. They do not constitute a substantial modern fighter force. Furthermore, Beijing has not announced plans to station a permanent operational fighter squadron at Ban Keun.
There is also insufficient public evidence that the installation currently supports sustained operations by larger Chinese combat aircraft. Its future capabilities will therefore depend on additional construction, equipment deliveries and operational arrangements.
An extended runway could accommodate larger transport or surveillance aircraft. Additional fuel storage, maintenance buildings and ammunition facilities could support more extensive aviation operations.
Similarly, permanent Chinese personnel deployments would provide clearer evidence of a sustained military presence. New air-defence equipment or electronic-surveillance installations would indicate additional military functions. However, none of these developments has been confirmed as part of an announced expansion programme.
China’s growing regional military presence tests Thailand’s defence ties with Washington and Beijing
The development also has implications for Vietnam. Laos shares a long frontier with Vietnam, while Cambodia borders the country to the southwest. Consequently, Chinese military access in both countries is relevant to Hanoi’s regional security assessments.
Nevertheless, the installations serve different functions. Ream is a naval facility on the Gulf of Thailand. Ban Keun is an aviation installation officially designated for joint training and support. Their legal arrangements, infrastructure and operational capabilities also differ.
China’s wider overseas military presence includes its acknowledged logistics base in Djibouti, established in 2017. Beijing has also developed extensive military infrastructure on artificial islands in the disputed South China Sea.
However, China’s overseas military network remains considerably smaller than that maintained by the United States. Thailand must meanwhile manage its defence relationships with both Washington and Beijing. The United States remains a treaty ally and an important military partner.
American forces regularly participate in exercises with the Royal Thai Armed Forces. China has also developed substantial economic and military cooperation with Bangkok. In parallel, Thailand maintains close relations with Laos and has direct security interests along the Mekong frontier.
These relationships form the background to Monday’s remarks by Air Chief Marshal Seksan. He stressed that Thailand must assess regional developments while preserving its independence. Military diplomacy, he added, must remain consistent with government foreign policy.
Thai air force monitors Chinese facility as the scale and terms of military access remain undisclosed
The Royal Thai Air Force has not announced an operational response to the new installation. Nor has Thailand identified an immediate military threat arising from its opening. Instead, the military is examining the facility’s economic, political and defence functions.
The precise nature of China’s long-term access arrangements remains undisclosed. Neither Beijing nor Vientiane has publicly established whether Chinese forces possess permanent basing rights beyond joint training arrangements.
For now, Ban Keun operates under the China-Laos Joint Support and Training Centre agreement. However, further construction, aircraft deployments and military activity will provide additional evidence of its eventual role.
China’s financial involvement in Laos remains substantial, with billions owed to Chinese mainland creditors. At the same time, the $5.9 billion railway remains a centrepiece of bilateral economic cooperation. These commitments accompany the newly inaugurated military aviation facility.
On another front, Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base and Chinese military equipment deliveries remain prominent in Thailand’s security assessments.
Bangkok weighs military developments in Laos and Cambodia while Beijing’s intentions remain unclear
The two developments have placed Chinese-backed military facilities in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia under closer scrutiny. Nevertheless, there is no verified evidence establishing a coordinated Chinese military plan directed against Thailand. The installations also differ considerably in purpose, capabilities and access arrangements.
On Monday, Air Chief Marshal Seksan made clear that the Royal Thai Air Force would continue monitoring the situation. His comments followed Ban Keun’s opening, the appearance of Chinese-designed aircraft and the disclosure of extensive aviation infrastructure.
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The immediate focus remains the facility’s operational capabilities and the extent of China’s military access. Meanwhile, the air force will coordinate its assessments with the government, Foreign Ministry and relevant security agencies.
The new installation is operational, but its longer-term military role remains undisclosed. China has confirmed joint training and support functions, while permanent combat basing arrangements remain unverified.
Thailand is therefore monitoring the project alongside Beijing’s extensive financial relationship with Laos and military cooperation with Cambodia. For Bangkok, the development adds another issue to an already complicated regional defence relationship with China.
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