Some post-rant diplomacy on Instagram cannot soften the impact of the radioactive words spoken. Lisandro Martinez’s atom bomb after the Champions League defeat to Atletico shredded any semblance of unity and coherence at Manchester United.
Old Trafford is almost three years into the minority ownership of Sir Jim Ratcliffe, which was supposed to change the world. It is 13 years since the last of United’s 20 league titles, and 21 since the Glazer family completed their leveraged takeover, seeding the debt-driven decline of the post-Ferguson era.
There are a multiplicity of factors contributing to United’s decline, exacerbated by the rise of irrational spending by state-owned Manchester City and the now-departed oligarchy at Chelsea.
As Martinez pointed out, responsibility for the mess starts at the top, filtering down by degrees from the owners, through the impoverished executive class and into the dressing room, where managers and players have one way or another made their own contributions. The critique cannot be unsaid, nor unheard.
Joel Glazer
In an increasingly desperate attempt to keep pace, United have repeated critical errors by a leadership lacking industry expertise. The rot started with Ed Woodward, who succeeded David Gill as executive vice chairman in 2013.
United have since been in the hands of financiers, specialists in debt management, policy makers who used the underlying value of the club to fund borrowing. The Glazers put down barely a third of the £800m purchase price in 2005. The rest came from loans paid not by them but by club profits.
A £500m debt has more than doubled since, with Ratcliffe even less concerned about debt levels than the majority owners.
Sir Jim Ratcliffe
Sir Jim’s big “sell” was local boy made good. He arrived as Britain’s richest man, the head of a chemicals and energy conglomerate. He said he was a United fan, though he left Failsworth aged 10 for Hull.
He promised a best-in-class revamp, putting football first. What he has delivered is the same finance-first approach, cutting costs and jobs, maximising ticket prices, and hiring quasi-industry experts from new brand leaders Manchester City to cover his tracks.
Jason Wilcox
Former City chief executive Omar Berrada was the key hire, followed by Jason Wilcox as director of football. Berrada was part of a City leadership subsequently found guilty of financial misconduct, which they deny. Wilcox was appointed from Southampton based on a decade building the City academy, which was also funded by denied malfeasance.
Together Ratcliffe, Berrada and Wilcox have repeated the pattern of misjudged managerial and player signings of earlier regimes, continuing last summer with the failure to address key positions in defence.
Erik ten Hag
The appointment of Erik ten Hag predated Ineos. His retention on the basis of an anomalous FA Cup victory over City was, however, all their own work.
Though Ten Hag finished third in year one, the collapse to eighth in season two exposed his flaws, a fall substantially accelerated by transfer activity that involved his agent brother, Kees Vos.
The success of Casemiro and Martinez was utterly outweighed by the colossal fails of Andre Onana, Manuel Ugarte, Joshua Zirkzee, Tyrell Malacia and to a lesser extent Mason Mount and Rasmus Hojlund.
The leadership allowed the win over City to cloud their judgment. Ten Hag should have gone in May 2024. When reality finally caught up with them five months later it cost United £10m to sack him.
Ruben Amorim
Enter three-at-the-back dogma. Patrick Dorgu aside, Amorim’s issue was not the players he bought, which included Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbuemo and Benjamin Sesko, but his unyielding commitment to a system that was clearly beyond the understanding of his team.
Amorim was Berrada’s big move, a young coach adept at bringing young players through at Sporting CP. What Amorim did not have was experience at a marquee institution. He naively believed he could impose an alien system unproven in the context of big-club dynamics in the Premier League.
He died on that hill, United finally ending a 14-month psychodrama in January of this year.
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Michael Carrick
Carrick is wrong as a consequence of the same failed thinking. Berrada and Wilcox ignored again a lack of experience. They took no account of Carrick’s only prior post at Middlesborough, from which he was sacked after 30 months.
They took no account of the unique circumstances of Carrick’s caretaker bounce-back, a period in which he proceeded free of the scrutiny that comes when your name is on the door. They saw significance in the connection of a former player, fell for the fantasy of United DNA.
Carrick has overseen the worst start to a season for more than a decade. Martinez was kind not to point the finger in his direction. But that does not absolve him. Thus does he take his place in the stocks alongside those who have broken United.