Gadi Eisenkot’s significance lies not only in the possibility that he may become Israel’s next prime minister, but also in the nature of the political alternative he offers. He opposes the full annexation of the West Bank and criticizes settler violence and the policies of the far Right, yet remains opposed to a fully sovereign Palestinian state and insists on overriding Israeli security control. In one interview, he raised the possibility of Palestinian self-government or what he described as a “minus state,” without a Palestinian army and without a large-scale evacuation of existing settlements.
This vision raises a question that goes beyond the differences between Eisenkot and Benjamin Netanyahu: Can Eisenkot offer a political alternative that opens the way to a lasting settlement, or would his proposals simply manage the conflict more efficiently without changing its underlying causes?
Improvements in security and economic management, however necessary, do not guarantee a political settlement unless accompanied by tangible progress on settlements, Palestinian sovereignty, rights, and mutual security. Nevertheless, some of his proposals could open a different political path if translated into clear and implementable commitments.
The real test of Eisenkot’s vision, therefore, is not how moderate his rhetoric appears compared with Netanyahu’s, but whether it can bring about meaningful changes in political, geographic, and economic realities while expanding the options available to Palestinians and Israelis. The issue is not simply how to manage the existing situation more effectively, but whether his policies would address the conditions that perpetuate the conflict or merely make its continuation easier to manage.
Constrained politics: Can Eisenkot change the direction or merely manage the constraints?
On August 27, 2026, Eisenkot argued that implementing the two-state solution after the October 7, 2023 attacks was unrealistic. At the same time, he opposed the settlement project known as E1, which threatens geographic continuity between Palestinian communities. In further statements in September, he reiterated his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state.
These positions illustrate the limits of the political approach he represents. He recognizes the dangers of annexation and uncontrolled settlement expansion, yet does not explain how the possibility of political separation can be preserved without a clear vision for Palestinian sovereignty.
Eisenkot therefore needs to answer a fundamental question: If the two-state solution is currently unacceptable to him, what viable political alternative does he propose? Does he regard existing security arrangements as a transitional phase or as a permanent model for relations with the Palestinians?
Postponing difficult decisions may appear to reduce immediate risks, but it can also narrow future options until a political settlement becomes even harder to achieve.
After the Israeli elections: Will the government change, or will policy change?
A change of government in Israel should not automatically be taken as a change in policy toward the Palestinians. Heightened security concerns since October 7, 2023, may continue to limit prospects for a settlement, even if Israeli leaders differ in their approaches to security, settlements, and relations with the Palestinian Authority.
Findings published by the Jewish People Policy Institute in August 2026 illustrate this political environment. Among Israeli Jewish respondents, 38% selected scenarios involving the annexation of the entire West Bank, while 35% chose scenarios based on partition. Another 22% selected a scenario involving annexation accompanied by the relocation of the Arab population to other countries. These were long-term strategic options presented in a survey, not direct measures of immediate support for annexation or population transfer.
In this context, Eisenkot rejects annexing millions of Palestinians and governing them directly, while also opposing a fully sovereign Palestinian state. His challenge, therefore, is not simply to change the way the conflict is managed, but to clarify whether the self-government he proposes is a transitional arrangement leading toward a settlement or a permanent condition of limited sovereignty. The real test for any future Israeli leadership is whether its policies create new, verifiable political possibilities or simply manage the status quo differently.
Settlements: Where does confronting violence end and addressing the underlying problem begin?
In an interview with The Jerusalem Post on September 24, 2026, Eisenkot pledged to reorganize the Civil Administration and policing in the West Bank under military coordination and restore enforcement measures against settlers who engage in violence. In another interview, he reaffirmed his support for settlements he considers consistent with Israeli law and Israel’s security interests, while rejecting a large-scale evacuation of existing settlements.
Confronting settler violence, however, is not the same as addressing settlement expansion itself. Nor does the classification of settlements under Israeli law determine their legality under international law.
Eisenkot needs to clarify whether he is prepared to halt projects that undermine Palestinian geographic continuity, rather than merely remove outposts that Israel itself considers illegal. A practical measure of his policy would be whether Palestinians can remain in their homes, access their land, and work safely, alongside effective protection of Israeli civilians from attacks.
Protecting civilians is essential for both peoples, but that responsibility does not relieve political leaders of the need to address the conditions that allow violence and control over land to remain enduring features of the conflict.
Palestinian sovereignty: Could a “minus state” become a permanent solution?
Eisenkot wants Palestinians to continue managing their own affairs, but opposes a Palestinian army or foreign military forces between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, while insisting on Israeli security superiority. His approach raises a question that goes beyond political terminology: How much independence can an entity exercise if it lacks ultimate control over its security, borders, and resources?
The Palestinian experience since the Oslo Accords has shown that self-administration does not automatically develop into political sovereignty. Eisenkot therefore needs to specify the powers he would be willing to grant Palestinians, the limits of Israeli intervention, and the guarantees that would prevent a transitional arrangement from becoming permanent.
Without a clear path toward addressing rights and self-determination, his proposed model could become a more orderly means of maintaining control rather than ending it.
The Palestinian Authority: Preserving it for what purpose?
Eisenkot opposes dismantling the Palestinian Authority or replacing it with a direct Jordanian role. He has also made clear that he does not want Israel to govern millions of Palestinians. This distinguishes his approach from those calling for the Authority’s dissolution or a reduction in its role.
But preserving an institution does not necessarily mean empowering it. Does Eisenkot envisage a Palestinian Authority capable of exercising meaningful political and economic powers, or an administrative body whose responsibilities remain limited to public services and security coordination?
At the same time, the Palestinian leadership faces responsibilities that cannot be postponed, including renewing political legitimacy, holding elections, strengthening accountability, and reforming institutions. Yet successful reform also requires political conditions in which Palestinian institutions can exercise their powers.
Eisenkot therefore needs to create room for the Palestinian Authority to develop into a genuine political partner, rather than merely preserve it to avoid an administrative and security vacuum.
The economy: Between work permits and the ability to build a future
Eisenkot advocates improving Palestinian living conditions by allowing certain groups to work in Israel, subject to strict security approvals, while encouraging foreign investment, including investment from Arab countries.
Such measures may provide important income and opportunities, but they do not, on their own, address the structural problems facing the Palestinian economy, including clearance revenues, banking relations, freedom of movement, trade, and access through crossings.
A survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion between June 24 and July 5, 2026, among 503 respondents in the West Bank, including east Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, found that 92.6% reported weakened purchasing power, while 90.7% believed poverty and unemployment had increased.
These findings reflect the economic pressures as perceived by respondents, without independently establishing their causes. They raise an important question for Eisenkot: Is his objective to ease immediate economic hardship, or to enable Palestinians to develop an economy capable of producing, investing, and planning for the future?
Economic stability depends not only on increasing the number of work permits, but also on creating conditions in which businesses and households can make economic decisions with greater stability and independence.
Gaza: The limits of a security-based Solution
In his October 6, 2026 interview, Eisenkot expressed his commitment to advancing US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza, while insisting on the complete disarmament of Hamas before the restoration of civilian governance, the deployment of an international force, and the start of reconstruction.
This approach reflects the priority he gives to security, but it raises questions about whether lasting stability can be achieved if rebuilding institutions and restoring essential services are delayed until all security conditions have been fulfilled.
The long experience since 1967 has demonstrated that military superiority alone has not brought the conflict to an end. Eisenkot needs to present a vision that links security arrangements with civilian governance, reconstruction, and Palestinian participation in determining the future, while preventing the political separation of Gaza from the West Bank from becoming permanent.
Rebuilding homes and infrastructure is a humanitarian necessity, but it cannot be sufficient if Gaza’s political future remains unresolved.
Palestinian public opinion: Is there still an opportunity?
Palestinian public opinion reveals a dimension that may receive insufficient attention in Israel’s security debate. A telephone survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion between July 5 and 18, 2026, among 309 respondents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, found that 92.9% selected non-military means as the most effective way to gain international support for Palestinian rights, compared with 3.2% who chose military action.
The survey also found that 68.9% believed coexistence could be possible if based on justice and equal rights, while 77.7% regarded the lack of trust as an obstacle to peace.
These findings do not indicate support for Eisenkot’s vision or acceptance of a “minus state.” They do, however, suggest a conditional openness that could provide a basis for political progress. Eisenkot needs to recognize that addressing security concerns alone will not build trust if political rights remain without a credible future.
In this context, Prof. Raphael Cohen-Almagor’s 2026 book, Resolving the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, published by Cambridge University Press, offers an important perspective grounded in trust, fairness, political courage, and mutual recognition. The book goes beyond these principles to discuss practical arrangements, beginning with the restoration of civilian and economic cooperation and moving toward a settlement in which the two-state solution remains central.
The comparison is revealing: If an Israeli scholar sees a way to combine security guarantees with a political settlement, the question facing Eisenkot is why overriding Israeli security control should remain an open-ended substitute for resolving Palestinian sovereignty.
Regional normalization: Can peace be achieved without the Palestinians?
Eisenkot sees opportunities to expand regional cooperation through US mediation, strengthen relations with Egypt, Jordan, and countries already participating in normalization agreements, and potentially extend those relationships to additional Arab states. He has acknowledged that these countries seek changes in the West Bank and in Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, while emphasizing that his decisions would be guided by Israeli interests.
This raises a fundamental question: Can Eisenkot use regional cooperation to open a path toward a political settlement, or does his approach aim to strengthen Israel’s regional position without substantially changing its relationship with the Palestinians?
Normalization may create economic, security, and diplomatic opportunities, but it cannot replace the need to address Palestinian rights. Nor are Arab positions identical: Saudi Arabia’s position on Palestinian statehood reflects considerations that differ from Jordan’s more immediate interests in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
Eisenkot needs to clarify whether he is prepared to turn regional cooperation into an incentive to halt settlement expansion, strengthen Palestinian institutions, provide mutual security guarantees, and establish a political process with clearly defined objectives.
Conclusion: The real test of Eisenkot’s vision
Eisenkot should not be treated as identical to Netanyahu. There are differences in their approaches to institutional management, confronting settler violence, relations with the Palestinian Authority, and engagement with the international community. Yet differences in governance do not necessarily translate into differences over the nature of a political solution.
His vision should therefore be assessed through observable outcomes: Will settlement expansion that undermines geographic continuity stop? Will Palestinian powers be expanded? Will the Palestinian economy become more capable of sustaining itself? Will civilian protection become more effective? And will a political process emerge that addresses sovereignty, rights, and mutual security?
Security without a political horizon may develop into a permanent system for managing the conflict, while justice without capable institutions and credible security arrangements may remain a difficult goal to achieve. Nevertheless, some of Eisenkot’s proposals could mark the beginning of a political shift if accompanied by clear, verifiable commitments that move the relationship from managing the conflict toward addressing its causes.
The real test for Eisenkot is not whether he can manage the conflict more efficiently than Netanyahu, but whether he is prepared to make decisions that bring a political settlement within reach. The question is not simply how the existing situation is managed, but whether the proposed policies change the conditions that keep it in place.
Dr. Nabil Kukali is the founder and president of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (PCPO) and a specialist in public opinion research and survey methodology. He has more than three decades of experience in social, political, and economic research and has supervised numerous national and international studies throughout Palestine and the Middle East.