When the Senate returns to session after the midterm elections, it will face sharp debate over a highly contested Fiscal Year 2027 (FY2027) National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The House version passed with a slim margin of 216-212, and included a provision entitled, “United States - Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative,” often referred to simply as “Section 219”; the pending Senate bill contains a related, but not identical provision, entitled “Section 1217: United States-Israel Framework for Upgraded Technologies, Unified Research, and Enhanced Security (FUTURES) Act of 2026”.
In title, the U.S.-Israel FUTURES Act sounds like one of many bilateral cooperative agreements between the U.S. military and a partner military force anywhere in the world. But in reality, as written, the provision would pressure existing security cooperation entities to expand and accelerate bilateral technological integration through a statutory executive agent arrangement that lacks clear precedent even among the U.S.’s closest allies.
The agreement isn’t necessary to advance cooperation. In practice, it puts undue pressure on the processes designed to protect U.S. interests and technology.
The issue discussed here is not if the U.S. should or should not increase its defense technological cooperation with Israel; the pros and cons are well-documented and highly debated elsewhere. What isn’t, or shouldn't be, a matter of debate are the implications of putting undo pressure and influence to short cut established security processes for the benefit of any single partner nation, and that is precisely what Sections 219 and 1217 would do.
The U.S. Department of Defense is already well underway in reforming its technology release and foreign disclosure procedures following Executive Order 14268 of April 2025. Short cuts to these reforms, or additional legislation laying on top of ongoing actions, will only confuse and complicate the process, adding additional vulnerabilities in the end.
So which parts of Section 219 put the system at greatest risk? It starts with directing the secretary of defense to designate an executive agent responsible for synchronizing U.S.- Israel cooperative efforts to expand and accelerate bilateral defense technology research and development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation, with particular focus on counter-unmanned systems, missile and air defense, AI, quantum, autonomous systems, directed energy, cyber defense and electronic warfare, biotechnology and medical defense, network integration, and data fusion. These are some of our most sensitive, and classified, areas of research and development. Additionally, Senate Section 1217 directs the secretary of defense to “consult with” (i.e. formally seeking and considering views or input of) the Israeli minister of defense in establishing the initiative, providing a foreign nation with influence over access to and integration of U.S. sensitive technology.
To break this down a bit more…
- The power of an executive agent within the Department of Defense is significant. DoD Directive 5101.01 gives an executive agent, within the areas of its assigned responsibilities and functions, the authority to take precedence over other DoD component heads with related responsibilities or functions. Heads of Department of Defense (DoD) Components include the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the directors of the defense agencies, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Meaning, the executive agent could create significant institutional pressure over the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) on access to and release of sensitive U.S. technology. DTSA is the primary office within the Department of Defense tasked specifically with protecting sensitive technology from release to foreign entities.
- An executive agent is assigned by the secretary of defense alone, with no separate confirmation process nor congressional oversight over how it exercises its authority. So, if Congress legislates DoD create an executive agent for his initiative, it abdicates more of this congressional oversight authority to the Executive Branch — at a time when the executive branch already acts unilaterally on issues in which it is supposed to inform/consult Congress.
- Once the executive agent pushes the system to embed foreign-original technology or systems in U.S. programs of record (a formally established and funded DoD acquisition program), it becomes fiscally and politically costly to pull those pieces back out. Such a process would require re-competing contracts and re-certifying systems, among other time-intensive tasks. Integration of intellectual property can create long-term dependencies, regardless of future U.S. policy.
- Many of the areas of prescribed integration are highly sensitive, presenting significant counterintelligence risk. Sharing and embedding U.S. cyber, AI, and autonomous system developments with a foreign partner before the U.S. has even fully developed sufficient and adequate regulatory provisions to govern the use of this technology puts the U.S. under an unnecessary influence of a foreign partner. Additionally, if U.S. systems are dependent on foreign technology, that foreign partner gains leverage over the U.S., and at a time when the U.S. needs to be more clear-eyed on its own priorities, not those of other nations.
If such cooperation as outlined above was regular business, perhaps some of the arguments could be debated more reasonably. But, it is not ‘business as usual.’ In fact, Section 219 would legislate a relationship distinct and more powerful than others in existence today, even with the U.S.’s closest allies, like the Five Eye partners and NATO. Section 219 creates a multi-generational technological relationship with one partner that would be very difficult to rollback once incorporated into U.S. development and acquisition systems. It is a pure political maneuver with great risk to the U.S.; it is not necessary and is, in fact, dangerous.
At this point, to protect sensitive U.S. technological development and to ensure congressional oversight is not further abdicated, the House should make clear it won’t vote for an NDAA that comes out of conference if it includes this provision, and the Senate should remove or amend its corresponding Section 1217 from the FY27 NDAA and enter into a separate debate over the issue.