Lebanon stands at a critical crossroads. As the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) approaches its end, Beirut faces a defining choice: continue relying on international peacekeepers to manage an unstable border or seize the opportunity to restore the Lebanese state’s authority over its own territory. After two decades of failed promises, repeated military escalations and devastating destruction, Lebanon can no longer afford to confuse international monitoring with genuine sovereignty.
The debate over UNIFIL’s future is about far more than peacekeepers and border security. It concerns Hezbollah’s independent military power, Iran’s regional ambitions and Lebanon’s ability to determine its own national destiny. Extending an international mission without confronting these underlying problems risks preserving the very conditions that have repeatedly pushed the country toward war.
The fundamental question is simple: how can Lebanon achieve lasting peace while an armed organization retains the power to make decisions about war and peace outside the authority of the state?
Adopted in August 2006 following the war between Israel and Hezbollah, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 sought to end hostilities, strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces and restore the government’s authority throughout southern Lebanon.
The resolution envisaged an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of armed personnel, weapons and military infrastructure except those belonging to the Lebanese government and UNIFIL. Its broader objective was to create conditions for Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah’s disarmament and lasting stability along the border.
Yet the central objectives remain unfulfilled.
Hezbollah has retained substantial military capabilities and infrastructure, while the Lebanese Armed Forces have struggled to establish an exclusive state monopoly over weapons. UNIFIL has monitored developments, reported violations and facilitated communication, but it has not secured the transformation that Resolution 1701 envisioned.
The problem is not simply the limitations of an international mission. It is the absence of a political and security arrangement capable of ensuring that the Lebanese state exercises effective authority over its territory.
Repeated confrontations since 2006, culminating in the major escalation of 2023–2024 and renewed hostilities during 2025–2026, demonstrate the fragility of the existing framework. Each escalation has exposed civilians to displacement and destruction while further weakening Lebanon’s already fragile economy.
If an international arrangement cannot prevent the conditions for another war from re-emerging, its effectiveness must be questioned.
Lebanon and France have supported extending UNIFIL’s mandate, warning that its withdrawal could create a dangerous security vacuum. These concerns are legitimate. Abruptly removing international monitoring could complicate de-escalation efforts and increase the burden on an already overstretched Lebanese army.
However, preventing a vacuum cannot be the only objective. The more important question is whether a successor arrangement will finally help Lebanon establish effective control over the south.
In 2025, the Lebanese government announced a plan to disarm Hezbollah and strengthen the army’s authority. US-backed initiatives have also sought to facilitate greater state control in designated areas. These efforts offer an opportunity, but declarations alone will not restore sovereignty.
The United States and other international partners have provided substantial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Nevertheless, financial support, training and equipment cannot compensate for a lack of political determination.
A national army cannot establish a monopoly on legitimate force if political authorities cannot consistently enforce their decisions against independent armed groups. Lebanon needs a credible strategy with measurable objectives, clear timelines and sustained political support.
UNIFIL’s departure should therefore be managed carefully, but its extension must not become another excuse for postponing difficult decisions.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres has proposed smaller successor arrangements, ranging from approximately 1,980 to 5,525 personnel, to monitor the Blue Line, support de-escalation and assist the Lebanese army.
At least 10 EU countries have reportedly expressed interest in contributing to a future mission focused on supporting Lebanon’s military.
Such international assistance could be valuable. European expertise, logistical support and coordinated training could help strengthen the Lebanese army. However, a smaller force or a differently structured mission will achieve little if it inherits the same political constraints that have limited UNIFIL’s effectiveness.
Any successor mission must have clearly defined responsibilities and benchmarks tied to tangible progress. Its purpose should be to support the Lebanese state in establishing control, not to perpetuate an international presence that merely documents violations.
The international community should also avoid treating Lebanon as a permanent security problem to be managed from abroad. Foreign assistance can support national sovereignty, but it cannot replace it.
The argument over whether Israel should withdraw first or Hezbollah should disarm first often creates a false dilemma.
Resolution 1701 established a framework for ending hostilities and strengthening Lebanese state authority. Earlier, UN Security Council Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
Both resolutions reinforce the principle that Lebanon cannot achieve genuine sovereignty while armed organizations operate independently of its legitimate institutions.
This does not absolve Israel of its obligations. Israeli forces must withdraw from Lebanese territory in accordance with applicable agreements and international law, while attacks that endanger civilians must be addressed. Israel’s military presence cannot become permanent, just as Hezbollah’s weapons cannot be justified indefinitely by invoking the Israeli threat.
A sustainable settlement must combine Israeli withdrawal, the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of Lebanese forces through verifiable arrangements. International monitoring can help ensure compliance, but the Lebanese state must ultimately exercise authority over security decisions.
The objective should be neither an indefinite Israeli military presence nor an entrenched Hezbollah arsenal. It should be a sovereign Lebanon capable of defending its territory through legitimate national institutions.
Hezbollah’s military role also connects Lebanon’s domestic security to Iran’s broader regional ambitions. Its relationship with Tehran has made Lebanon vulnerable to strategic calculations extending far beyond its national interests.
When Hezbollah escalates a confrontation with Israel, the consequences are not confined to the organization. Lebanese civilians, businesses, public institutions and displaced families bear the costs of destruction and instability.
No sovereign state can function normally when an armed organization can independently expose the country to war. Decisions concerning military escalation, ceasefires and diplomacy must belong to the legitimate government.
Disarmament, however, cannot be achieved through military measures alone. Lebanon must address the concerns of communities that regard Hezbollah as a source of protection, strengthen confidence in national institutions and demonstrate that the state can provide security for all citizens.
Political dialogue and national reconciliation are essential. The objective must be to bring every armed group under legitimate state authority while ensuring that no community feels abandoned or deprived of protection.
The approaching end of UNIFIL’s mandate should become a turning point rather than another diplomatic exercise. Lebanon needs a credible transition plan that strengthens the Lebanese Armed Forces, prevents unauthorized military infrastructure from being rebuilt and establishes the government’s authority throughout the country.
A carefully designed successor mission could support this transition, provided that its mandate is clearly linked to measurable progress. International partners should coordinate assistance around concrete objectives and demand accountability for implementation.
The alternative is a familiar cycle: Hezbollah retains its weapons, Israel continues to perceive an enduring threat, foreign forces attempt to contain the consequences, and ordinary Lebanese citizens pay the price.
Lebanon cannot afford another two decades of managed instability. It must reclaim the south, restore the state’s monopoly on legitimate force and prevent any armed organization from dragging the country into a regional conflict without national consent.
The challenge is formidable, but the cost of inaction is greater. UNIFIL’s future should not be measured simply by the number of peacekeepers deployed or the length of its mandate. Success must mean that Lebanon can finally govern and secure its own territory.
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