Before taking office, you told journalists that, as defense minister, you considered it important for the government to formulate an updated threat assessment that would guide all sectors and the entire civil service. How has that gone during your first few weeks in office? Have there been any obstacles?
There have been no obstacles. I can't say that I've formulated it precisely in the government or that it's been put down on paper anywhere, but I have done so at the Ministry of Defense. The assessment is that the threat from Russia will increase dramatically from the moment it stops using its current resources in Ukraine. After that, I would say, the threat to us will increase dramatically.
The Defense Ministry's former secretary general, Kaimo Kuusk, gave an interview to Õhtuleht that was published Saturday. He said that you cited a very different perception of the threat as the reason why it was impossible to continue working with him. Describe the ways in which your perception of the threat differs from that of the ministry's previous senior leadership.
I don't want to turn this into some kind of competition and I wouldn't want to describe anything as impossible. But one example concerning the speed of action is this: If the Russian threat exists and will increase at some point and we don't actually know when that increase will begin — whether it's the day after tomorrow or a year from now — then we should be asking when organizations and institutions providing vital services need to know what threats they would face in wartime and what measures they can take to reduce or mitigate those threats.
Or other similar questions, all related to the threat assessment: When should these things be known? When, for example, should Estonian construction companies have an overview of the obstacles and fortifications that Estonian military personnel need along the eastern border? When should they be informed and what is their role? Or when should everyone in Estonia know what their role would be in wartime?
In my view, they could know that today. They could have known it yesterday. I'm trying to make sure they find out over the course of next year.
Before March, even before the end of this government's term?
Some of it before March, yes, but the effects of certain measures will certainly extend throughout next year.
Can you point to anything else you have done fundamentally differently during your first few weeks in office compared with how the defense sector was previously managed?
I can't really point to anything that's entirely new. It's very important not to dismantle things that have been done well in the past and a great many things have been done well. So I'm not competing to come up with new initiatives.
What I've been examining is Estonia's overall preparedness at sea, against threats from the air and against threats coming overland from the east. I've made some preparations and drawn up plans in these areas and presented them to the Ministry of Defense. The ministry has reviewed them, improved them and made some changes and we'll proceed on the basis of that plan.
This isn't some personal management style of mine. It's simply the Ministry of Defense carrying out its responsibilities in response to the threat environment.
A public opinion monitoring survey commissioned by the Government Office and published in late September shows that the share of Estonian residents concerned about the possibility of war breaking out in Estonia or elsewhere in Europe has increased by three percentage points. Sixty-seven percent of residents are now concerned about this. What should be done about that concern?
That concern isn't necessarily a bad thing. It simply reflects the picture we see when we look east. The problem arises when those people who are worried don't have solutions. The Ministry of Defense is certainly one of the institutions that must explain those solutions and, of course, provide them. That's the most important task.
When people talk about fear of war, both I and psychologists believe that what we're seeing in the media coming out of Ukraine inevitably creates fear. People's imaginations and their knowledge of warfare amplify that fear and then things can get completely out of hand.
The sensible approach is for the state to explain what the threats are and what solutions exist to address them. Research tells us that this should reduce anxiety.
There are actually people who consider you someone who stokes fears of war. Some public figures have expressed that view on social media in response, for example, to the public lectures you gave at the University of Tartu this fall. Among other things, you've shown maps illustrating how far different types of drones launched from across the Russian-Estonian border can fly or how far Russian glide bombs can travel, showing that the city of Tartu, for example, falls within their range. What purpose does publicly visualizing Russia's capabilities on a map of Estonia in such detail serve? Some people believe it fuels fear and that you therefore shouldn't do it. What do you see as its purpose?
Very much the same purpose as the images we see on cigarette packages. They're all unpleasant images, but they're not scaremongering and they're not false.
I've visualized these threats and possible scenarios, thereby explaining to people what a military conflict might look like. The aim isn't simply to make people understand the threat, but also to show what measures can be taken to reduce or mitigate it.
I know that about a year ago, when Ukrainian drones entered our airspace, people in the Tallinn area assumed that the drones capable of reaching Tallinn were small FPV drones. There was even talk of using fishing nets to catch them.
That's wrong, because those types of drones are extremely unlikely to reach us. Instead, what can reach us are large drones measuring two or three meters, which you can't catch with a fishing net.
That's precisely why these threats and their solutions need to be visualized, so people in different regions understand what threats they may face at different times.
I would emphasize that this is purely about education, not scaremongering of any kind.
Have you also received a different kind of feedback on your lectures and visual materials? I'm thinking specifically of people who previously had no connection to the defense sector and have now gained access to this information through your public lectures.
The feedback I've received, to the extent that people have provided it, has been mostly positive.
There has been some criticism that I would describe as politically motivated, but I believe that stems more from whom those people see me as representing — a Reform Party minister in the current government.
That criticism also needs to be taken into account and those people need things explained to them several times as well.
I've had some success on social media, too. We exchange five or six posts and eventually the person says they understand what's going on.
A teacher has to be patient. That's how students become knowledgeable.
At what pace is Estonia's defense capability improving? Are the weapons systems and ammunition purchased with increased defense spending now arriving and to what extent? And to what extent are we actually developing new capabilities?
The overall military picture isn't bad. A great deal of ammunition and military equipment that is very important for our defense will be delivered to Estonia this year, next year and the year after that.
Last year, the Ministry of Defense completed almost 100 percent of its planned procurements. We'll see how things go this year and next.
So the picture is good in that respect. Where we really need to catch up is in society as a whole.
Again, this isn't about frightening people. It's about explaining the threats, preparing to address them and, in part, taking physical measures as we're already seeing along the eastern border, for example.
Will any of the funds allocated in this year's defense budget go unspent and if so, how much? For example, because ammunition cannot be delivered due to the U.S.-Iran conflict or some other reason?
I can't say today. My prediction is that it will be a very small proportion.
At present, there's no indication that any procurements will fail to go ahead because of the U.S.-Iran war or anything else.
All our procurements are proceeding and I don't see any major risks here.
There are some things that will probably be pushed into next year, but they'll be completed next year.
For years, you've advocated the approach that if war breaks out, we shouldn't be chasing arrows but should instead target and hunt down the archer. That's the rationale behind our purchase of HIMARS systems from the United States. However, we haven't received the long-range HIMARS ammunition from the U.S. that would allow us to fire at targets up to 300 kilometers away and hit the archers on Russian territory — those who are firing at us. What are the prospects? When will we receive the long-range ammunition?
The shortage of ATACMS missiles is, of course, very bad. There's no need to make excuses for it. It is bad and I can't say when they'll arrive.
However, we do have the ammunition with a range of 70 kilometers. Everything that was included in our original contract has now arrived in Estonia.
The launchers for the Korean system (K239 Chunmoo — ed.) will arrive next year. Hopefully, the ammunition will also arrive next year, but more likely at the beginning of the following year.
In addition, various types of ammunition with ranges well beyond 50 kilometers, approaching 100 kilometers, will arrive this year and next. That includes both artillery ammunition and loitering munitions, which are large, winged drones.
What does that mean in practical terms? Now that we have ammunition with a range of 70 kilometers, does that mean the Russians can't fire at us from Pskov, Pechory or Ivangorod because they know they'll immediately be destroyed? That they'll have to move farther away?
They can still fire, but we have weapons that pose a threat to them.
War doesn't work in such a way that having a particular weapon solves everything. No, it's much more complicated than that.
But the adversary has to take into account that we can now strike targets as far as 100 kilometers away.
We've also had anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 200 kilometers for quite some time.
A few days ago, the Ukrainians used their Neptune anti-ship missile to destroy Su-34 aircraft at a distance of about 300 kilometers. There's now some debate over whether they destroyed four or six.
So we actually have a weapon of that kind. Of course, it's not the most sensible weapon for destroying aircraft on the ground, but at some point it could prove useful.
Let's suppose Russia's objective isn't to seize a large area of territory but to drive a wedge between NATO allies — a scenario that has been widely discussed. Russia launches what it calls a limited military operation, for example, taking control of Narva in a surprise attack and sending drones against infrastructure targets in Estonia. I am concerned about whether NATO allies and particularly the United States under President Trump would allow Estonia to use long-range HIMARS ammunition to strike targets inside Russia in such a situation. Would the U.S. share the necessary intelligence with us or would it cut off that intelligence and say this is actually just a small conflict and that it won't allow strikes against Russia?
There are several things I want to emphasize here.
First, such a scenario is highly unlikely to unfold before the war in Ukraine comes to some kind of halt. Until then, Russia remains tied down.
Would the United States prohibit us from using certain ammunition? There's nothing like that in the contracts and I haven't seen any indication of it in my current conversations with U.S. military personnel.
Could certain intelligence channels be shut down on Trump's orders? That's difficult to predict today.
Unlike Ukraine, however, we are a NATO member and I don't think it makes sense to panic about that now.
But the fact is that we need to develop the relevant capabilities ourselves anyway and that's what we're doing.
Estonia is currently drafting its next 10-year national defense development plan and as a new defense minister with a fresh perspective, you now have an opportunity to influence its priorities. Which areas need a change in policy compared with the approach taken so far?
In military terms, it's still the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces who leads and develops the armed forces. The defense minister's job is to shape and improve the operating environment and resources.
If we're talking about the defense minister's responsibilities, then first, together with our allies, we need to establish a clear understanding of the Baltic Sea situation, one that the public also understands: We must maintain control of the Baltic Sea's maritime connections at all times.
Those connections must not disappear in a crisis or war and we must ensure that together with our allies.
The second task, which is more domestic in nature, concerns society's preparedness. That requires discussions with other ministries.
Again, the defense minister and ministry officials shouldn't be seen as people coming in to defend the 5 percent defense spending target and talk about war. Instead, there should be a clear explanation of the threats and the Ministry of Defense should also offer concrete solutions.
Third, the minister must certainly do everything possible with landowners, various government agencies and businesses to accelerate construction of the defensive zone.
Whatever we don't build now must be planned, agreed upon and capable of being completed within a sufficiently short period.
I'd like to ask about a few specific areas. Will you proceed with the plan launched under the previous defense minister to purchase four new vessels for the Estonian Navy over four years — two for operations near the coast and two for operations farther offshore?
Under the previous defense minister, that plan had already been changed to a single type of vessel. We're working on it now.
Again, together with our allies, we need to examine what solutions will allow us to maintain control of those sea routes.
But the fact is that the navy needs vessels.
We need vessels, whether crewed or uncrewed, for mine hunting, mine laying, maintaining a presence at sea and carrying out peacetime duties.
Whether that's maritime search and rescue or oil spill response, for example, vessels are definitely needed for those tasks.
Although my background is in the infantry, I also don't see all of these being some kind of 10-meter uncrewed systems.
We definitely need larger vessels as well, several dozen meters long, with crews on board.
The question is what additional military functions they'll perform. That's something we're still working out.
How do you respond to criticism that it might be more cost-effective to invest in maritime drones and coastal defense systems and purchase a large number of small, fast boats that would be harder for the enemy to neutralize in a conflict than, say, four ships?
It's very difficult to conduct mine hunting along sea routes — in plain language, several dozen kilometers from the coast — using a small, fast boat.
If we want to lay naval mines, we need to do it quickly, which means the vessel must be able to carry a large number of mines. By a large number, I mean 20 or more.
You can't do that with a small, fast boat either.
Small, fast boats aren't suitable for oil spill response.
And if we want to maintain a presence at sea and, when necessary, deploy a team from a vessel to board a suspicious ship, a very small boat isn't suitable for that either.
So we can't carry out our missions at sea if all we have are, for example, 12-meter vessels or boats. It's simply not possible.
As for shore-based sensors and effectors — missiles and other uncrewed systems, for example — that's all absolutely right. Of course we need to develop those capabilities.
But none of that eliminates the need for certain types of vessels.
If someone thinks that's sheer stupidity, then all the countries around the Baltic Sea must be complete fools because they're building ships too.
What changes do you envision in Estonia's approach to drone warfare specifically?
The Defense Forces is actually moving in the right direction.
What we probably need to explain to society as well is that we shouldn't talk about "drone warfare." Drones perform specific functions within combat operations.
Drones can replace certain reconnaissance equipment and sensors and gather information.
Drones can take on some of the roles of artillery, mortars and anti-tank weapons. But they don't replace those systems entirely; they supplement them.
Drones can carry out transportation tasks and they also have a role in air defense.
So we should look at drones in terms of the functions they perform, rather than simply saying we need drones.
That's exactly the direction the Defense Forces are moving in, step by step: conducting experiments, learning from Ukraine and making procurements.
Do we need to make any major changes? More in our understanding of what we need drones for.
The term "drone" covers a very broad range of systems, from an aircraft with a wingspan of three or four meters that can fly 1,000 kilometers to a drone that flies just 10 kilometers to conduct reconnaissance.
Those are very different things.
As I understand it, people's concern right now is more about the scenarios you've described: If hundreds or thousands of these drones suddenly started coming toward us, would we have the capability to shoot them down or not?
In some areas, our counter-drone capability is quite similar to what Ukraine had a year ago.
If we look at our air defense weapons — whether shoulder-fired missiles, heavy machine guns or anti-aircraft guns — we already have all of those.
In Ukraine, 12.7-millimeter machine guns are being used effectively today.
Whether they're remotely operated with computer assistance or simply mounted in the back of a truck is a separate question.
We have all of those weapons.
Many of them still need to be adapted and we need to practice using them, but hopefully we'll have time to do that.
So we're not completely defenseless.
And finally, as recently as 2023, people in both Ukraine and Estonia were saying that electronic warfare systems were needed to counter small drones and that nothing else would work.
Today, drones are being shot out of the sky in Ukraine with small arms.
Our conscripts have been practicing shooting drones out of the sky with their own Rahe assault rifles for two years now, if I'm not mistaken.
So the situation isn't quite as bad as it might seem, but we still have a great deal to develop.
Is it even possible to defend Narva against a drone attack or will the state simply announce that it isn't? That if it becomes clear things are going badly and war is approaching, those who want to save themselves in Narva will have to evacuate?
Narva is very similar to Kherson where people talk about a "human safari" in which drones hunt people. And they really do hunt people!
But tens of thousands of people still live there.
It's dangerous, but the city remains under Ukrainian control and ordinary civilian life continues there as well.
I've driven through the city myself, although faster than usual and choosing my routes carefully, but no drone attacked me, for example.
I believe Narva can be defended in much the same way as Kherson.
In interviews with privately owned media outlets, you've spoken about the need to improve air defense, a mobile application for the public and the possible acquisition of small fighter jets, such as the Czech L-39, of which Estonia already has two as training aircraft. Could you explain to the public broadcaster what problem we would solve by acquiring these fighter jets?
First, the air raid warning system.
We need to bring our nationwide air raid warning system up to the level that exists in Ukraine.
Otherwise, to put it simply, if we declare an air raid alert across northern Estonia during wartime, production accounting for 75 percent of GDP would simply grind to a halt.
And if Russia starts playing games with us by triggering such alerts before a war, we'll go bankrupt pretty quickly.
That's why we need a system that allows businesses to decide for themselves whether a particular threat is actually heading in their direction.
As for the L-39 or other light jet fighters, aircraft of this kind are currently destroying more than half of the long-range drones and jet-powered drones flying in Ukrainian airspace.
And this appears to be the most cost-effective approach.
When I talk about fighter jets, I don't mean F-35s or F-16s. I mean the jet aircraft we already operate today, which we could probably arm and use against those same drones.
At present, ours aren't armed.
How much would a modernized version of an aircraft such as the L-39 cost, equipped with radar and weapons suitable for engaging aerial targets? How many would we need, where would we find the necessary pilots and how quickly could we theoretically acquire such a capability?
I really can't say at the moment.
As for pilot training, in terms of simply flying the aircraft, we could get quite a few planes into the air immediately. We have the pilots.
But it's all much more complicated than that.
The aircraft would need to be integrated with ground-based air defense.
That means assigning aircraft their own areas of operation and ground-based air defense systems their own areas, so they don't end up engaging one another.
What tactics the aircraft would use, how they would be directed from the ground against these drones and at what altitudes they would operate — all of that requires separate training and planning, as well as the development of operational concepts.
That will take time.
At the same time, I don't think this is something we couldn't accomplish within the next four years, either in terms of time or financial resources.
Are we talking about something on the order of five aircraft or 50?
If the choice is between five and 50, then closer to five.
And the price of an aircraft is around €20 million, I believe?
I really can't tell you the price of an aircraft today.
But modern air defense systems are also quite expensive. The cost of shoulder-fired missiles — just the missiles themselves — has already risen to several hundred thousand euros each.
So the ammunition used by those aircraft would undoubtedly be cheaper.
Will the updated 10-year national defense development plan provide an answer to that question?
The updated development plan was actually submitted to the Government Office back in the spring and I can't say when it will receive approval at the national level this fall. That's beyond my control.
It's been the work of the Defense Forces.
The commander of the Defense Forces has made additional proposals, including these same light fighter jets.
We'll review those carefully.
And I see no reason why, even if the 10-year development plan is approved, we shouldn't make changes to it as the threats from Russia evolve, technology develops and our understanding of how to use that technology changes.
The 10-year development plan is more about showing us what resources we have available, how much we'll need to spend maintaining equipment and capabilities we've already acquired and developed, how much we can devote to developing new capabilities and how we can maneuver within those limits without locking ourselves into particular choices.
There's also an ongoing debate about developing one or more ballistic missile defense bubbles. Figures of €1 billion or even €2 billion have been mentioned, but in reality, such a bubble would protect only a very small part of Estonia's territory, just a few percent. Is that a sensible investment or could we achieve better results by spending that money on other defense capabilities? Will the development plan answer that question?
At present, the development plan's answer is that we'll begin developing that capability.
But you're right. For that kind of money, we'd be able to protect Tallinn, Paldiski and Tartu against ballistic missiles. That's it.
And the protected areas would be roughly the size of those cities.
When Ukraine was facing large numbers of ballistic missiles, it intercepted around 30 percent of them.
If I apply that picture to Estonia, then even after acquiring such a defensive capability — a ballistic missile defense system — we would still be unable to protect 80 percent of Estonia's airspace.
And the fact is that ballistic missiles wouldn't be fired only at Tallinn.
There's a very strong political and public expectation for this capability, but I think a somewhat mistaken impression has developed that if we have a long-range air defense system whose missiles can hit targets 120 kilometers away, then a couple of launchers will cover all of Estonia.
That's true when we're talking about air defense against aircraft and helicopters.
Against ballistic missiles, those coverage circles become very, very small.
What developments are planned for the Baltic Defense Line? Could you explain what changes are expected, for example, in Setomaa Municipality near the Estonian-Russian control line, beyond the anti-vehicle ditches that have already been dug there on local initiative?
First, we need to continue developing what the Defense Forces want to do and what the state and the Setomaa Union have already done.
Second, we need to give businesses a clear understanding of what's expected of them.
To do that, we need to build some examples, some demonstration sections, whether they're dug-in positions, obstacles or drone protection in the form of so-called net tunnels.
We need to do this to understand how to build them, what resources they require and how well they withstand the weather and different seasons.
So we might see a trial section of anti-drone netting installed over a road somewhere in Setomaa?
The current plan is to build such a trial section in both northeastern and southeastern Estonia.
And finally, a political question. Martin Herem, when will you decide whether to join the Reform Party and whether to run in the March elections? There have already been hints after all. You appear in one of the Reform Party's campaign videos.
Yes, I had absolutely no objection to appearing in a Reform Party advertisement, supporting the Reform Party and, at the same time, using the Reform Party as a platform for developing national defense.
Unlike the others, I appeared in the video wearing a green shirt.
But as for whether I'll be on the party's candidate list, I'll leave that question open for now, following the example of other politicians who aren't in a hurry to make such decisions or at least to announce them.
How much time do you have to make that decision?
I have exactly until the candidate lists are finalized.
And when will that happen, as far as you know?
I don't know off the top of my head right now. But I have time.
--