Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Uzbekistan on October 17–18, just ahead of United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who arrived in Samarkand on October 18 with a delegation of American business leaders seeking new contracts.
While China already has a substantial presence in Uzbek manufacturing and energy, Washington is seeking to expand American involvement in critical minerals and technology. The visits highlight the growing competition between the world’s two largest economies for influence in Central Asia.
On October 17, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Li Qiang. According to the Uzbek presidential administration, the portfolio of joint projects backed by firm agreements has reached nearly $60 billion. More than 6,000 joint ventures with Chinese participation have been established in Uzbekistan.
China is Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner. Bilateral trade totaled approximately $16–18 billion in 2025, according to Chinese and Uzbek figures. China accounted for 23% of Uzbekistan’s total foreign trade turnover in January–August 2026.
Railway Through Kyrgyzstan
Construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway was another topic of discussion. Work officially began in December 2024.
The route will cross mountainous areas of Kyrgyzstan and connect the railway networks of China and Uzbekistan. The 304-kilometer section through Kyrgyzstan alone is estimated to cost $4.7 billion and will require 50 bridges and 29 tunnels.
Uzbekistan is landlocked, making the cost and timing of its international freight shipments heavily dependent on transit conditions in neighboring countries. The railway through Kyrgyzstan will provide an additional route, reducing reliance on transit through Kazakhstan and potentially shortening journeys between China and Uzbekistan.
Beijing considers the railway part of its efforts to develop overland connections under the Belt and Road Initiative.
Rubio Arrives with American Business Delegation
On October 19, Rubio attended talks in Samarkand under the C5+1 format, bringing together the U.S. and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented in Samarkand. Companies were discussing agreements potentially worth billions of dollars, with concrete announcements expected following the meetings.
Among Washington’s priorities are critical minerals used in advanced technologies, including electronics and batteries.
The U.S. is seeking new sources of raw materials and opportunities to process them outside China. Beijing holds a dominant position in processing several of these materials, and American companies are interested in alternative suppliers.
Uzbekistan’s mineral deposits include copper and uranium. For Tashkent, an important question is whether American investment will bring new processing facilities and jobs or concentrate mainly on extracting and exporting raw materials.
Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said the U.S. was not asking Central Asian countries to end cooperation with other partners. Washington intends to compete for contracts and investment projects.
Chinese Enterprises and American Contracts
The gap between China and the U.S. is particularly stark in trade. According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, American goods trade with Uzbekistan totaled just $1.05 billion in 2025, less than one-fifteenth of the value of Uzbekistan’s trade with China. Including services, U.S.–Uzbek trade reached approximately $1.7 billion.
Economic cooperation with the U.S. is developing through major investment projects, equipment supplies, financing, and technological partnerships.
In November 2025, during the C5+1 summit in Washington, Uzbekistan and the U.S. announced commercial agreements and contracts worth approximately $34.5 billion. President Donald Trump also spoke of planned Uzbek purchases and investments in the U.S. exceeding $100 billion over ten years.
Those announcements suggest considerable ambitions, but the trade figures show how far Washington remains behind Beijing.
Uzbekistan has long sought to maintain economic relationships with Western countries alongside its ties to China and Russia. Greater American investment would give Tashkent more options, but China’s commanding share of Uzbek trade illustrates how difficult it would be to reduce its dependence on Beijing.
Moreover, American and Chinese interests increasingly clash in sectors such as critical minerals and advanced technology. Washington wants to reduce its dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains, while Beijing is expanding its own manufacturing and technological presence in Uzbekistan. Tashkent may welcome investment from both sides, but their competing priorities could complicate its efforts to work with them simultaneously.
Li Qiang’s visit demonstrated the depth of China’s existing economic ties with Uzbekistan. Rubio’s challenge is to turn Washington’s promises of investment into a commercial presence capable of narrowing the gap.