The ratification of the disputed Turkey-Libya maritime memorandum by Eastern Libya’s House of Representatives is creating new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and raising questions about the extent of Athens’ influence in Benghazi.
The development, which was not entirely unexpected, also highlights Turkey’s successful strategy of rapprochement with the regime of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Ankara is capitalizing on both its economic and diplomatic reach across the wider region and its traditional ties with the vast North African country, rooted in their shared Ottoman past.
The ratification of the November 2019 agreement — which caught the Greek government by surprise at the time — does not produce legally valid international consequences for the delimitation of maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. The memorandum runs counter to fundamental provisions of the Law of the Sea and has been condemned by all other parties involved in the region.
Athens has therefore rejected the decision by Eastern Libya’s House of Representatives, maintaining that the memorandum’s illegal, invalid and legally baseless character remains unchanged. Greece also says the agreement contravenes “the international Law of the Sea and infringes upon the sovereign rights of states in the region.”
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The Greek Foreign Ministry has reiterated that Turkey and Libya do not share a maritime boundary and that there is therefore no lawful basis for delimiting maritime zones between them. As Athens has repeatedly argued, the Turkey-Libya memorandum disregards “the Greek islands and their rights to maritime zones under UNCLOS and customary international law.”
Turkey’s Growing Foothold in Eastern Libya
Nevertheless, the decision by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives confirms that Ankara now has a strong foothold in Eastern Libya, particularly within the circle of Saddam Haftar, one of Khalifa Haftar’s sons.
It also shows that, after bringing Tripoli’s transitional government increasingly within its orbit, Turkish diplomacy is now focused on expanding its presence throughout Libya. Benghazi, for its part, appears relatively unconcerned with questions over the memorandum’s legality and has instead made a highly visible choice to embrace Turkey as a strategic partner in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Over the past three years, Ankara has pursued closer ties with Eastern Libya in several ways. A major opening came when Turkey sent substantial humanitarian assistance after Storm Daniel devastated the region, particularly the city of Derna.
At the same time, growing amounts of Turkish capital were invested around the Benghazi authorities, while significant agreements were signed in trade, infrastructure and defense. The two sides have even conducted joint military exercises. Pakistan, a close Turkish defense partner, also appears to play a distinct role in this military cooperation.
The most significant development in relations between Ankara and Benghazi, however, is that the principal source of their former rivalry has gradually diminished: Turkey’s support for the transitional government in Tripoli.
During Libya’s civil war, Turkish forces prevented Haftar’s forces from entering Tripoli. Today, despite calls from the international community for their withdrawal, Turkish troops remain stationed in Libya.
Turkey has simultaneously worked at the diplomatic level to bridge differences between the country’s western and eastern authorities. Regardless of how successful that initiative, known as “One Libya,” has ultimately been, Ankara has benefited by building effective networks close to Libya’s centers of decision-making.
Today, Saddam Haftar, who is being positioned as a potential successor to his father and possibly as a presidential candidate should free elections eventually be held, appears to be giving absolute priority to close cooperation between Eastern Libya and Turkey.
EU Reacts as Cairo’s Response Is Awaited
That shift has come despite a strong response not only from Greece but also from the European Union.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa stressed that “the memorandum violates the sovereign rights of third countries, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and is invalid,” while reaffirming their solidarity with Greece and Cyprus.
Cairo’s response is also being closely watched. Benghazi maintains important ties with both the EU and Egypt in migration, trade and economic cooperation.
Setting the stage for the intensive diplomatic maneuvering expected to follow, Athens has already briefed its partners and allies across the wider region. At the same time, it is calling on Eastern Libya — and, through it, Turkey — to refrain from actions that undermine stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Greece-Cyprus Cable and Energy Exploration
Benghazi’s recognition of the 2019 agreement comes just weeks before work is due to begin on the Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection cable.
Part of the project crosses waters claimed under the Turkey-Libya memorandum, particularly south of the Greek island of Kasos, where a French research vessel is expected to begin operations first.
Parts of the designated offshore blocks south of Crete where U.S. energy company Chevron is expected to operate also lie within the boundaries claimed under the disputed pact.
It should be noted, however, that in declaring its own offshore blocks, Libya has followed the median-line principle established by Greece in 2011 under the so-called Maniatis Law. In practice, that approach contradicts the logic of the Turkey-Libya memorandum.
It remains unclear whether technical-level talks between Athens and Tripoli on delimiting maritime zones will continue.
The Turkey-Libya memorandum dominates those negotiations, with Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, head of the Tripoli-based transitional government, having told the Greek side that the agreement is part of Libyan law and will not be taken off the table.
It is reasonable to expect that this will now also become Benghazi’s position, with the memorandum serving as Libya’s guide on the crucial issue of maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Athens is considered certain to take the necessary steps before international organizations, including the United Nations, to safeguard Greece’s sovereign rights. Meanwhile, discussion within Greece is gaining momentum over a possible extension of the country’s territorial waters south of Crete to 12 nautical miles.
Shifting Balance in the Tobruk Parliament
The shift in Eastern Libya’s internal balance in Turkey’s favor was capped by the recent removal of Aguila Saleh as speaker of the House of Representatives.
His replacement, Al-Salhin Abdel Nabi, is regarded as a close interlocutor of Ankara and previously headed the parliament’s friendship committee with Turkey.
Saleh had maintained effective channels of communication with Athens. He visited the Greek capital again last December, meeting, among others, Greek Parliament Speaker Nikitas Kaklamanis. He had also periodically emerged as a bulwark against the possible ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum despite intense Turkish pressure.
The former parliamentary speaker was also in constant communication with Cairo, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s government has supported Haftar in a variety of ways.
Egypt itself protested at the United Nations in December 2023 after Libya declared a 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone that Cairo said infringed on Egypt’s continental shelf along their western maritime boundary.
Greece, Egypt and Legal Maritime Delimitation
Beyond their close, multifaceted cooperation, Greece and Egypt are linked by their August 2020 agreement on the partial delimitation of an Exclusive Economic Zone.
That agreement intersects with the disputed Turkey-Libya memorandum and is based on the fundamental principles of the Law of the Sea, serving as an example of bilateral maritime delimitation.
Beyond Greece and Egypt, legal delimitation agreements in the Eastern Mediterranean have also been concluded between Cyprus and Egypt, Cyprus and Israel, and Israel and Lebanon.
All are based on international law, in stark contrast, according to the article, with what it describes as the coercive approach Ankara is seeking to impose in the Eastern Mediterranean, now with both Tripoli and Benghazi under significant Turkish influence.
The Limits of Greek Diplomacy in Libya
The developments nevertheless raise questions about the strategy Greece has pursued in Libya, an arena that has proved to be shifting ground for Greek diplomacy.
By general admission, Athens has neither the economic and investment resources, the defense capabilities nor the necessary network of influence on Libyan territory to compete with Turkey’s presence.
For that reason, Greece has pursued a softer diplomatic approach in recent years, engaging with both sides of Libya’s political divide while seeking to strengthen bilateral relations in trade, infrastructure, economic and business cooperation, investment and migration, as well as in more specialized areas such as training Libyan Coast Guard personnel.
As part of that approach, Greece reopened its consulate in Benghazi.
Athens, however, took several steps backward following the failed and poorly planned humanitarian aid mission to Derna in the fall of 2023, when five members of the Greek Armed Forces were killed in a road accident.
What the latest developments unfortunately demonstrate is that the limits of Greek influence in post-civil-war Libya are finite. Neither Greece’s role as a gateway to the European Union nor its ability to serve as a channel for European funding has proved sufficient to counterbalance Turkey.
Migration and the Role of the United States
On the other hand, Eastern Libya’s authorities now appear to feel strong enough to risk significantly damaging their relations with both the European Union and Egypt.
In dealing with Europeans — particularly Greece and Italy — Benghazi retains the powerful card of using migration as leverage.
Whether coincidental or not, migration flows from Libya’s eastern coast toward Crete have increased in recent weeks.
The episode in the summer of 2025 also remains fresh, when a European delegation — consisting of the relevant EU commissioner and three European ministers — was effectively expelled from Benghazi after Haftar’s authorities concluded that they had not been accorded the international recognition they believed they deserved.
The position taken by Massad Boulos, U.S. President Donald Trump’s adviser on North Africa and Arab affairs, will also be watched with particular interest — both regarding Turkey’s broader presence in eastern Libya and specifically over the ratification of the memorandum.
Boulos has been working toward Libya’s reunification and remains in constant contact with the region’s major players.
Finally, Benghazi’s ratification of the Turkey-Libya memorandum has prompted sharply contrasting reactions on the two sides of the Aegean. In Greece, the opposition is attacking the government’s handling of the issue. In Ankara, officials are celebrating and preparing to mark the disputed agreement together with the Libyans.