Viviane Morales is returning to Colombia’s government as presidential peace commissioner, with President Abelardo de la Espriella assigning her to review the country’s peace policies and dismantle what his administration calls the “false peace” promoted by former President Gustavo Petro. Her responsibilities include examining compliance with peace commitments, reviewing public spending and identifying institutional failures affecting justice, victims’ reparations and security.
Presidente Abelardo De La Espriella designa a Viviane Morales como Consejera Comisionada de Paz para liderar la revisión y el desmonte total de la falsa paz. https://t.co/BS2geAUtmb
— Presidencia Colombia(@infopresidencia) October 23, 2026
Announced on Oct. 23, Morales’ appointment also places her temporarily in charge of the Unit for Implementation of the Peace Agreement, which coordinates the government’s commitments under the 2016 accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The government has signaled plans to restructure the unit, making its future one of the main questions surrounding her return.
The appointment follows the termination of peace negotiations inherited from Petro’s government. Congress is considering separate proposals to alter the legal framework for talks and restrict the mandate of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP). These initiatives address different parts of Colombia’s peace architecture and could have consequences beyond the government’s immediate security strategy.
From education minister to peace commissioner
Morales joined De la Espriella’s cabinet on Aug. 7, 2026, as education minister. She resigned at the end of August, citing a family situation that required her attention. Reports attributed her departure to her daughter’s health.
Her return comes less than two months later, as the government moves from ending Petro-era negotiations to reviewing the policies and institutions associated with them.
On Aug. 30, De la Espriella announced the termination of three dialogue processes involving structures linked to alias Calarca, the Coordinadora Nacional Ejercito Bolivariano, and the Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada.
On Sept. 11, the Presidency announced a broader decision to end inherited dialogue processes and socio-legal engagement mechanisms that had failed to produce concrete progress toward peace, disarmament or submission to justice. The affected processes included negotiations involving the National Liberation Army (ELN), FARC dissident structures and Comuneros del Sur, as well as discussions with criminal organizations in Medellin and the Aburra Valley, Quibdo, and Buenaventura.
According to the Presidency, the previous administration spent more than 7 billion Colombian pesos (about US$2.2 million) on fees for representatives, spokespeople and negotiators alone.
What changes under De la Espriella?
Enacted under Law 2272 of 2022, Petro’s Total Peace strategy sought to negotiate with multiple armed groups simultaneously. It combined political negotiations with insurgent groups and socio-legal engagement with criminal organizations that might agree to surrender weapons or submit to justice.
The approach faced setbacks, including renewed violence during negotiations with ELN and divisions among FARC dissidents. According to De la Espriella, the process allowed armed organizations to gain political status and legal advantages without offering adequate concessions in return. His government has ended the inherited talks and emphasized law enforcement against groups that continue criminal activities.
A separate legislative initiative could restrict the legal basis for future negotiations. House bill, introduced by Representative Simon Molina Gomez, proposes amending or repealing provisions of Law 2272 that allow certain judicial measures to be suspended during negotiations with criminal organizations. The bill seeks stronger safeguards before authorities grant such benefits, but it remains subject to congressional approval.
The 2016 peace agreement remains in force
Ending Petro’s negotiations does not terminate the 2016 agreement with FARC. That accord established commitments on rural reform, political participation, illicit crops, victims’ rights, transitional justice, and the reintegration of former combatants.
The Unit for Implementation of the Peace Agreement coordinates government efforts to meet those commitments. Morales’ temporary leadership puts her at the center of a review that will examine compliance, public spending, and institutional shortcomings affecting justice, reparations, and security.
The government has also signaled plans to restructure the unit, potentially transferring its responsibilities to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace. That change could reshuffle how implementation is managed and tracked, but it does not, on its own, eliminate the agreement’s binding obligations.
The review will need to clarify which institutional arrangements the government intends to change and how it plans to fulfill outstanding commitments. Victims, former combatants, and communities awaiting rural development and security guarantees remain directly affected by implementation.
Senator Gomez’s proposal targets JEP
Senator Enrique Gomez Martinez has introduced a separate constitutional amendment that would set a fixed deadline for the JEP. The proposal would make March 2028 the tribunal’s final deadline, with no extension.
Created under the 2016 agreement, the JEP investigates and adjudicates serious crimes committed during Colombia’s armed conflict. It can impose restorative sanctions designed to contribute to victims’ rights and reparations, rather than relying exclusively on conventional prison sentences.
Gomez argues that the tribunal should remain temporary and that its results must justify the resources it receives. He estimates that extending its operation for another five years would cost about 6.2 trillion Colombian pesos between 2027 and 2033. This is the senator’s estimate supporting his proposal, not an independently established forecast of the tribunal’s total future costs.
Under the proposal, unfinished investigations and proceedings would pass to the Attorney General’s Office and ordinary courts after the deadline, subject to safeguards for procedural rights. The amendment has not become law and would require approval through the constitutional amendment process.
The proposal and the bill to amend Law 2272 address separate questions: the duration of a transitional justice institution and the legal conditions for negotiating with armed organizations. Both could change elements of the framework established around Colombia’s peace process.
Security and justice will determine the outcome
Ending negotiations could increase pressure on armed groups through arrests, military operations, and criminal prosecution. But it does not guarantee improved security. Groups could intensify attacks, compete for territory, or increase coercion against civilians. The government will need to show that its approach produces lasting improvements in affected communities.
Institutional changes also carry consequences. Restructuring the implementation unit could complicate coordination of the 2016 agreement, while transferring unfinished JEP cases without adequate resources could delay justice and reparations. Future reforms must honor legal obligations and preserve procedural rights.
Morales’ review will help establish how the government intends to reorganize peace-related institutions and measure progress under its revised policy. Congressional decisions on the proposed reforms will determine how far the administration can translate its agenda into lasting legal changes.