LSU’s Defensive Breakdowns Are More Troubling Than the Scoreboard Suggests

LSU had an adjustment for Kentucky’s empty formation. The problem was getting its defenders to execute the same one.

On the winning two-point conversion in Kentucky’s 35-34 overtime victory, Kenny Minchey took the shotgun snap and ran through the middle. Lane Kiffin later explained that the defensive rush was supposed to change when Kentucky emptied the backfield.

“Someone got the call, and one didn’t get the call,” Kiffin said.

Bigger Things at Heart

That explanation is more concerning than simply losing a matchup. LSU anticipated the possibility of a two-point attempt. According to Kiffin, it also had an adjustment designed to account for the quarterback running vertically.

The defense still reached the decisive snap without everyone operating under the same instructions.

A call offers no protection when only part of the defense receives it. One defender’s rush affects the space another must cover. When those responsibilities stop matching, the offense gets an opening without having to beat every defender.

Kiffin previusly stated that Whit Weeks was wearing the "Green Dot" or the helmet with coach-to-player communication devices in it, but that in his absence, it was not a set in stone thing who would be wearing it.

Kentucky found costly openings long before overtime.

On its first offensive play, CJ Baxter ran 77 yards through the middle before PJ Woodland narrowly brought him down at the LSU 3. Baxter scored on the next snap.

Run defense requires each player to account for his assigned gap. A defender who leaves his gap can compromise teammates who are handling theirs. Pursuit becomes damage control once the runner reaches the secondary.

Baxter’s opening run forced LSU to defend its goal line after one snap. The cost of the breakdown was an entire possession’s worth of field position.

Tackling created another expensive failure early in the second quarter. Brock Coffman returned a punt 55 yards for a touchdown, although there was a missed block in the back penalty, to put Kentucky ahead 14-10.

In Kiffin’s postgame assessment, he specifically pointed to an LSU player being in position to tackle the returner but failing to finish.

That touchdown belongs to punt coverage rather than the defensive unit. It still supplies a clear example of the tackling problem: reaching the ball carrier does not complete the job. The tackler must arrive under control, secure the runner and finish through contact. Position alone produces nothing if the runner escapes.

Kiffin’s broader assessment was direct.

“If you don’t do fundamentally sound stuff, you get exposed versus good teams,” he said.

LSU also produced defensive stops. Deuce Geralds broke up a fourth-down pass at the LSU 17 in the third quarter, ending a Kentucky possession after an interception had given the Wildcats a short field. Those successful snaps deserve consideration.

They also show why isolated failures require attention: LSU could execute a difficult stop and still surrender a decisive opening elsewhere.

Coaching accountability remains part of that discussion. Installing an adjustment is only the beginning.

Coaches must establish how it gets communicated, how players confirm it and whether everyone can execute it before the snap. Kiffin’s explanation of the final play describes a failure in that process.

Kentucky exposed three concrete problems: an unaccounted-for gap, an unfinished tackle and an adjustment that failed to reach everyone. Each gave the Wildcats yards or points LSU had a chance to prevent.

The next measure of defensive improvement should start there. Hold the assigned gap. Finish the tackle. Confirm the adjustment. LSU’s best plays cannot compensate reliably for leaving those jobs unfinished.

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