Recently, Baodian Times, a Chinese-language media outlet based in Europe, exclusively exposed what it described as the largest government information-technology project in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): the "Anke Replacement Project," into which the CCP has poured trillions of yuan.
Its total investment reportedly exceeds even that of the Three Gorges Dam.
What exactly is this project? What implications does it have for the rest of the world? And why is the CCP willing to spend such an enormous sum on it?
A Systemic National Security Undertaking
The so-called "Anke Replacement Project" is intended to replace foreign technologies and products with domestically produced Chinese alternatives across virtually the entire technology stack—from chips and operating systems to databases, terminal devices, and infrastructure—in order to achieve what the CCP calls genuine "security and reliability."
"Anke (安可)" is an abbreviation for the Chinese words meaning "secure (安全)" and "reliable (可靠)."
According to a batch of cross-verifiable classified Chinese government documents obtained by Biaodian Times, "a national-level domestic substitution project covering Chinese Party and government agencies, radio and television, healthcare, education, centrally administered state-owned enterprises, and critical information infrastructure has been underway for many years.
"Internally, the project has been referred to as the 'Anke Replacement Project,' 'Deepening the Application of Secure and Reliable Technologies,' or 'Domestic Goods for Domestic Use.' It is neither a chip project nor an ordinary information-technology upgrade.
Rather, it is a systemic national security undertaking intended to reconstruct China's e-government and critical-industry information-technology systems, as well as the facilities used in government workplaces.
"Its objective is to gradually replace foreign products and technologies with domestically produced alternatives in virtually every area within Party and government institutions—from chips, servers, PC terminals, switches, audiovisual surveillance equipment, storage devices, printers, government vehicles, air-conditioning systems in government offices, and large-scale lighting systems, to databases, server operating systems, artificial-intelligence computing chips, and other hardware and software systems.
"The scale and scope of this replacement effort are unprecedented anywhere in the world."
From E-Government to the Military, Police, Hospitals, and Schools
Biaodian Times further reported that the "Anke Replacement Project" initially focused primarily on the e-government systems of Party and government agencies.
It was later expanded to the military, public security authorities, state security agencies, drug regulators, meteorological agencies, and other audiovisual and data-monitoring systems, before gradually extending into radio and television, healthcare, education, state-owned enterprises, and numerous other sectors.
Because its coverage is extraordinarily broad, involving enormous quantities of hardware and software—as well as the entire chain of preliminary research and development, product evaluation, dedicated supply guarantees, government procurement, system adaptation, equipment replacement, and subsequent security maintenance—the project's long-term investment may reach several trillion yuan.
So far, domestic chips certified under the project include nine Chinese AI chips made by seven companies: Huawei HiSilicon's Ascend 310 and Ascend 910; Alibaba T-Head's Zhenwu M530 and Zhenwu M890; Biren Technology's Bili 166; Hygon Information Technology's DCU-3G; Iluvatar CoreX's KCC-V100X; MetaX's MXC600; and Moore Threads' PH100.
The project is currently coordinated by the "Central Leading Group for the Promotion of Secure and Reliable Applications." This group has close ties to the CCP Central Committee's General Office, and its work overlaps with systems involved in the construction of China's national e-government internal network.
A Vast Bureaucratic Network—and a Highly Secretive Project
At the implementation level, numerous government and Party bodies are involved, including the CCP Central Committee's General Office, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, the National Administration of State Secrets Protection, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, and the State Administration for Market Regulation.
Together, they form a vast implementation network spanning the Party-state bureaucracy, the national security apparatus, the industrial-policy system, the government-procurement system, and the centrally administered state-owned enterprise sector.
Yet because the CCP has imposed strict secrecy surrounding the project, the outside world still knows very little about it.
Public Records Corroborate the Project
Nevertheless, many of the surrounding structures described in Biaodian Times' revelations can be corroborated by the Chinese government's own publicly available information.
For example, in May 2026, the China Information Technology Security Evaluation Center and the National Secrecy Science and Technology Evaluation Center publicly released "Secure and Reliable Evaluation Results."
Nine domestically produced AI chips—including Huawei's Ascend 310 and 910, Alibaba T-Head's Zhenwu M530 and M890, as well as chips from Hygon, Biren, and Moore Threads—were all placed on the Level I list. A large number of Chinese-made databases were also incorporated into the evaluation system.
At the end of June, Chinese authorities released the Secure and Reliable Evaluation Guidelines V4.0. The document explicitly states that the evaluation is not limited to cybersecurity in the conventional sense.
It also examines whether key stages of product design, development, and manufacturing are completed within China; whether the supply chain can remain stable and sustainable; whether core technologies are independently controlled; and whether technical documentation can be made "fully available and traceable" to Chinese evaluation authorities.
By September, authorities had again published new lists of domestic CPUs, AI chips, printer chips, server operating systems, and databases.
In other words, even without examining the secret documents disclosed by Biaodian Times, we can already see that the CCP is constructing an independent domestic technology system encompassing chips, operating systems, databases, servers, and terminals. That in itself is no longer a secret.
Why Is the CCP Willing to Pay Such an Enormous Price?
The next question, then, is why the CCP is willing to bear such an enormous cost.
Clearly, what the CCP wants most is not necessarily the highest performance, but a high degree of "control."
Even if a domestically produced CPU is slower than one made by Intel or AMD, as long as it can satisfy the needs of government offices, the CCP considers it more "secure" than a higher-performance processor that could potentially be cut off by US export restrictions.
Likewise, even if a Chinese AI chip cannot match the performance of Nvidia's most advanced GPUs, it still has strategic value as long as China can continue manufacturing it independently. In 2025, the CCP even ordered some state-funded data centers to stop using foreign AI chips.
The project therefore appears designed to address a fundamental issue: If China were one day completely cut off from chips, operating systems, databases, and other critical technologies supplied by the United States and its allies, could the CCP government and China's critical infrastructure continue to function?
In this sense, "Anke" should be understood as the CCP's long-term strategic preparation for the possibility of a comprehensive future technological blockade.
The Ministry of State Security—and the Threat to the Free World
Another aspect of the project that deserves particular attention is the role played by China's Ministry of State Security.
According to Baodian Times, "The entire Anke replacement system has been guided throughout by the Ministry of State Security. This means that within China, this security system can be used to monitor different regions, government departments, and industries. Once it enters the government, military, or law-enforcement systems of any other country, it could pose an enormous risk to that country's national security."
Article 7 of the CCP's National Intelligence Law explicitly stipulates that "All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of." The officially published text of the law makes this perfectly clear.
In other words, every device manufactured by a Chinese company represents a supply-chain risk that foreign governments and operators of critical infrastructure cannot afford to ignore. Why?
Because today's servers, switches, cameras, databases, and AI platforms are not static pieces of equipment that cease to have any connection with their manufacturers once they are sold. They require firmware upgrades, software patches, cloud-based management, remote maintenance, account authentication, and telemetry services.
In other words, whoever controls the updates potentially possesses a pathway into the system.
The Critical Question of Remote Access
If the CCP's state security apparatus itself participates in defining the technical specifications, vulnerability systems, or even security architecture of domestically produced Chinese products, foreign users must ask a crucial question:
Do exported models use the same firmware, software modules, cloud platforms, key-management systems, or remote-management interfaces as products used inside China?
Today, Chinese surveillance and communications technologies have already spread across the globe. Hikvision products have entered at least 155 countries. Hikvision and Dahua at one point accounted for more than one-third of the global video-surveillance market by value. AI surveillance technologies from Chinese companies including Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE have entered at least 63 countries.
The US Federal Communications Commission has placed Huawei and ZTE, as well as certain telecommunications and surveillance equipment produced by Hikvision, Dahua, and Hytera, on its "Covered List" of equipment and services deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to national security.
A single ordinary surveillance camera may appear insignificant. But tens of thousands of networked cameras can reveal who enters government offices, who meets with whom, and when particular vehicles appear.
A core network switch may be able to observe the data flow of an entire institution. Servers and cloud platforms may contain emails, files, databases, and even government secrets.
How did the United States and Israel find Ali Khamenei? What if the CCP were to use the same kinds of technology and networks against the leaders of other countries? This is a risk that cannot be ignored.
The real question the international community should therefore be asking about the "Anke" project is not simply whether "Made in China" products are safe. It is this: Between the technological architecture built inside China with the participation of state security agencies and similar technologies exported around the world, are there shared mechanisms for remote management, data transmission, or system access?
'Anke' as an Inevitable Product of the CCP's Ideology and Values
Interestingly, even as the CCP attacks other countries for what it calls the "over-securitization" or "generalization of the concept of national security," it is itself devoting enormous resources to actively decoupling technologically from the West in the name of "national security" and "technological self-reliance."
In my view, a deeper political logic lies behind this.
The CCP is not satisfied merely with obtaining a larger share of the existing global technology system. Instead, in an increasing number of fields, it is building its own chips, operating systems, databases, standards, cloud platforms, and information-control systems.
As The Communist Manifesto states: "The Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things [...] The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."
In other words, from the first day of its existence, the Communist Party has been an enemy of all existing human civilization. Today, "all existing social systems" naturally include the technological systems and technical standards already established by Western free societies.
Viewed from this perspective, the CCP's active decoupling from the world in this field is not merely an issue of information security or national security. It is also an inevitable choice dictated by its ideology and values.
In addition, deep within the CCP's thinking, the ultimate strategic judgment that "there will eventually be a war with the United States" has not only always existed; the Party has also been actively making practical preparations for that possibility.
That is why, within the technological systems and standards already established around the world, it seeks to construct its own "independent kingdom."
The CCP understands very well the hostility and vigilance that the world directs toward it. And it is also preparing for a final "showdown" with the world.
Will 'Anke' Become Yet Another Unfinished Megaproject?
But can this "independent kingdom" actually be built?
Over the past several decades, the CCP has become far too accustomed to stealing technology from the West and achieving what it calls "overtaking on a curve." When it comes to honestly developing technologies from the ground up, Chinese companies may have largely forgotten how.
A recently exposed scandal involving some of China's supposedly strongest AI companies, including Moonshot AI and DeepSeek, offers an especially ironic example. These companies allegedly sent users' questions to American AI models, then returned the answers they received as though they were their own—only to inadvertently expose CCP military secrets in the process.
It is a striking irony: a country spending enormous sums in an attempt to break free from the Western technological system still finds itself dependent on Western systems at some of the most sensitive points in the technology chain.
So will the "Anke Replacement Project," with its multitrillion-yuan price tag, ultimately end up unfinished and abandoned, like so many other projects launched under Xi Jinping?
That is a question very much worth watching.
RELATED:
- Secret Internal Report to Xi Jinping Lays Bear China's Economic Crisis
- CCP Revives Mao Era Playbook to Strip Chinese Entrepreneurs of Their Wealth
Author: Jennifer Zeng