The struggle to preserve a fair international law

The news that South African jurist Navi Pillay is the recipient of the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize could not have come at a better time for those agonisingly disconcerted by global apathy towards international law. At a time when international law is being battered by powerful, authoritarian men, drunk on power and willing to go to any lengths to pursue their imperialistic designs, the Nobel Committee has unequivocally signalled that international law matters. The real question, however, is what kind of international law matters.

Multiple narratives shape international law. One key narrative, as mentioned, is that vital tenets of international law, such as prohibiting the use of force in international relations, have been completely shredded, with multiple wars raging. Likewise, with rising authoritarianism, there has been a precipitous waning in compliance with international human rights law and an increase in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

While the normative decline of international law has been going on for quite some time, the fall has been precipitous in recent years, accompanied by utter disdain for universally accepted international norms. This scornful attitude towards international law became evident when (then) U.S. President Joe Biden leaned heavily towards using the ambiguous term “rules-based order” instead of “international law”, signalling a movement towards an era of norm-light global governance. U.S. President Donald Trump took this several notches up when he said that he did not need international law because he was guided by his own morality.

Authoritarian international law

This brings us to what Tom Ginsburg calls authoritarian international law — an attempt to create a new normative order. Thus, while authoritarian leaders attacking the fundamental tenets of international law might give the impression that they are hollowing it out, the more nuanced picture is that authoritarians are retooling international law to pursue their objectives. As Ginsburg, Shirley Scott and others argue, the liberal international law order that emerged after the Second World War and which intensified after the end of the Cold War was a product of what democratic states did on the international plane.

Although the liberal international law order’s democratic credentials can always be questioned, civil, political and human rights were institutionalised and made part of its operating system. Countries created international organisations (IOs) to which they delegated significant powers, accompanied by high judicialisation — the creation of international courts and tribunals to settle disputes.

A scant respect for rights

With the rise of authoritarianism, including in liberal democracies, the fundamental nature of the liberal international legal order is being altered or, as Anne Applebaum argues, its operating system is changing. Authoritarian states view international law as a tool for coordinating regime survival. Respect for civil, political and human rights, and holding executive power accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity, has little place in the authoritarian international legal order. Innovative uses of the age-old concept of sovereignty are another key feature. While developing countries often invoke sovereignty to shape international legal norms to serve their aspirations, today, sovereignty seems to be the cloak aimed at shielding authoritarian regimes’ excesses from international scrutiny. Israel’s systematic rejection of reports by UN human rights bodies that chide it for human rights violations, on the grounds that they interfere in its sovereign affairs, is a case in point.

Creating weak IOs with limited independent powers is another key feature of authoritarian international law. Once created, an IO takes on a life of its own, and member-states should not be able to control on a whim. This, however, does not suit authoritarian states, which want to retain maximum power while delegating as little as possible to IOs. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a case in point. A preference for negotiation or quasi-judicial mechanisms to resolve disputes, rather than faith in third-party international adjudication, is also a pivotal attribute of authoritarian international law. The recent backlash against international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, is an example.

The need for a fightback

The kind of international law that Ms. Pillay represents is what most authoritarian regimes despise. The clearest example of this is Israel’s condemnation of the Nobel prize, saying that the Nobel Committee has awarded the prize to the “greatest lie” of the 21st century. Israel was referring to Ms. Pillay’s role as the Chair of the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which concluded that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza.

Rather than serving merely as a tool for extending a regime’s influence and values beyond its borders, the kind of international law that Ms. Pillay represents has a thicker conception of the rule of law, laced with values of equality, fairness, accountability and making the individual a subject of international law. Authoritarian regimes cannot be expected to develop a fair international legal order premised on justice. Other actors, including courts, civil society and academia, must therefore mount international resistance to authoritarian regimes to pave the way for a liberal and fair international law.

Prabhash Ranjan is a Professor and Vice Dean (Research), Jindal Global Law School. The views expressed are personal