Collective defense is often measured through military spending, troop numbers, advanced weapons and the ability to sustain combat operations. Yet these conventional indicators do not fully capture what makes an alliance effective. Strategic geography, access to critical infrastructure, operational coordination and political commitment can be equally important. The experience of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) demonstrates how smaller states can make contributions to regional security that extend far beyond their military size.
As Iranian attacks intensify regional security concerns, the role of smaller Gulf states deserves greater attention. Bahrain, in particular, illustrates how a country with limited territory and strategic depth can become an indispensable partner by hosting allied forces, supporting maritime security and strengthening multinational cooperation. Its experience offers valuable lessons not only for the GCC but also for NATO as it adapts to an increasingly contested security environment.
Bahrain’s geographical position gives it importance far beyond its size. With a population of approximately 1.6 million and located less than 200 kilometres from Iran, the kingdom occupies a sensitive position in the Persian Gulf. Its proximity to potential threats creates significant vulnerabilities, particularly when adversaries target the infrastructure and facilities that underpin regional security.
The Iranian attacks described in 2026 have exposed these risks. Strikes have reportedly affected critical infrastructure, including an oil refinery, an aluminium smelter and a desalination plant. Naval Support Activity Bahrain, which hosts US Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the US Fifth Fleet, has also sustained substantial damage. These developments demonstrate how attacks on a small host country can disrupt military operations, energy supplies and essential civilian services simultaneously.
Nevertheless, Bahrain’s importance is not defined by its vulnerabilities alone. The kingdom has continued to deepen its security relationships despite the risks associated with hosting allied military infrastructure. This commitment illustrates a central principle of collective defense: the reliability of a partner and its willingness to sustain cooperation under pressure can be as important as the size of its armed forces.
Bahrain’s maritime role provides a clear example of how smaller states strengthen collective security. US naval forces have maintained a presence in the kingdom since 1948, and Bahrain became a major non-NATO Ally in 2002. Today, the country hosts the US Fifth Fleet, NAVCENT and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, a multinational partnership involving 47 nations. The United Kingdom also maintains its largest permanent overseas naval base in Bahrain.
These facilities serve purposes beyond the interests of their host country. They provide platforms for coordinating maritime operations, protecting shipping routes, sustaining deployments and responding to emerging threats. Bahrain’s participation in NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative since 2005 further illustrates its commitment to international security cooperation.
The strategic value of such arrangements becomes particularly apparent when facilities come under attack. Damage to a military installation can affect numerous partners, forcing them to adjust logistics, relocate personnel and find alternative operating arrangements. Consequently, protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring operational continuity should be shared responsibilities rather than burdens placed exclusively on host nations.
Bahrain’s experience highlights the need for alliances to develop contingency plans, establish alternative logistical networks and strengthen the resilience of essential facilities. Collective defense requires not only the ability to respond to an attack but also the capacity to continue operating when parts of the security network are damaged.
Bahrain’s contribution is reinforced by investments in military modernization and interoperability. US arms sales notifications in 2026 reportedly included Patriot missiles, precision-guided munitions, F-16 sustainment and AH-1Z attack helicopters. Such acquisitions can strengthen national defense while improving the ability of Bahraini forces to operate alongside allied militaries.
However, equipment alone does not guarantee effective cooperation. Common procedures, integrated planning, intelligence sharing and regular joint training are essential to translating military purchases into operational advantages. Smaller states can generate considerable strategic value when their forces and facilities are integrated into wider command and coordination structures.
Bahrain’s establishment of a bilateral combined command post for air defense with US Central Command at Ras Al-Bar Camp in December 2025 reflects this approach. By creating a dedicated framework for joint planning and coordination, the arrangement strengthens the connection between national capabilities and collective defense.
The kingdom’s response to threats against maritime navigation offers another example. During the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping in late 2023, Bahrain was publicly identified among the initial participants in Operation Prosperity Guardian. Its support for international efforts to protect shipping demonstrated a willingness to accept political risks in pursuit of a broader security objective.
These commitments also reinforce Bahrain’s relationships with its Gulf neighbors. Its support for Saudi Arabia’s security and its public solidarity with Saudi Arabia and Qatar following attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz reflect an understanding that threats to one Gulf state can affect the entire region. Shared security therefore depends on cooperation across national boundaries, particularly when energy infrastructure and international shipping are at stake.
Bahrain’s experience illustrates why the GCC should approach collective defense as an integrated system rather than a competition between national military capabilities. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess substantial military and economic resources. Smaller members, meanwhile, can contribute through strategically located facilities, specialized capabilities, diplomatic engagement and established partnerships with external powers.
These contributions are complementary. A larger military may possess the resources to conduct sustained operations, but its effectiveness can depend on access to ports, airfields, command facilities and logistical support provided by smaller partners. Likewise, diplomatic relationships and regional coordination can help build the political conditions necessary for collective action.
Bahrain’s participation in the Abraham Accords and its involvement in diplomatic initiatives also demonstrate how smaller states can contribute through channels beyond conventional military power. Although diplomacy cannot eliminate regional instability, it can facilitate communication, create opportunities for cooperation and support broader efforts to manage conflict.
Recognizing these contributions does not diminish the importance of military strength. Rather, it acknowledges that national capabilities become more effective when connected through reliable institutions, infrastructure and partnerships.
NATO faces a similar challenge in determining how best to assess the contributions of its smaller members. Defense expenditure and force size remain important indicators, but they cannot fully measure an ally’s strategic value. Access to ports and airfields, the hosting of command facilities, maritime surveillance, logistical support and the ability to sustain operations during attacks all contribute to alliance effectiveness.
Smaller allies can occupy geographically critical positions, support reinforcement routes and provide specialized capabilities that larger members cannot easily replace. Their infrastructure may become especially important during a crisis, when the disruption of a single facility can complicate operations across an entire region.
NATO should therefore incorporate these contributions more systematically into defense planning. This means identifying strategically important facilities, improving infrastructure protection, developing alternative supply routes and ensuring that forces can continue operating when key installations are damaged. It also requires burden-sharing frameworks that recognize operational contributions alongside financial commitments.
The GCC’s experience suggests that resilience depends on how effectively these different strengths are combined. Alliances must protect their smaller members not only because they have a collective obligation to do so, but also because the security of the wider network may depend on them.
Bahrain demonstrates that a small state can be both highly vulnerable and strategically indispensable. Its geographical position, maritime facilities, defense partnerships and commitment to regional cooperation give it an influence that cannot be measured by population or military size alone.
For the GCC, the priority should be to integrate the distinct capabilities of its members into a more resilient regional security architecture. For NATO, the lesson is equally clear: smaller allies should be evaluated not only by what they can deploy independently but also by what they enable the alliance to accomplish collectively.
Ultimately, collective defense is strongest when every member’s contribution is understood, protected and integrated into a common strategy. An attack on one state should not become a weakness for the entire alliance. Instead, the relationships, infrastructure and coordination connecting its members should ensure that individual vulnerabilities do not undermine collective security.
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