The intensification of Houthi military operations across Yemen and into Saudi Arabia in recent weeks highlights the need for a more decisive element within US policy toward Iran’s regional network.
The Iran-backed Houthi forces have this month launched missile and drone strikes on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, killing more than a dozen people and wounding hundreds, targeted Saudi Aramco facilities, struck the presidential palace complex in Aden and hit Yemeni government training camps, with one attack killing as many as 73 recruits. On Wednesday, two people were killed in an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam.
These actions have reignited fighting in Yemen, deepened an already severe humanitarian crisis and added volatility to global energy markets and shipping routes.
When the US devises its strategy toward Iran, it is essential that the Houthis are not treated as outside the core parameters of that strategy. A central pillar must recognize that the Houthis function as an operational extension — an arm — of the Iranian government.
When a terrorist or militia group reaches the stage of systematically attacking civilians, expanding operations across borders and employing sustained violence, limited defensive measures or a purely diplomatic approach are insufficient to produce restraint.
Groups that operate at this level of aggression respond most clearly to the credible prospect of being stopped
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
Groups that operate at this level of aggression respond most clearly to the credible prospect of being stopped. Silence or waiting for exhaustion does not alter their trajectory. If they perceive that they are advancing, they tend to increase the scale of their actions. A strong military response capable of thoroughly degrading their capacity to project force therefore becomes a necessary component of any effective approach.
The US has previously demonstrated the military capability to impose meaningful costs on the Houthis. During earlier periods of concentrated operations, particularly those conducted in coordination with partners, Houthi attack rates were reduced and some operational patterns were disrupted.
That record shows that American forces, working with European allies, the internationally recognized Yemeni government and regional partners including Saudi Arabia, possess the means to degrade Houthi capabilities substantially. A focused, coordinated campaign of this kind could achieve decisive results in a matter of days by targeting command nodes, weapons production and storage sites, and launch infrastructure.
For the US, this tactical requirement is directly linked to the broader strategic objective of countering Iran and bringing it to the negotiating table. As long as Iranian allies and proxies such as the Houthis retain the ability to conduct attacks of this nature, Iran itself will continue to feel emboldened. Tehran has little incentive to negotiate seriously and in good faith or to make concessions on issues such as its enriched uranium stockpile while its forward proxies continue to operate with effect.
The US ought to recognize the fact that when Iran’s proxies remain strong, Tehran feels strong and is less inclined to back down. Weakening those proxies is therefore equivalent to weakening Iran.
There is no serious dispute that Iran, through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has acted as a sponsor of the Houthis. The Wall Street Journal this week detailed how Iranian support has included the provision of targeting intelligence, training and tactical guidance and related assistance that has enabled Houthi strikes against Saudi Arabia and its partners. Iranian officers have been described as contributing to the identification of targets and the direction of operations.
The tactics the Houthis have employed — striking countries that are not the primary parties to a direct conflict with Iran and focusing on civilian and economic infrastructure — parallel methods long associated with Iranian regional practice. Saudi Arabia, which was not a party to the war, did not initiate offensive operations against Iran or its proxies and had instead sought to promote peace and regional stability through diplomatic efforts. It has now absorbed repeated missile and drone attacks on its airports and energy facilities. This pattern of externalizing pressure while limiting direct risk to Iranian territory remains a consistent feature of the approach.
A firmer US posture does not need to involve open-ended commitments. It can take the form of clear prioritization by treating Houthi military capacity as a core component of the Iranian threat network. Therefore, the US can coordinate kinetic pressure with partners who share the operational burden, interdicting residual flows of Iranian materiel and expertise, and sustaining focused efforts long enough to produce lasting degradation of attack capacity.
Iranian officers have been described as contributing to the identification of targets and the direction of operations
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
Such an approach would reinforce freedom of navigation through critical maritime chokepoints, strengthen regional stability, enhance the credibility of deterrence and improve the prospects for any durable diplomatic outcome with Tehran. Recognizing the Houthis as an integral arm of Iranian power projection, and acting accordingly, strengthens rather than complicates the overall strategy.
In conclusion, the Houthis are increasing their aggression in ways that inflict damage domestically within Yemen, regionally across the Arabian Peninsula and globally through disruptions to energy markets and maritime commerce. It is therefore important that the US fully incorporates the Houthis into its Iran strategy. The Houthis function as an extension of the Iranian government. Allowing continued Houthi aggression would embolden Iran itself, reducing incentives for Tehran to negotiate or restrain its broader activities.
For these reasons, the US needs a firmer stance against the Houthis. Past operations have already shown that Washington possesses the military capability to stop or significantly degrade them. Working with partners — including the internationally recognized Yemeni government, regional allies such as Saudi Arabia and European partners — the US can bring an end to Houthi aggression and the killing of innocents in a very short period of time.
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a Harvard-educated Iranian-American political scientist. X: @Dr_Rafizadeh
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh is a political scientist specializing in U.S. foreign policy and the Middle East and is a Harvard-educated scholar. He can be reached at [email protected] or on X at @Dr_Rafizadeh.