Israel's political parties explained: Shas and United Torah Judaism

(Oct. 16, 2026 / JNS)

Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ) enter the Oct. 27 Knesset election seeking lasting protection for their religious institutions and communities. The two parties won 18 seats in 2022, supplying more than a quarter of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s original 64-seat coalition. That partnership is now tested by the unresolved dispute over Haredi military service.

The parties

Although commonly grouped together as the Haredi, or ultra-Orthodox, parties, Shas and UTJ emerged from different communities and represent distinct political traditions.

Shas entered national politics in 1984 under the spiritual leadership of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, a former Sephardi chief rabbi. Its founders sought independent representation for Sephardi Haredim who felt marginalized within the predominantly Ashkenazi religious establishment. The party joined the defense of religious observance and education to a broader mission of restoring Sephardi religious prestige and representing disadvantaged families.

That combination gave Shas an electorate extending beyond the yeshivah community. Its appeal reached traditional Sephardi and Mizrachi Israelis who identified with Yosef’s religious authority and the party’s social agenda without adopting a strictly Haredi lifestyle. Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) researcher Gilad Malach wrote that Shas is “a party open to a broad group of traditional voters rather than just the ultra-Orthodox community.”

Aryeh Deri leads Shas politically, with Yinon Azoulay second on its submitted electoral list. Political leadership operates under the authority of the Council of Torah Sages, which provides the party’s religious direction. Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, Ovadia Yosef’s son and himself a former Sephardi chief rabbi, is a prominent spiritual figure in the current leadership.

UTJ, meanwhile, brings together two branches of Ashkenazi Haredi society. Agudat Yisrael principally represents Chassidic communities, while Degel HaTorah represents the Lithuanian, non-Chassidic tradition. Rabbi Elazar Menachem Man Shach established Degel HaTorah in 1988 after disputes over representation within the Chassidic-dominated Agudat Yisrael. The two began contesting national elections jointly in 1992, pooling their electoral strength while retaining separate organizations and rabbinical authorities.

That structure continues to shape UTJ’s leadership. Yaakov Asher heads its electoral list, followed by Agudat Yisrael leader Yitzhak Goldknopf. Asher’s rise follows Rabbi Dov Lando’s decision that veteran Degel HaTorah lawmakers Moshe Gafni and Uri Maklev would not seek reelection. Lando is Degel HaTorah’s senior spiritual leader. The change shows that politicians remain accountable to religious authorities who determine their representation and political boundaries.

The platform

Passing a comprehensive draft law to shield yeshivah students from compulsory military service is the central demand of both parties. Their leaders regard sustained religious study as a contribution to Jewish continuity that the state should support. Shas and Degel HaTorah have shown greater willingness than Agudat Yisrael to negotiate recruitment targets and limited financial sanctions for a potential bill. In late 2025, Degel HaTorah backed a bill that would let eligible yeshivah students defer service while studying until receiving an exemption at age 26, alongside recruitment targets for the wider Haredi population. It would not require every student to serve before receiving that exemption. Agudat Yisrael has taken a harder line against targets and sanctions.

All three oppose compulsory service for full-time yeshivah students. Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef has also opposed drafting students experiencing a “crisis” in their studies, while clarifying that he was not referring to all Haredim outside full-time study.

On education, both parties seek public funding for yeshivahs and Haredi schools while defending their educational autonomy, including funding for institutions that do not teach the full core curriculum of subjects such as mathematics and English.

Their economic priorities extend to childcare subsidies, family assistance and housing. Shas places particular emphasis on low-income households and food assistance; Deri made resolving a food-voucher funding dispute a condition for supporting the budget in late 2025. UTJ emphasizes expanding housing suited to Haredi communities.

On religion and state, both parties seek to preserve Orthodox authority over marriage, conversion and religious services, oppose civil marriage and resist expanded public transportation on Shabbat. These policies shape religious arrangements for the wider population as well as their own constituents.

Their support for restricting judicial intervention is closely connected to these priorities: court rulings have affected conscription arrangements, institutional funding and religious policy. Both have backed limits on the High Court’s power to overturn legislation and government decisions.

Security positions are less central to their programs but remain consequential. Shas opposes Palestinian statehood and has backed settlement expansion in Judea and Samaria. On Gaza, Deri has supported dismantling Hamas while also backing negotiated ceasefires and hostage releases. UTJ has no unified territorial platform, and its factions differ: Agudat Yisrael’s Goldknopf has advocated extending Israeli sovereignty and reestablishing Jewish settlements in Gaza, while Degel HaTorah’s Gafni has opposed resettling Gaza. These differences make it difficult to assign UTJ a single position on territorial policy, even as both factions cooperate with parties advocating settlement expansion.

The partners

Shas and UTJ have long helped anchor Netanyahu’s governing bloc, but the conscription dispute has strained that partnership. In July 2025, UTJ left the government and coalition after negotiations failed to secure exemptions for yeshivah students. Shas withdrew its ministers two days later but remained in the coalition, subsequently resigning from its parliamentary coalition posts in October that year. Both sought to pressure Netanyahu, though they differed over how far to distance themselves from his government.

They enter this election maintaining their own alliance. On Oct. 11, the parties signed a surplus-vote agreement, which can help one of them secure an additional seat. They also pledged continued cooperation over educational funding, conscription legislation and state religious institutions. That coordination does not settle whom they will support for prime minister. On Oct. 13, Deri told Kan Moreshet he favored a broad government including Yashar Party leader Gadi Eisenkot, led by Netanyahu.

Asher has publicly expressed willingness to serve in a government led by Eisenkot. However, Meir Porush, number four on the UTJ list, rejected such a possibility, arguing in an Oct. 5 radio interview that Netanyahu-aligned parties are more sympathetic to Haredi religious and communal interests. Their statements reflect UTJ’s competing impulses to preserve its established partnership and consider alternatives.

Those alternatives carry significant obstacles. Eisenkot advocates broad Haredi conscription. His bloc supports conditioning school funding on a full core curriculum. Most parties in it also favor prioritizing those who serve and work for government benefits. An agreement would require compromises on educational autonomy and public assistance.

UTJ’s stated conditions also limit postponing the draft question until after a government takes office. Porush said its two factions had agreed not to accept ministerial or committee leadership positions, or support coalition legislation, until the status of yeshivah students was resolved in law. Coalition promises alone would not secure the party’s full participation.

Shas and UTJ face competition from both their right-wing allies and smaller Haredi lists. Challengers, such as the Haredi Public Party, are competing for dissatisfied Haredi voters. IDI analysis found that 11% of self-identified Haredi voters backed Likud or Religious Zionism-Otzma Yehudit in 2022. An Oct. 11 Kan News poll projected seven seats for Shas and eight for UTJ, three fewer than in 2022. Retaining their electorate is essential to preserving their bargaining power in the next Knesset.