Midterm Odds and the Limits of Trump’s Power

UNITED STATES · MIDTERMS 2026 · ANALYSIS

The midterm odds have turned against President Donald Trump’s Republicans, with bettors on Polymarket giving Democrats a 90.5% chance of taking the House of Representatives in the vote on Tuesday 3 November. The same market gives Democrats a 63.5% chance of winning the Senate, where Republicans now hold 53 of the 100 seats.

If those prices are right, Trump would spend his last two years facing a Congress that controls federal money, can subpoena his officials and could impeach him. He would still keep wide powers of his own, from tariffs under trade law to sanctions and military orders, and this analysis sets out where each of them stops.

What the Midterm Odds Say

The House has 435 seats, and a party needs 218 for a majority. The Clerk of the House lists 218 Republicans, 214 Democrats, one independent and two vacancies, so Democrats need a net gain of four seats on today’s count.

The independent is Kevin Kiley of California, and the vacant seats are Florida’s 20th and Texas’s 23rd districts, both left open by resignations in April. Because every House seat is on the ballot, the national swing matters most, and the most-traded Polymarket range for the House popular vote is a Democratic lead of 8 to 10 points, at 28.5%.

The Senate lists 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats and two independents, Bernie Sanders of Vermont and Angus King of Maine, who caucus with the Democrats. Because Vice President JD Vance breaks ties, Democrats need 51 seats, a net gain of four, while Republicans keep control with 50.

Thirty-five Senate seats are on the ballot: 33 regular seats plus special elections in Ohio and Florida for the seats now held by appointed senators Jon Husted and Ashley Moody. By the Senate’s own roster, Republicans are defending 22 of those seats and Democrats 13.

On the combined question of who controls Congress, Polymarket prices a Democratic sweep at 61.5%, a Democratic House with a Republican Senate at 28.5% and a Republican sweep at 9.5%. Kalshi’s matching contracts show 60.5%, 29.5% and 10%, so the two platforms tell the same story.

The midterm odds for the Senate turn on a handful of races where Republicans are mostly on defence. In North Carolina, Democrat Roy Cooper is priced at 96% against Republican Michael Whatley for the seat Thom Tillis now holds, and in Georgia the Democratic senator Jon Ossoff is at 96%.

In Alaska, Democrat Mary Peltola is at 73.5% against Republican Senator Dan Sullivan, and in Texas, Democrat James Talarico is at 64.5% against Republican Ken Paxton, the state’s attorney general. In Ohio, Democrat Sherrod Brown is at 61.5% against Senator Jon Husted, and in Maine, Democrat Troy Jackson, who replaced Graham Platner on the ballot in July, is at 59.5% against Senator Susan Collins.

Republicans lead in Iowa, where Ashley Hinson is at 57.5% against Democrat Josh Turek for the seat Joni Ernst now holds. In Michigan, a seat Democrats already hold, Polymarket prices the Democratic candidate at 70.5%.

What Prediction Markets Say

The midterm odds quoted here come from real-money bets, and Polymarket has drawn US$16.6 million in bets on House control, US$6.4 million on the Senate and US$22.6 million on its combined balance-of-power market. Kalshi, which is regulated in the US by the CFTC, has traded about 38.2 million contracts on its balance-of-power question, each paying US$1 if right.

The midterm odds barely moved in the past day, but over the past week the Democratic sweep slipped 3 points while a Democratic House with a Republican Senate gained 1. The largest weekly move among the key races came in Michigan, where the Republican side gained 3.5 points.

On impeachment, Polymarket’s contract on whether the House impeaches Trump before his term ends trades at 71%, and Kalshi prices an impeachment before 1 January 2028 at 66.5%. Kalshi’s separate contract on impeachment and removal from office trades at 17.5%, a gap explained below, and live prices are tracked on our Prediction Markets page.

Why we show this: prediction markets turn real-money bets into a live probability that moves within minutes of the news, which is why investors, campaigns and newsrooms in the United States now follow them closely. We show them next to polls and official results, never instead of them.

What Trump Could Still Do on His Own

Even if the midterm odds prove right, a Democratic Congress would not end Trump’s presidency, and many of his most-used powers do not need a vote. Each of them has limits, though, and the courts have already drawn some of them this year.

Executive Orders

Executive orders direct federal agencies and need no vote in Congress, which makes them the president’s fastest tool. They cannot override a law or spend money Congress has not provided, and judges can block them.

In August, for example, the Supreme Court paused a lower-court injunction against Trump’s executive order on election procedures while a challenge by several states continues. A Democratic Congress could pass laws to reverse specific orders, but each law would need Trump’s signature or a veto override.

Sanctions and Export Controls

Sanctions rest largely on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that lets the president block assets and transactions once he declares a national emergency. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) writes and enforces the sanctions lists, and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) runs export controls on sensitive technology.

The Supreme Court’s tariff ruling dealt only with tariffs and did not touch IEEPA’s power to block assets. Congress can end a national emergency or rewrite a sanctions programme by law, but such a bill would face a veto.

Military Action and the War Powers Clock

As commander in chief, the president can order US forces into action, and Trump did so in Venezuela in January and against Iran from 28 February. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 says he must end any such use of force within 60 days of reporting it to Congress, with up to 30 more days to withdraw safely, unless Congress authorises it.

The White House told Congress on 1 May that the hostilities with Iran that began on 28 February “have terminated”, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congress’s research arm. The administration also argues that the president’s constitutional authority to defend the country is enough, which is why it treats the 60-day clock as no bar.

The same law lets Congress direct a withdrawal by concurrent resolution, and the Senate adopted one on Iran by 50 votes to 48 on 23 June. Such resolutions never go to the president, and their binding force has been disputed since a 1983 Supreme Court ruling against legislative vetoes, so the purse remains the stronger tool.

Tariffs Under Sections 232 and 301 and Under Emergency Law

Tariffs are where the courts have already drawn a line. On Friday 20 February 2026 the Supreme Court ruled 6 to 3, in cases brought by small businesses and 12 states, that IEEPA does not allow the president to impose tariffs, because the Constitution gives the power to lay duties to Congress.

Trump ended the IEEPA duties the same day and replaced them with a 10% import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows up to 15% for no more than 150 days unless Congress extends it. The Court of International Trade ruled that surcharge invalid on 7 May for the plaintiffs before it, the government appealed, and the 150 days ran out in July.

The same court has ordered the reliquidation of entries, the step that triggers refunds of IEEPA duties, in more than 4,000 lawsuits by individual importers. On 8 October it certified a class of importers who paid those duties between February 2025 and February 2026 and had not sued on their own.

What remains rests on Section 232, which covers imports that threaten national security, and Section 301, which targets unfair foreign trade practices. In July the Trade Representative imposed Section 301 tariffs of 10% or 12.5% on 60 trading partners over their failure to ban goods made with forced labour, and a separate 25% tariff on certain Brazilian goods.

Both laws require investigations and findings, which slows the president down but leaves courts less room to strike the tariffs down. A Democratic Congress could vote to repeal or limit them, but Trump could veto that bill.

Pardons

The Constitution lets the president grant pardons for any federal offence except in cases of impeachment, and Congress cannot review or reverse them. A pardon does not reach state crimes, and it cannot stop the House from investigating the conduct behind it.

The Veto

Every bill a Democratic Congress passes still goes to Trump, and the Constitution requires two thirds of both chambers to override his veto. In a full Congress that means 290 House votes and 67 Senate votes, far more than either party holds today.

Diplomacy and Recognition

The president alone receives ambassadors and decides which foreign governments Washington deals with, which is how the United States came to work with Venezuela’s acting government. Treaties need two thirds of senators present, but executive agreements, such as the June memorandum with Iran, need no vote.

Immigration Enforcement

The executive branch sets immigration enforcement priorities, such as whom agencies target for arrest and removal. The limit is money, since detention beds, deportation flights and border construction depend on appropriations that a Democratic House would have to approve.

What a Democratic Congress Could Stop

The Constitution says no money may be drawn from the Treasury except under appropriations made by law, which makes the House’s power of the purse the main check on any president. Current funding expires on Friday 11 December, so the first spending fight comes before the new Congress is seated, and every later spending bill would need the new House.

War money is the sharpest test, since the White House asked Congress on 24 June for US$87.6 billion in supplemental funding, US$67.1 billion of it for the Pentagon. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the war with Iran had cost the Pentagon about US$38 billion by 1 August, and the Senate’s roll-call record shows no vote on the request so far.

A Democratic House could also refuse new money for immigration detention and deportations, although funds already appropriated stay available until they expire. Republicans argue that would weaken border security, while Democrats argue Congress must set limits on how enforcement money is spent.

House committees can issue subpoenas, demand documents and hold hearings, and a Democratic majority would chair every one of them. Oversight would likely start with the Iran war’s cost, the Venezuela oil accounts and the use of emergency powers.

Any new law needs both chambers, so a Democratic House alone could block Republican bills but could not pass its own. In the Senate, the filibuster rule requires 60 votes to end debate on most bills, which limits any majority short of that number.

If Democrats also win the Senate, they would control confirmations of cabinet members, judges and ambassadors, which need only a simple majority. This year the Senate confirmed Todd Blanche as attorney general by 50 votes to 49 on 8 August, the kind of narrow vote a Democratic majority could block.

Treaties need two thirds of senators present, so neither party can ratify one alone. A Democratic Senate would matter most for nominations and for deciding which bills reach the floor.

Impeachment needs only a simple majority in the House, which is why markets price it as likely if Democrats win, with Kalshi at 66.5% for an impeachment before 2028. Removal needs a two-thirds vote of senators present, 67 if all 100 vote, and no president has ever been removed, which is why the same platform prices impeachment and removal at 17.5%.

Republicans argue that impeachment would be a partisan exercise, while Democrats say the House has a duty to investigate possible abuses of power. Either way, the Senate arithmetic, not the House, decides whether Trump could be forced from office.

What It Means for Venezuela, Iran and Cuba

Venezuela

US forces captured Venezuela’s president, Nicolás Maduro, and his wife, Cilia Flores, on 3 January 2026, and both face narco-terrorism charges in federal court in New York. Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and oil minister from the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), has governed since then as acting president with US backing.

Washington lifted its own sanctions on Rodríguez in April, according to the CRS, while the European Union and Canada have kept theirs. Polymarket bettors give her a 93.5% chance of still being Venezuela’s de facto leader at the end of 2026, and give a US invasion by 31 December 3.1%.

The state oil company PDVSA remains under sanctions, but Treasury’s General License 46E, reissued on 28 September, lets established US companies buy, ship and refine Venezuelan oil. Payments to sanctioned parties must go into US-controlled Foreign Government Deposit Funds created by an executive order in January, and a State Department official told Congress in April that US$3 billion had passed through them.

A Democratic House could demand the audits of those accounts, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio promised in June to share with Congress, and could hold hearings on the oil deals and on the missing election timetable. It could not cancel the licences, which Treasury issues on its own authority (see also: House Democrats Demand Venezuela Oil Deal Papers).

Iran

The United States and Israel began strikes on Iran on 28 February, and a ceasefire announced on 7 April was followed by a memorandum of understanding signed on 17 June. US forces struck Iranian targets again on 7 and 8 July after attacks on commercial ships, and US Central Command has kept issuing releases on enforcing a naval blockade of Iran.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guard says the Strait of Hormuz is closed while Secretary of State Marco Rubio says it is open, and several tankers have been hit near it this month, according to The National, a newspaper in Abu Dhabi. Polymarket prices the chance that the US carries out no new strike on Iranian soil through 30 November at 46.5%, a US invasion before 2027 at 16.5% and a final nuclear deal by 31 December at 14.5%.

The Senate has voted on Iran war-powers measures at least 14 times this year, most recently rejecting one on 24 September by 50 votes to 49. A Democratic Senate could pass such a measure, but a binding version would still face a veto (see also: Panama Probes US Jet Strike on Its Ship).

Any final nuclear agreement would also trigger review by Congress under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. Beyond the midterm odds, bets put the chance of Hormuz traffic returning to normal by 31 December at 15.5%, a risk for oil prices whoever controls Congress.

Cuba

Cuba’s embargo is written into law by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, also called the LIBERTAD Act, so it cannot be lifted unless the president first certifies that a transition or democratically elected government is in power. Even then Congress can override a suspension by joint resolution, and a separate 2000 law bars Treasury from licensing tourist travel to Cuba.

Tightening needs no vote: Trump declared a national emergency over Cuba on 29 January and, on 1 May, authorised sanctions on anyone operating in Cuba’s energy, defence, mining, financial or security sectors. A tariff on countries that supply oil to Cuba, created under IEEPA in January, was among the duties he ended after the Supreme Court ruling.

Military action against Cuba would fall under the same war-powers rules as Iran, and Polymarket prices a US strike on Cuban soil by 31 December at 10.5%. Bettors give 10% to President Miguel Díaz-Canel leaving office by year-end and 12% to a US-Cuba economic deal (see also: Cuba Denies Contract for 90 Fuel Shipments US Seized).

Mexico, Canada and Brazil

For Mexico, the policy at stake is the State Department’s February 2025 designation of cartels, including Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation, as foreign terrorist organisations, which rests on executive power alone. Congress can revoke a designation by law, but such a bill would face a veto.

Canada faces 50% tariffs under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, announced on 20 July, and certain Canadian alcoholic drinks and dairy products have been barred from the US market since 29 September, according to the White House. Those measures rest on trade law, so a Democratic Congress could hold hearings but would need a veto-proof majority to undo them.

Brazil faces a 25% Section 301 tariff on certain goods, announced by the Trade Representative on 15 July over digital trade, ethanol, deforestation, anti-corruption enforcement and other practices. Because it rests on trade law rather than IEEPA, it survived the Supreme Court ruling, and only the president, a deal or a new law would remove it.

When the Change Would Take Effect

Whatever the midterm odds say, nothing changes on election night, because the current 119th Congress sits until noon on Sunday 3 January 2027, when the terms of the newly elected members begin. Until then, the Republican majorities can still pass bills, confirm nominees and settle spending.

The main deadline in that lame-duck session is Friday 11 December, when the stopgap funding law Trump signed on 2 September expires. A Republican Congress could use the next funding bill to lock in money for the Iran war or immigration enforcement, while Democrats would try to push those decisions into January.

Judicial confirmations are the other lame-duck priority, since a Senate that changes hands in January would end confirmations on party-line votes. Since July the Senate has confirmed several district and appeals judges by margins of five votes or fewer, according to its roll-call record.

What It Means for US Readers

For investors reading the midterm odds, a Democratic House would add uncertainty mainly to spending and war funding, not to tariffs, which now rest on trade laws the president controls. Importers should note that refunds of the struck-down IEEPA duties are moving through the Court of International Trade, which certified a class of importers on 8 October.

Oil traders will watch the Strait of Hormuz and the US blockade more than Congress, but a fight over the US$87.6 billion war request could affect defence companies’ order books. Funding deadlines under a divided Congress also bring shutdown risk, which bond and currency traders watch for its effect on Treasury yields and the dollar.

For Latin American assets, Venezuela’s debt is the clearest case, since a May Treasury licence lets the acting government hire US advisers to prepare a restructuring of debts that may total US$240 billion, according to reports cited by the CRS. Brazilian exporters face the 25% Section 301 tariff whichever party wins, because only the president or a new law can lift it.

Travellers should note that tourist travel to Cuba remains barred under US law, and that ships near the Strait of Hormuz are still being attacked. Americans in Venezuela, Cuba or the Gulf should follow State Department travel advisories, and our USA & Canada Intelligence Brief, Tuesday, October 13, 2026 tracks the campaign day by day.

What Is Not Known

Several Senate races, including Iowa, Maine, Ohio and Texas, are priced between 57% and 65%, so the midterm odds there leave real room for upsets. Alaska uses ranked-choice voting in its general election, and close races anywhere can go to recounts that delay the result for days or weeks.

A 90.5% price in the midterm odds is not a promise, since a favourite at 90% still loses one time in ten. Prices can also move fast on news, such as renewed fighting with Iran or an economic shock, in the three weeks before the vote.

It is not known whether a Democratic House would in fact impeach Trump, on what charges, or how the appeal over the Section 122 surcharge will end. The administration has not said what it would do with the Iran blockade or the Venezuela oil accounts if Congress refused to fund them.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who is favoured to win the House in 2026?

Democrats. On the midterm odds, Polymarket bettors gave them a 90.5% chance of winning the House and Kalshi 90% (13 October, 11:14 a.m. ET). They need 218 seats and hold 214 today.

Who is favoured to win the Senate in 2026?

Democrats are favoured, but the Senate midterm odds are closer. Polymarket gave them 63.5% and Kalshi 61.5% (13 October, 11:14 a.m. ET). They need a net gain of four seats for a 51-seat majority, because Vice President JD Vance breaks ties.

Can Trump be removed if Democrats win the House?

A Democratic House could impeach him by a simple majority, but removal needs a two-thirds vote of senators present, 67 if all 100 vote. Kalshi prices impeachment before 2028 at 66.5% but impeachment and removal at 17.5%.

What can Trump do without Congress?

He can issue executive orders, impose sanctions under emergency law, order military action subject to the War Powers Resolution, set tariffs under Sections 232 and 301, grant pardons, veto bills and conduct diplomacy. The Supreme Court ruled on 20 February 2026 that he cannot impose tariffs under IEEPA.

When would a new Congress take over?

The newly elected Congress begins at noon on 3 January 2027. Until then the current Republican majorities stay in charge, and federal funding must be renewed by Friday 11 December.

Sources: US Senate, party division; US Senate, senators list; Clerk of the House, members and vacancies; US Senate, 2026 roll-call votes; Supreme Court, Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (20 February 2026); Supreme Court, Trump v. California (24 August 2026); Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 26-47 (Section 122); Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 26-53; Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 26-123 (IEEPA refund class); Executive Order 14389, Ending Certain Tariff Actions; USTR, Section 301 forced-labour action fact sheet; USTR, Section 301 action on Brazil; White House, Canada Section 338 fact sheet (8 September 2026); White House, H.R. 6500 signed into law; OMB, Statement of Administration Policy on S.J.Res. 180; Congressional Budget Office, Iran war cost letter (15 September 2026); CRS, Venezuela post-Maduro transition, August 2026; CRS, U.S.-Iran ceasefire, May 2026; CENTCOM, strikes of 8 July 2026; CENTCOM, blockade enforcement; OFAC, Venezuela-related sanctions and General License 46E; Executive Order 14380 on Cuba; Executive Order 14404 on Cuba; US Constitution; War Powers Resolution, 50 USC 1544; LIBERTAD Act, 22 USC 6032 and 6064; Trade Sanctions Reform Act, 22 USC 7209; Maine Secretary of State, post-primary withdrawals; Texas Secretary of State, 2026 ballot certification; North Carolina State Board of Elections, 2026 candidate list; Iowa Secretary of State, 2026 general candidate list; Ohio Secretary of State, 2026 sample ballot; The National (Abu Dhabi), Strait of Hormuz attacks, 13 October 2026. Market prices from Polymarket and Kalshi, read on 13 October, 11:14 a.m. ET.

Editorial responsibility: Matthias Camenzind, Editor-in-Chief · Editorial standards · Report an error

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