As military operations between the United States and Iran seem to subside, a war of competing narratives is emerging, and opposing claims over the Strait of Hormuz are creating potentially misleading and profound consequences.
On the one hand, Iran declares that the Strait is shut down, while allowing a limited number of ships and vessels to gain safe, yet reportedly paid, passage through its territorial waters. The United States, meanwhile, continues to insist that the Strait is open and that free, unobstructed navigation is guaranteed. President Trump has gone further, declaring the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory.
Beyond these competing claims, however, lies a compelling reality. Satellite imagery and marine tracking applications undeniably show that traffic across this Strait is very limited, with navigation now operating at only a fraction of its normal level before 28 February 2026. Contrary to US claims, the severely restricted passage of commercial ships across the Strait has clearly affected the global energy market, driving a surge in oil prices.
As this narrow passage becomes congested with military fleets, tankers, and other vessels, and as international interest grows, new realities are unfolding. Reported bilateral discussions between the two coastal states bordering the Strait, Oman and Iran, have reached a critical stage, defining new routes for vessels into and out of the strait. The bilateral discussions, meticulously followed by the US and the mediators, Pakistan and Qatar, is said to introduce new realities which did not exist before the US-Israeli attacks on Iran last February.
The Maritime Security Group's open-source analysis indicates that Iran seeks a role in overseeing inbound, and possibly outbound, maritime traffic through the Strait. Tehran is reportedly demanding new arrangements concerning vessels carrying military articles that could be used in military operations against Iran. If these reports prove accurate, they would mark the beginning of a fundamental shift in how access, navigation, and security are managed in the Strait of Hormuz.
Yet, even a successful conclusion of bilateral discussions with Oman would not guarantee the reopening of the Strait. Iranian officials have stressed that reopening the Strait of Hormuz is not contingent on the successful conclusion of these talks. Rather, Tehran views US adherence to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) bilaterally signed with Iran as a precondition for a sustainable resumption of navigation across Hormuz. In particular, Iran is calling for swift implementation of the MOU provisions on the cessation of hostilities, the lifting of the blockade, and the easing of sanctions. This distinction is critical.
The Oman-Iran discussions may address the mechanics of navigation through the Strait, but Tehran appears to be linking the sustainability of that navigation to a much broader political and security framework.
Those familiar with Iran’s nuclear negotiations will realise the magnitude and the level of concession Tehran has made on the nuclear front. A closer look at the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding reveals that Iran has committed itself to halting uranium enrichment, down-blending its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and imposing a moratorium on nuclear fuel cycle activities.
Amid growing speculation of a rift with Iran’s leadership, these concessions may have prompted hard-line elements, already dissatisfied with the MOU's terms, to seek to renegotiate Article 5, which addresses the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. This is consistent to a great extent with repeated statements by Iranian officials that the “Hormuz card” is more valuable than possessing nuclear weapons; To the Iranian mindset, the strategic leverage offered by the Strait is the perfect compensation to Iran’s concession in the nuclear file.
All this suggests that the Strait of Hormuz may not return soon to pre-war conditions. For Iran, Hormuz is not simply a waterway; it is now the “guarantor”, a part of its broader strategic equation involving sovereignty, deterrence and gaining lasting leverage.
For Oman, known for its balanced relations and tradition of diplomatic mediation, this Gulf state finds itself in a peculiar yet potentially advantageous position at the forefront of emerging regional arrangements.
Other GCC states may be the greatest losers from these evolving dynamics and arrangements. Obviously, GCC states have to face the new reality that Iran is not simply a neighbour, but a “gatekeeper for Hormuz”. Given GCC economies’ heavy dependence on maritime trade and energy exports, we may soon see GCC plans for alternative routes to export/import oil and commodities. This contingency planning would profoundly affect oil prices and markets.
For the United States, a key player facing an equally difficult calculation in the region, there is a fundamental interest in keeping international navigation open across Hormuz, alongside a recognition that military pressure would backfire.
Russia, meanwhile, remains in a comfortable position, benefiting from US exemption from oil sanctions, which allows it to sell its oil to international markets. The longer the crisis in Hormuz, the greater the benefit for Russian energy exports.
For China, the calculation is different. As one of the world's largest energy consumers, Beijing has a strong interest in restoring predictable navigation through Hormuz while exploring mechanisms to evade sanctions.
Regardless of these positions, the critical question is not simply whether the Strait becomes open. It is whether regional actors can build a mechanism that keeps Hormuz open, rather than using it as an instrument of pressure.
Ayman Khalil is a Senior Researcher at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. A physicist by training and holds a Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Reading University (UK). He is the coordinator of the "Missile Capabilities Platform" and “Nuclear Forum”, the only specialized forum in the Arab world that promotes policy and public dialogue in CBRN and delivery vehicles.
Fadel Kaseb is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer at the Arab Institute for Security Studies. He possess strong academic qualification with a Diploma focused in policy and strategy from U.S Naval War college and a diploma from UK's joint staff college. He has vast experience in Defence and security studies, with a Master degree from the University of London/King's College. Brigadier retired Kaseb has specific interest in joint military operations, future and strategic foresight. Fadel Kaseb and Ayman Khalil are both coordinators of the Maritime Security Group, a Norwegian sponsored initiative.
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