More than 19 months after massacres swept through Syria’s coastal provinces, the country’s courts have begun handing down death sentences and prison terms. Yet the proceedings have brought a troubling question into sharper focus: can Syria’s new authorities deliver justice for the atrocities without examining the responsibilities of their own military commanders?
The violence erupted on 6 March 2025, when armed groups associated with the former Assad regime attacked government positions in Latakia, Tartous and Hama, killing 238 members of the army and security services. A large-scale military mobilisation followed, accompanied by widespread reprisals against civilians, predominantly from the Alawite community.
The subsequent atrocities included summary executions, torture, looting, arson and sectarian abuse.
A national investigation established by President Ahmad al-Sharaa identified 1,426 people killed, including 90 women, and recorded 20 missing persons. Investigators collected 938 testimonies and identified 298 suspects in serious violations against civilians, alongside 265 individuals suspected of involvement in attacks by armed groups linked to the former regime.
The findings exposed the scale of the bloodshed. They also established the basis for what would become one of the most sensitive tests of Syria’s political transition: whether the new state could investigate crimes committed by forces operating under its own authority.
Verdicts Raise Difficult Questions
On 15 October, the Military Criminal Court in Aleppo delivered verdicts against ten defendants involved in cases arising from the coastal violence.
Two men associated with the former regime, Waddah Ismail and Maher Ali, were sentenced to death after being convicted of offences related to provoking civil war and sectarian conflict and leading armed groups. A third defendant received a 12-year prison sentence.
The court also convicted several members of the current Ministry of Defence. Mohammed Bakkour, from the 82nd Division, received a 20-year sentence for intentional killing, while Ammar Abdul Aal was sentenced to three years for torture. Other defendants received shorter prison terms, and two were acquitted because of insufficient evidence.
The verdicts followed earlier rulings in September that included a death sentence, life imprisonment, a 20-year prison term and an acquittal.
That members of government forces have been prosecuted is significant. It demonstrates that the judicial process is not confined to supporters of the ousted regime.
Nevertheless, the contrast between the severity of some sentences has attracted attention. Differences in punishment cannot automatically be taken as evidence of unequal justice, since each case depends on the charges, evidence and individual responsibility. Without access to detailed judicial reasoning, definitive conclusions would be premature.
The more important issue concerns the scope of the prosecutions. Thus far, the publicly disclosed proceedings have focused primarily on individual defendants. They offer little indication of whether prosecutors are investigating those who planned, directed and supervised the military operations during which the massacres occurred.
The Question of Command Responsibility
The national investigation concluded that the killings of civilians were neither organised nor systematic acts ordered by Syria’s military leadership. It attributed the atrocities to individuals and groups motivated by revenge, sectarian hostility and the breakdown of security.
The committee also maintained that the authorities had taken measures to stop the violations and that investigators had found no evidence of direct orders from senior government officials to commit the crimes.
However, a joint investigation published in September 2025 by Human Rights Watch, Syrians for Truth and Justice, and the Syrian Archive raised questions about the responsibilities of the military command.
The investigation, entitled Are You Alawi? Identity-Based Killings During Syria’s Transition, documented executions, raids, looting, property destruction and the mistreatment of detainees.
It found that the abuses occurred during an operation centrally coordinated by the Ministry of Defence, which organised the mobilisation and deployment of forces. According to the investigators, the ministry continued directing troop movements even after information about widespread killings had emerged.
The report did not establish that senior officials had ordered the atrocities. Nevertheless, its findings highlighted a crucial distinction under international criminal law: responsibility for atrocities can extend beyond those who personally commit them.
Military commanders may be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by subordinates if they knew, or had reason to know, about the violations, possessed the ability to prevent or punish them, and failed to take the necessary measures.
This principle does not make commanders automatically responsible for every crime committed by their troops. It does, however, require serious examination of the chain of command, operational orders, field reports and the decisions taken once the killings became known.
For Syria, this is where the question of accountability becomes particularly sensitive. Establishing who pulled the trigger is essential. Determining who commanded the perpetrators, what those commanders knew and how they responded is equally important.
Hundreds of Suspects, Limited Transparency
The gap between the national investigation’s findings and the publicly announced judicial proceedings raises another concern.
The committee identified 563 suspects across two categories: those implicated in violations against civilians and those associated with attacks on government forces.
Yet the authorities have not published a comprehensive account of how many have been arrested, formally charged, brought before the courts or convicted.
This does not mean that hundreds of suspects have escaped justice. Some cases may still be under investigation, while others could be proceeding without extensive publicity. Moreover, being named as a suspect does not establish guilt.
Nevertheless, the absence of detailed and regular judicial reporting makes it difficult to assess the true extent of accountability.
The Syrian Justice and Accountability Centre, which has independently monitored proceedings before the Aleppo Military Criminal Court, has documented witness testimony, defence submissions, the examination of video evidence and opportunities to appeal.
These observations suggest that the trials have involved substantive judicial procedures. They cannot, however, establish whether prosecutors are pursuing the full range of crimes or concentrating on a relatively small number of direct perpetrators.
The legal implications are substantial. In August 2025, the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria concluded that violations committed by forces associated with the new government and armed groups loyal to the former regime could amount to war crimes.
Such a classification raises questions extending beyond ordinary criminal offences under domestic law. It requires consideration of the armed conflict in which the abuses occurred and the different forms of responsibility recognised under international criminal law.
Whether Syria’s existing judicial framework can adequately address these complexities remains uncertain.
Justice Must Also Be Fair
The coastal trials carry particular weight in a country where courts were long associated with political persecution, coerced confessions and the suppression of dissent.
The new authorities face the challenge of demonstrating that accountability will be governed by evidence and due process, including when defendants are associated with the former regime or with the government itself.
The death sentences make these safeguards especially important. Defendants must have meaningful access to legal representation, the ability to challenge evidence and the right to appeal before independent courts.
Victims and their families, meanwhile, are entitled to truth, justice and reparations.
These obligations are mutually reinforcing. Trials that fail to meet credible legal standards risk undermining the very accountability they are intended to establish.
A Test of the New Syria
The coastal massacres occupy a distinctive place in Syria’s troubled transition. They occurred after the fall of Assad, under authorities that came to power promising to break with the practices of the former regime.
The prosecutions therefore test something more fundamental than the state’s willingness to punish individual offenders. They test whether its institutions can investigate crimes involving their own personnel and examine failures within the structures of military authority.
The verdicts issued so far represent a step towards accountability. Yet they leave unanswered questions about the fate of hundreds of suspects and the possible responsibility of commanders who oversaw the operations.
Answering those questions requires more than convictions and prison sentences. It demands transparent investigations into military orders, troop deployments, communications and the response of senior officials as reports of atrocities emerged.
The credibility of Syria’s new justice system will ultimately depend on whether it can establish a complete and convincing account of what happened along the coast in March 2025.
For the families of the victims, that means knowing who committed the crimes and who allowed them to continue.
For Syria’s new leadership, it means demonstrating that accountability can reach every level of authority, including those entrusted with exercising power in the name of the new state.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
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