- The choking of Hormuz and the rerouting of crude to Fujairah and Yanbu
- Maritime extortion and covert funding for Hezbollah
- The US electoral calendar and the Asian energy paradox
- Internal strife in Yemen and Riyadh's response
The drone and missile offensive launched by Houthi insurgents against the Saudi airports of Abha and Riyadh has crossed a critical threshold with regional repercussions.
The attack, which left three civilian fatalities — two women holding Moroccan and Algerian citizenship and a Sudanese national — alongside 36 injured, not only evidences a qualitative leap in the Yemeni group's operational reach but also exposes the extreme vulnerability of key transport infrastructure across the Arabian Peninsula.
This escalation coincides with a severe reconfiguration of global energy routes: the collapse of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the use of alternative pipelines towards the Emirate of Fujairah and the port of Yanbu, and the multimillion-dollar rerouting of funds from Tehran to its allied militias.
To break down the geopolitical risks of this crisis and the role played by Washington, we spoke with diplomat, international analyst, and Atalayar contributor Gustavo de Arístegui.
The choking of Hormuz and the rerouting of crude to Fujairah and Yanbu
Your analyses in Atalayar warn that these attacks represent a qualitative leap for regional stability, differing from Marco Rubio's assessments regarding Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
I hold great personal respect for Marco Rubio, yet I observe with concern how the US administration squandered the opportunity to neutralise the oligarchic and jihadist regime of Iran by agreeing to a truce last April.
Tehran was then on the verge of military collapse, whilst economically the collapse was already complete: nearly ten million jobs have been destroyed due to the regime's incompetence and corruption, compounded by a nearly year-long internet blackout, galloping inflation, and the plunge of the rial to rates near four million per dollar.
Regarding oil exports, it is true that total regional extraction volume remains around 18.2 million barrels per day, a level similar to pre-28 February figures. However, the crucial nuance lies in the export routes: oil physically traversing the Strait of Hormuz has plummeted by 40%, and overall maritime traffic through that chokepoint has dropped by 27%.
Crude is primarily exiting via two alternative overland routes. Firstly, through pipelines transporting crude from Abu Dhabi to terminals in the Emirate of Fujairah — the only one of the seven emirates with direct access to the Arabian Sea outside the Persian Gulf —, terminals now squarely in the sights of Iran and the Houthis.
Secondly, via pipelines connecting eastern oilfields to the Red Sea, terminating at the Saudi port of Yanbu — already struck on multiple occasions by Houthi projectiles —, from where between 5 and 5.5 million barrels depart daily. From there, vessels bound for Europe travel via Suez, whilst those destined for Asia must head south past Bab el-Mandeb, where Houthis harass tankers with short-range anti-ship missiles.
Maritime extortion and covert funding for Hezbollah
You severely denounce the payment of fees or tolls in order to navigate these waters.
Those who pay extortion fees or tolls to allow their vessels to cross Hormuz or Bab el-Mandeb unattacked incur direct complicity with terrorism and Tehran's totalitarian regime. Paying protection money to an armed group directly funds its next terrorist attack, regardless of who the payer is: a state, a private shipowner, or a multinational corporation. Such conduct is legally and ethically unacceptable.
Simultaneously, Tehran's financial machinery continues operating. The transfer of 200 million dollars from Iran to Hezbollah under the formal pretext of humanitarian aid has been verified.
It is evident these funds are earmarked for military rearmament. To channel these resources, Iran has re-established overland and logistical corridors connecting its controlled areas in Iraq directly to Hezbollah positions in Lebanon, particularly in the Beqaa Valley and the Baalbek region.
The US electoral calendar and the Asian energy paradox
President Donald Trump has ruled out a preemptive strike against Iran ahead of the 3 November elections and alludes to ongoing contacts. Is the strategy frozen by the ballot box?
Historically, the Iranian regime has never used a ceasefire to repair civilian infrastructure or hospitals; it uses truces to rebuild its missile batteries, drone launchers, and to fortify its secret nuclear facilities.
The US institutional design subjects decision-making to a perpetual electoral campaign due to the House of Representatives being up for renewal every two years. Yet a superpower's security and defence policy cannot be subordinated to immediate electoral calculations or rhetorical swings alternating threats of total destruction with offers of negotiation depending on fluctuations in the oil price.
As thinker James Freeman Clarke reminded us, the difference between a statesman and a politician is that the former thinks of the next generation, whilst the latter thinks of the next election.
There is also a major paradox: those least harmed by disruptions to Gulf supplies are the United States — which enjoys energy self-sufficiency — and Europe. The destination for the bulk of that crude is Asia, and its primary global buyer is China, which absorbs nearly 40% of Gulf production. In other words, the West is bearing the military and operational cost of stabilising a maritime artery whose primary economic beneficiary is its principal geostrategic competitor.
Internal strife in Yemen and Riyadh's response
Following this strike against its airports, will Saudi Arabia shoulder the response alone or activate regional alliances?
In the Yemen scenario, two highly complex realities coexist. The first is the strategic disparity between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which sustain divergent agendas and alliances on Yemeni soil.
The second concerns the nature of the Houthis: for decades certain theoretical analyses dismissed their link to Tehran, arguing doctrinal discrepancies between Zaydism and the Twelver Shia Islam dominant in Iran. That is a miscalculation; Tehran's logic is not theological, but pragmatic: it forges alliances with any actor opposed to its enemies.
The Iranian regime conceives confrontation in decades-long cycles. Its objective is to hold out in the hope that a handover in Washington will dilute military pressure and allow it to consolidate effective hegemony over the region's strategic chokepoints. In response, Saudi Arabia will continue bombing Houthi launch sites to protect its population and infrastructure, in legitimate self-defence against a terrorist actor threatening global stability.