Feeding a nation from the farm gate: “Planting for Food and Jobs” and the test facing the “Feed Ghana Programme”

Agricultural policy should be judged by its reach: how many farmers received support, how many officers could get to the field, and whether yields and incomes improved. Judged this way, the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ), launched in 2017, set a demanding benchmark. Supporters of the NPP argue that the National Democratic Congress’s (NDC) Feed Ghana Programme (FGP) has yet get close to the success stories from the Planting for Food and Jobs (PFJ) at the district-level delivery that farmers actually experience.

Inputs at Scale

PFJ rested on a simple economic logic: lower the cost of production and farmers will produce more. In 2017, 121,000 MT of fertilizer was supplied at a 50% subsidy under PFJ, alongside 4,400 MT of certified seed. The programme then expanded rapidly. In 2018, 577,000 farmers received subsidized fertilizer and seed against a target of 500,000, and in 2019 some 920,000 eligible farmers were supported. Exceeding a programme own target was rare milestone in public policy.

Measurable Productivity Gains

According to the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, maize yield rose from 1.8 MT/ha in 2016 to 3.0 MT/ha in 2017. Independent scholarship supports the direction of these gains. One review estimated that maize and rice production levels are more than 40 percent higher than they would have been without PFJ, and a survey of 400 maize farmers found that participants earned higher gross profits than non-participants. For local economic development, this is the essential evidence: income effects at the household level.

Human Capital and Mobility

Policy on paper counts for little if officers cannot reach farmers. PFJ engaged over 2,000 agricultural agents in 2017, and district directors and extension officers were equipped with vehicles and motorbikes. Pick-up vehicles for directors and motorbikes for technical officers may sound mundane, but they turned training into a field activity rather than an office one.

Responsive and Diversified Design

PFJ was also adaptive. Modules such as Planting for Export and Rural Development (PERD) and the Special Rice Initiative (SRI) extended support beyond staples, while the free distribution of verified, true-to-type oil palm seedlings created long-term tree-crop assets. When Fall Army Worms (FAW) hit maize fields in the first year, the government responded with free chemicals and training for officers and farmers. The Minerals Development Fund and the Minerals Commission also supported PERD, a contribution documented in the records of both institutions.

The Feed Ghana Test

The FGP is ambitious on paper, with twenty-two priority commodity value chains and a planned network of farmer service centres. In practice, the most visible district-level activity has been poultry: about two million day-old chicks brooded and distributed across 10 regions, alongside the appointment of coordinators.

Conclusion

NPP supporters argue that this falls short of the input subsidies, extension logistics and crop support that farmers saw under PFJ. Their case is that a programme credibility depends on delivery in the districts, not on strategy documents. Nearly two years into the NDC government and these three questions remains unanswered:

1) Where is the fertilizer allocation?

2) Where are the mechanization centers?

3) How are extension officers and directors being resourced?

The comparison, as a farmer, is between a programme that built its record on inputs, mobility and measurable yields, and one that is yet to show the same reach. The FGP has time left in its 2025–2028 term to prove us all wrong, and farmers will be the judges.

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