HISTORY, it has famously been said, repeats itself first as tragedy and then as farce. Today, it is repeating itself in Pakistan as both tragedy and farce. Recent events have deepened some of the country’s overlapping fault lines — enduring features that have shaped its political landscape for decades. Together they have contributed to its chronic instability and impeded its progress.
It has meant the absence of a calm and predictable environment in which to meet the country’s growing challenges. The country seems caught in a time warp with a power elite ensuring it cannot escape its past.
Four fault lines (there are others too) are laid bare by recent political developments: unceasing confrontation between the government and opposition; centre-province conflict resulting in dismissal of elected provincial governments; parliament’s marginal role in the political system; and weak institutions whose evolution is stymied or independence eroded by predatory ruling elites.
The ongoing confrontation between the PML-N-led government and PTI may have novel aspects but it reflects a long-standing fault line in the country’s divisive politics. Government-opposition conflicts have been endemic in Pakistan’s history, with political behaviour driven by the ethic of war rather than competition. Political leaders and parties have viewed opponents as enemies to be eliminated from the political arena in a terminal conflict, not rivals to compete with, much less accommodated. Branding opponents as disloyal to the country is a well-worn, unseemly tradition. This is evident today by the disingenuous narrative peddled by federal ministers that the ousted KP government was aligned with terrorist organisations.
A culture of compromise, tolerance, and restraint never took root leaving ruling and opposition parties perpetually at loggerheads. This, in turn, opened the door to both direct and indirect interventions by the military, which could always count on support from one political party or another to oust governments and expand its power. Divide and rule strategies pursued by the establishment also fuelled political conflict.
Some enduring aspects of the political landscape are holding Pakistan back.
There were rare moments of political consensus as for example when the 1973 Constitution was adopted, Charter of Democracy agreed (but never implemented) between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 2006 and in more recent years, the unanimous passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010. Beyond these and some other exceptions, the tradition of intolerance and authoritarian behaviour has persisted.
Opposition parties have rarely accepted the legitimacy of governments while governments refused to recognise opposition as a legitimate activity fundamental to democracy. The underlying reason has usually been disputed elections. Pakistan’s history is replete with losing sides contesting results and alleging ballot fraud, often for good reason. This happened most recently in the 2024 election which, despite its controversial nature, still saw PTI winning a plurality in the national legislature. It was blocked from forming the federal government by an alliance between its opponents and the establishment. Its uncompromising conduct today stems from what it sees as a stolen election and political manoeuvring to keep it out of power.
While linked to government-opposition conflict, the second fault line is distinct: troubled relations and friction between the centre and provinces, which have punctuated the country’s history and weakened federalism. Intolerance of opposition-controlled provincial governments by parties governing at the centre became a common feature from the very inception of Pakistan.
Just seven days after independence, the NWFP government was deposed, setting an unfortunate precedent. Thereafter, every province saw elected governments replaced by governor’s rule at some time or another, undermining the federation and testing the country’s unity. The consequences of intolerance of rivals together with the establishment’s efforts to centralise power and failure to make the federal arrangement work, were writ large in the rise of the Bengali nationalist movement that culminated in the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.
But no lesson was learnt and the fault line endured. Fast forward to the 1990s when the regionalised nature of election outcomes meant that parties forming governments at the federal level were often different from those that constituted provincial governments. This should have urged efforts to establish smooth and cooperative centre-province relations. But that did not happen. The notion that reciprocal obligations between the centre and provinces are more than a constitutional precept and actually have to be fulfilled by both sides still finds few takers.
A third fault line relates to parliament’s weakness and its inability to play its fundamental role of exercising oversight of executive actions and hold governments to account. Successive governments have viewed parliament principally as a means to maintain themselves in power rather than a forum to initiate and debate laws and policy. The preferred mode of legislating has often been through ordinance or using a brute majority to rush through laws without deliberation. This reduced parliament to little more than a rubber stamp.
The most recent examples are the 26th and 27th Constitutional amendments that were steamrolled through parliament in 2024 and 2025 without real debate and without even sharing their texts with members before moving them. There was virtually no debate when the two chambers recently endorsed the imposition of emergency in KP. Few if any governments encouraged parliament to play an active legislative and deliberative role. Instead, they preferred the legislature to be a passive body. This remains the case.
Even ruling parties with handsome majorities failed to recognise parliament’s utility as a forum to ventilate, change and share opinion. Whether this reflects lack of confidence in their backbenchers or poor understanding of how parliament should function, the outcome is marginalisation of the legislature’s role. This denudes the political system of democratic accountability.
The fourth fault line — weak institutions — is no less consequential. It is rooted in a political culture that has privileged personalities over institutions, and in a ruling elite that has little appetite for strong institutions because they impose checks and balances and place limits on power. Nothing illustrates this better than the judiciary. Its independence has been steadily eroded over the years by both civilian and military governments. The recent constitutional amendments have taken this further, making the superior judiciary subservient to the executive.
Political fault lines are not cast in stone. Their persistence doesn’t mean they cannot be overcome especially when their impact on the country is so damaging. But it requires bold, visionary leadership to break from the past.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, October 19th, 2026