Pallab Bhattacharyya
(Pallab Bhattacharyya is a former director-general of police, Special Branch and erstwhile Chairman, APSC. Views expressed by him is personal. He can be reached at pallab1959@hotmail.com)
On 9 October 2026, Punjab appointed 1992-batch IPS officer Gaurav Yadav
as its regular Director General of Police (DGP), ending more than four years during which he had headed the force in an officiating capacity. The appointment followed scrutiny by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which questioned the delay despite a Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) panel of three eligible officers. The decision revives a basic question about who controls the police in a constitutional democracy: the elected government, the law or the public interest.
V.K. Bhawra, originally a 1987-batch Assam-Meghalaya cadre IPS officer, became Punjab’s DGP in January 2022 after being selected from a UPSC panel. However, the AAP government was dissatisfied with his functioning, and Bhawra had to go on leave in July. In September, he was transferred to the Punjab Police Housing Corporation, shortly before his leave was due to end. The government cited deteriorating law and order. The transfer came about seven months into his tenure, well short of the Supreme Court-mandated minimum tenure of two years. The public record does not establish that a court found the transfer politically motivated; the concern is that a broad explanation such as “law and order” can be used to displace a chief unless safeguards are followed.
The episode is connected to the landmark 2006 judgment in Prakash Singh v. Union of India. Former police chiefs Prakash Singh and N.K. Singh filed a public interest litigation in 1996, challenging political interference, arbitrary transfers and weak accountability. Their case followed years of official inquiries. The National Police Commission, established in 1977, issued eight reports, while the Ribeiro and Padmanabhaiah committees revisited police organisation. The Sorabjee committee produced a Model Police Act in 2006. Repeated reports exposed a contradiction: governments endorsed reform in principle but resisted limits on their discretion.
On 22 September 2006, the Supreme Court issued seven directions to remain in force until governments enacted suitable laws. States were to establish State Security Commissions to set broad policy, assess performance and protect the police from unwarranted pressure. The DGP was to be selected from the three senior-most eligible officers empanelled by the UPSC, taking into account their service records, very good records of service and experience, and was to receive a minimum tenure of two years, irrespective of normal retirement. Inspectors General, Superintendents of Police and station-house officers were also to have minimum two-year tenures, subject to specified exceptions. Investigation was to be separated from law-and-order duties. Police Establishment Boards were to handle transfers and postings of junior officers and advise on senior appointments. State and district Police Complaints Authorities were to examine serious misconduct. A National Security Commission was envisaged for the chiefs of central police organisations.
These directions aimed to change incentives, not merely organisational charts. A chief protected from arbitrary removal can resist improper demands; a station officer secure from politically driven transfers can investigate more freely; and an independent complaints body offers citizens a route beyond the force they accuse. Tenure is not immunity. The judgment permitted early removal following disciplinary action under service rules, conviction for a criminal offence or corruption, or incapacity, in consultation with the State Security Commission. The purpose is to replace arbitrary discretion with stated reasons and fair procedures.
Implementation revealed the gap between judicial directives and political practice. A committee chaired by former Supreme Court judge K.T. Thomas found serious shortcomings. Some states enacted police laws but created government-dominated commissions or diluted safeguards. On 3 July 2018, the Supreme Court tightened the process: states must send proposals to the UPSC at least three months before a vacancy, appoint a DGP from its panel and never appoint an “acting DGP”. As far as practicable, candidates should have at least two clear years of service remaining, with both merit and seniority considered. Conflicting rules remain in abeyance to the extent of their inconsistency with the court’s directions. Orders in 2019 clarified that the two-year rule protects tenure; it is not a device to appoint someone just before retirement to secure an extended term.
Punjab’s four-year acting arrangement shows how a safeguard may be defeated by delay rather than direct dismissal. The 2018 order rejected the concept of an acting DGP, yet Yadav served in that capacity from July 2022 until October 2026. The Supreme Court’s scrutiny continues: in October 2026, it questioned Jharkhand’s rules removing a six-month residual-service requirement for DGP candidates and sought an examination of the rules in other states. These are ongoing proceedings, not a final ruling that every challenged rule is invalid.
The judgment has narrowed the choice for the top appointment, established a tenure safeguard and provided a legal standard for challenging arbitrary action. Yet political influence persists in everyday policing. Governments can weaken oversight bodies, delay appointments, transfer officers below the DGP level, control budgets and priorities, or enact laws that dilute reform. Informal instructions may leave little evidence. Breaches often require litigation, and there is no automatic penalty for every failure. Because police and public order are State List subjects, some governments view UPSC involvement as an intrusion into federal autonomy. That concern merits discussion but cannot justify ignoring binding Supreme Court directions.
International experience offers principles, not templates. In England and Wales, chief constables direct operations, while elected Police and Crime Commissioners provide local accountability. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services inspects performance, and the Independent Office for Police Conduct investigates serious complaints. Japan uses public safety commissions to separate policy supervision from direct command. New Zealand has an Independent Police Conduct Authority. Canadian and Australian jurisdictions use civilian boards or commissions in varying forms. Though the systems differ, the lessons are consistent: protect operations from partisan direction, preserve accountability for misconduct, and give oversight bodies independent procedures, professional staff and funding.
India can adapt these principles without abandoning democratic control. State Security Commissions should include government, opposition and independent members selected transparently, with published minutes and reasoned recommendations. Police Complaints Authorities need staff, funding and powers to investigate serious complaints, along with protection against retaliation. DGP selection and early removal should follow statutory criteria, with recorded reasons open to review. Police Establishment Boards should decide routine transfers, while exceptional political directions should be written and auditable. Investigation units need trained personnel and forensic support, with prosecutorial and judicial oversight.
Reform is possible under the present Constitution. Articles 14 and 21 support non-arbitrary administration and the protection of life and liberty; Article 142 empowered the Supreme Court to issue directions. Under the Seventh Schedule, state legislatures can enact police laws concerning police and public order, subject to constitutional requirements and binding judgments. Parliament and the Union can act regarding central forces and Union Territories, while police-modernisation assistance can encourage reform. Moving police to the Concurrent List or constitutionally entrenching an independent commission would require a larger political settlement, but neither is essential to meaningful progress.
The point is not to remove elected oversight but to prevent partisan command over cases, investigations and personnel decisions while preserving democratic accountability and public safety.
Gaurav Yadav’s appointment is a test, not a conclusion. Bhawra’s early transfer and the prolonged acting arrangement show how political discretion can persist despite judicial standards. Prakash Singh cannot create professional independence by itself if governments evade its spirit, commissions remain ornamental and citizens cannot obtain remedies. The task is to turn tenure into institutional integrity: impartial investigations, predictable personnel decisions, independent complaints review and transparent accountability. A police force must serve the law and every citizen, not the government of the day. This is not a demand for a police force without control, but for control exercised through law rather than political favour.