US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth last week sparked controversy among America's European allies by suggesting they had not pulled their weight during the two-decade war in Afghanistan. He repeated a joke he had made previously about the International Security Assistance Force, suggesting that the acronym ISAF stood for “I Saw Americans Fighting.”
His remarks drew criticism from many European leaders, who pointed out the sacrifices made by their armed forces in Afghanistan. More than 1,100 non-American troops lost their lives during the conflict, most of them Europeans fighting alongside American troops.
If this were a one-off incident, it could be dismissed. However, this comment is part of a large and concerning pattern of criticizing America’s European partners.
Perhaps the clearest indication of how much the transatlantic relationship has changed under President Donald Trump’s second term can be found by comparing the national security strategies published during his first and second terms.
The 2017 National Security Strategy recognized Europe as an important partner in advancing American interests around the world. It emphasized the importance of NATO, highlighted the contributions of America’s European allies and explicitly identified Russia as a threat to transatlantic security.
Fast-forward eight years to the National Security Strategy published late last year and the contrast could hardly be more striking. While mildly acknowledging Europe’s strategic importance, the latest document places far greater emphasis on the continent’s perceived political, cultural and economic shortcomings. This has framed Europe as a potential problem for Washington to manage rather than a strategic partner. Remarkably, the recent strategic document also fails to identify Russia as even a competitor, much less an adversary of the US.
This suggests a fundamental shift in how Washington views the strategic value of its European allies and partners
Luke Coffey
This represents more than a change in tone. It suggests a fundamental shift in how Washington views the strategic value of its European allies and partners.
Of course, Trump’s first term was hardly free of criticism of Europeans. However, despite the sometimes harsh rhetoric, the policy outcomes told a different story.
By the time Trump left office in January 2021, the US had invested more money in European defense, deployed more troops to the continent and conducted more military exercises with European allies than when he entered office.
On Ukraine, Trump also became the first American president to authorize the delivery of advanced defensive weapons, after his predecessor refused to do so.
For these reasons, some European policymakers remain hopeful that the outcome of Trump’s second term will resemble that of his first. They argue that the rhetoric and public disagreements are best ignored and that attention should remain on actual policy outcomes.
This time, however, the situation feels different. More often than not, the Trump administration’s rhetoric has been accompanied by actions that have undermined trust between Washington and European capitals.
Perhaps the most damaging example was Greenland, when Trump refused to rule out using military force to acquire the Danish territory. Although the US, Denmark and Greenland recently reached an agreement concerning America’s future role on the island, policymakers in Washington continue to underestimate the damage this episode has done to transatlantic trust.
Other issues are constantly lingering in the background. These include the trade wars targeting European countries, uncertainty about the future presence of American troops in Europe and Washington’s commitment to NATO, and the unpredictability of Trump’s policy toward Ukraine.
The deterioration of trust between Washington and European capitals risks having lasting consequences for American interests. The stability, security and prosperity of Europe are directly connected to America’s own well-being. This is particularly evident when examining the economic relationship. In simple terms, Europe is too important to dismiss.
Together, North America and Europe account for about half of global economic output. Europe remains America’s largest export market, with 48 of the 50 US states exporting more goods to Europe than to China. Meanwhile, Europe is the single largest source of foreign direct investment in the US.
Taken together, this economic relationship creates millions of American jobs and contributes directly to the American economy.
The deterioration of trust between Washington and European capitals risks having lasting consequences for US interests
Luke Coffey
The economic success of the transatlantic community did not happen by mistake. It has been made possible, in large part, by the stability and security provided by NATO and sustained American engagement in Europe.
There is also a broader geopolitical dimension that Washington cannot ignore when it comes to Europe. Europe is not America’s enemy. At a time when the US faces significant challenges in the Middle East, East Asia and across the Eurasian landmass, American policymakers should be looking for opportunities to add to and multiply the number of America’s allies and partners, not subtract from and divide them. There is no better place than Europe for America to do just that.
This is why the administration’s repeated criticism of long-standing European allies, combined with actions such as threatening Greenland or trade wars, is ultimately self-defeating.
Alliances are not simply transactional arrangements that can be switched on and off according to the whims of Washington policymakers. They depend on trust, mutual respect and routine engagement.
There will inevitably be disagreements between Trump and his European counterparts over global affairs, domestic politics, cultural issues and, of course, burden sharing inside NATO. In fact, many of these disagreements transcend multiple US presidents, both Democratic and Republican.
However, both sides must look beyond these disagreements, work together and recognize the bigger geopolitical picture. The US and Europe share far more strategic interests than the current state of their relationship might suggest.
Putting the transatlantic relationship back on track should therefore be a priority for both sides of the Atlantic. After all, the consequences of instability in US-European relations will be felt far beyond the North Atlantic, precisely when unity and cohesion are most needed to confront shared global challenges.
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. X: @LukeDCoffey