Banks can influence demand for stablecoins through the interest they offer savers, according to an October working paper published by the Bank for International Settlements. The research finds that increases in U.S. deposit rates are followed by slower growth in stablecoin market capitalization, with a stronger response for USDC than USDT.
The paper, by Rashad Ahmed and Iñaki Aldasoro, examines weekly data from January 2019 through June 2025. It studies how the return on bank savings affects the appeal of holding digital dollars, rather than attempting to measure a current exodus of deposits from banks.
The authors’ views are their own, rather than a formal BIS policy position. The October paper also identifies an earlier version from March 2026; its findings should not be presented as a new rule or a study first released today.
The competition includes the return on savings
A stablecoin and a bank deposit can both offer a relatively stable unit of account, but their usefulness depends on more than their dollar denomination. Payment access, transfer speed, redemption arrangements and the interest available elsewhere can all affect the choice.
A saver who earns more by leaving money in a bank account faces a greater opportunity cost from holding a non-interest-paying token. That does not mean every stablecoin user will switch. Someone who needs tokens for blockchain settlement may still value their specific function. The research asks whether the aggregate balance changes as deposit pricing moves.
The authors account for other financial variables, including Bitcoin prices, Treasury rates and broader market conditions. They also examine the possibility that causality runs in both directions: banks could raise deposit rates because they are responding to competition from stablecoins.
The estimates have practical limits
The paper uses the way banks respond to higher policy rates to help separate those effects. The resulting estimates indicate that deposit pricing matters, while the authors acknowledge limitations in identifying the relationship. A historical estimate is not a mechanical forecast of how much stablecoin supply will change after the next rate adjustment.
The stronger response for USDC is consistent with closer links to U.S. depositors, the researchers argue. It does not establish that every USDC holder is American, or that the same relationship will persist as payment networks and token products change.
The study also does not demonstrate that stablecoin growth has already reduced aggregate bank lending. Where issuers place their reserves matters: money can return to banking institutions through issuer deposits or take other forms. A shift in who supplies funding is different from proving that total deposits have disappeared.
Deposit pricing is different from peg stability
Slower growth in a token’s market capitalization does not automatically mean it is failing to maintain its dollar value. A stablecoin can experience redemptions while continuing to trade close to its intended price. Our explanation of stablecoin pegs and redemption mechanisms distinguishes supply changes from a loss of the peg.
The research adds an economic dimension to the debate over digital money: adoption depends partly on what competing forms of money offer. Banks’ existing deposit accounts, and the rates paid on them, can remain relevant even as new blockchain payment systems expand.