For more than a decade, Syria was the arena where other countries’ armies fought. Now, Damascus is weighing whether to send its own soldiers to fight someone else’s war.
Syria is considering deploying 10,000 to 20,000 troops to Yemen to reinforce Saudi-backed forces against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Axios’s Barak Ravid reported on Oct. 7. The idea reportedly came up when Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, as Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major ground offensive to retake Houthi-held territory. Both governments reportedly consulted the Trump administration, which is not opposed in principle, and U.S. Central Command has been consulted on how such a deployment might work.
Damascus has pushed back. Ahmad Zaidan, al-Sharaa’s media adviser, called reports of a Saudi request “a lie.” Syria’s Foreign Media Department said the country “was focused on stability, not opening new fronts.” Such denials deserve serious consideration. But public statements rarely capture everything discussed behind closed doors, and a denial is not, by itself, evidence of a secret deal either.
At first glance, Syrian participation would serve an interest shared by Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel: weakening an Iranian proxy that has struck Saudi airports, attacked the Jewish state and threatened shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. But for Israel, the more consequential story may not be what happens in Yemen. It is what the episode reveals about Syria’s ambitions and the army that al-Sharaa is building.
‘A provider of security’
Since the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in December 2024, al-Sharaa—a former jihadist commander—has worked to establish himself as Syria’s legitimate leader. His priorities are rebuilding a devastated economy, attracting foreign investment, returning Syria to the international community and reducing its dependence on patrons such as Turkey.
Saudi Arabia has been central to that effort. Mohammed bin Salman helped open doors for al-Sharaa in Washington, and Riyadh has become a major partner in Syria’s reconstruction. Until now, however, the relationship has largely centered on what Syria needed from Saudi Arabia. A Yemen deployment could change that equation. Instead of requesting investment and diplomatic support, al-Sharaa could offer something of his own: military manpower in a war Riyadh wants to win.
That may be the real significance of the episode. Al-Sharaa appears to be positioning Syria as a provider of security, rather than merely a recipient of assistance, and a country that provides security negotiates from a stronger position. Paradoxically, he may not need to deploy anyone to benefit. The mere perception that Riyadh sees Syrian troops as a useful military asset raises his standing. He might gain much of what he wants without a single soldier ever reaching Yemen.
It would be tempting to read the episode as Syria moving closer to Saudi Arabia at Turkey’s expense. That would miss a broader pattern. As I have argued previously, al-Sharaa seeks diverse partnerships, not a new patron. Turkish backing, Saudi investment and dialogue with Washington need not be mutually exclusive.
The clearest evidence came in August, when Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani said that Damascus was considering joining the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, the collective-defense framework linking Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, under which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. Turkey and Pakistan have pledged military support to Saudi Arabia under the pact, although Ankara has ruled out participating in offensive operations.
Joining an arrangement that includes both Ankara and Riyadh would let al-Sharaa integrate into a wider regional security structure instead of choosing between competing partners. Seen this way, troops for Yemen could serve as Syria’s entry ticket.
Yet the strategy contains a contradiction. The deeper Syria becomes involved in collective-defense commitments, the greater the risk of being drawn into wars unrelated to its own interests. Alliances meant to expand al-Sharaa’s freedom of action could end up restricting it.
The military risks are just as serious. Al-Sharaa is still trying to forge a national army from former rebel factions, militias and foreign fighters with different backgrounds and loyalties. Discipline, reliable command, common training and institutional loyalty remain works in progress. Sending thousands of soldiers into a distant campaign against an experienced adversary skilled in guerrilla warfare, missiles and drones could expose those weaknesses while Syria still faces sectarian tensions and enormous reconstruction needs at home.
‘The picture is mixed’
The composition of the force matters even more. According to Axios, the units under consideration are the 90th Division, based near Damascus, and the 84th Division, based near Sweida. The 84th includes thousands of Islamist foreign fighters who fought under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham umbrella during the civil war. Sending them against the Shi’ite Houthis could make the deployment look less like a national army on a state mission and more like Sunni jihadists exported to a sectarian war.
That is precisely the image al-Sharaa has worked to shed and one that would deepen fears among Syria’s own minorities—from Alawites to Druze—about the army he is building. A deployment would therefore be more than a favor to Riyadh. It would be the first real test of whether al-Sharaa can use his new army beyond Syria’s borders without undermining stability at home.
For Israel, the picture is mixed. Weakening the Houthis is clearly in Israel’s interest; the movement has fired missiles and drones at Israel, and disrupted Red Sea shipping. Closer Syrian ties with Riyadh and Washington could also give both capitals more leverage over Damascus. Having invested heavily in Syria’s recovery, Saudi Arabia would gain both the motive and the means to restrain Syrian moves that risk a confrontation with Israel.
There is also a more immediate consideration. A deployment involving elements of the 84th Division could temporarily reduce the presence of Islamist fighters in southern Syria, where Israel has intervened militarily amid threats to the Druze community. But units that return from Yemen would come home with combat experience and with new foreign partners.
That points to two longer-term risks.
The first is military. Fighting alongside Saudi and Yemeni forces could expose Syrian units to more advanced methods of warfare, operational intelligence, command-and-control systems and logistics. Training, equipment and sustained cooperation could accelerate the development of Syria’s armed forces. For Israel, the question is not only how the Syrian army performs today, but what it could do in five or 10 years.
The second risk is diplomatic. A Syrian president fighting an Iranian proxy alongside key U.S. regional partners could gain a new measure of international acceptance. That legitimacy has consequences. As Damascus becomes more closely tied to influential regional players, the diplomatic cost of Israeli military operations on Syrian territory could increase, even when Jerusalem considers them essential to protecting its northern border.
None of this means that stronger Syrian-Saudi ties should automatically be seen as a threat. What matters is the nature of the partnership, the capabilities transferred through it and the commitments Damascus assumes.
Syria is trying to move from dependence on foreign aid to a seat in the emerging regional security order. Israel should judge that transformation not by the enemies Syria offers to fight, but by the capabilities it develops, the alliances it builds and the freedom of action it retains.
The decisive question is not whether al-Sharaa sends troops to Yemen. It’s what kind of Syria emerges from the partnerships he is building and what that Syria will mean for Israel when their interests no longer align.