Roman Gurevich is a writer and Honorary Ambassador of the Jewish Agency for Israel in Azerbaijan. He was born and raised in Baku.
(Oct. 20, 2026 / JNS)
Relations between Turkey and Israel are in a deep crisis. In Syria, our two countries have come dangerously close to a military confrontation. Turkish leaders accuse Israel of every conceivable sin.
Turkey has also declared a complete economic boycott of Israel. If political statements cannot change Jerusalem’s policies, why not try to hit Israel where it hurts economically?
This is where the interests of the United States, Israel and Turkey intertwine. For Washington, this conflict is more than just another Middle Eastern quarrel.
Turkey is a NATO member, while Israel is a strategic ally of the United States. A possible confrontation between two American partners in Syria would confront Washington with an extremely uncomfortable choice.
But another country matters to the United States in this situation—one that maintains close relations with both sides of the Mediterranean conflict and could help American diplomacy.
That country is Azerbaijan.
But let us begin with the ships. There is an unexpected surprise waiting for us.
On Oct. 7, 2025, the Turkish newspaper BirGün reported 456 direct voyages from Turkish ports to Israel during the first nine months of the year: 302 to Haifa and 154 to Ashdod.
Yet on March 30, 2026, Turkey’s Ministry of Trade once again declared that bilateral trade with Israel had been completely suspended since May 2024.
Something does not add up. Either the politicians have no idea what the businessmen are doing or the businessmen have no idea what the politicians want.
So where does the truth lie? Let us follow the trail.
They say it is difficult to trace the flight of an eagle across the sky or the course of a ship across the sea. Modern technology, however, makes the seemingly impossible possible.
This month, the Azerbaijani news agency APA published an investigation reporting that between Sept. 17 and Sept. 30, six vessels linked to Turkish shipping companies made 11 calls at Israeli ports.
Of course, port calls alone do not prove a violation of the trade ban. Establishing that would require identifying the origin of the cargoes and their recipients.
Perhaps these enormous merchant ships had no commercial purpose at all. Perhaps the sailors simply wanted to visit the Bahá’í Gardens in Haifa or relax along Ashdod’s waterfront. Anything is possible.
But the question remains: Just how comprehensive is Turkey’s declared boycott? And what about Azerbaijani oil?
On Jan. 21, Reuters reported that shipments of Azerbaijani oil to Israel through the Turkish port of Ceyhan had reached their highest level in three years.
According to the Kpler subscription-based data and analytics platform, shipments rose by 31% in 2025 to approximately 94,000 barrels per day, accounting for about 46% of Israel’s oil imports. Ankara maintains that it does not control the ultimate buyers of Azerbaijani oil and that its transit therefore does not violate the trade ban.
Legally, that explanation is understandable. Economically, however, the picture is rather interesting: Turkish infrastructure continues to help supply Israel with oil. And not for free.
So where does Azerbaijan come into the picture?
Azerbaijan and Turkey are strategic allies. The Azerbaijani poet Bakhtiyar Vahabzadeh described them as “two sons of one mother, two branches of one tree.” At the same time, Azerbaijan maintains close relations with Israel. Brotherly relations, I would say, as an old Baku native.
But Baku’s friendship with Jerusalem troubles certain political circles in Turkey. During protests against the Azerbaijani company SOCAR, demonstrators demanded an end to oil supplies to Israel.
The result is a rather strange picture. Azerbaijan is being urged to abandon its economic relations with Israel, while Turkey itself maintains the infrastructure that makes those relations possible. Why should Ankara decide whom Baku can be friends with?
Baku has already demonstrated its ability to provide a venue for successful negotiations.
Azerbaijan is an independent state that pursues its own foreign policy. Even its closest allies will not dictate Azerbaijan’s policies. Azerbaijan will decide for itself whom to befriend and whom to trade with. Baku has the means to do so.
Baku’s opportunities on the international stage could prove extremely useful to the United States. On April 10, 2025, Reuters reported that Turkey and Israel had begun technical talks in Azerbaijan aimed at preventing military clashes in Syria.
Notice: Not in Washington. Not in Brussels. In Baku.
This is no coincidence. Azerbaijan enjoys Israel’s trust, is bound to Turkey by a strategic alliance, and is strengthening its relations with the United States.
Each of these three countries has its own interests. But Baku’s ability to maintain relations with all three, together with the trust Azerbaijan enjoys, opens up enormous diplomatic opportunities.
For Washington, this is particularly important: Instead of having to choose between two partners, it has an opportunity to use an existing channel of dialogue.
Of course, Azerbaijan cannot resolve every disagreement between Turkey and Israel. But it has already demonstrated its ability to provide a venue for successful negotiations. And that is very important for American leaders.
So what conclusion can we draw from this situation? Political declarations change quickly, but economic interests are far more enduring.
And this is where Azerbaijan could prove particularly useful. Baku is respected in Washington, maintains a strategic alliance with Ankara, and enjoys close relations with Jerusalem. Most importantly, it has already demonstrated that it can serve as a venue for dialogue between them.
Perhaps Washington should make greater use of these diplomatic opportunities. And perhaps Ankara, instead of attacking its brotherly ally Azerbaijan, should take advantage of Baku’s relations with Israel.
All four countries would benefit.
And who knows? Perhaps one day, instead of threats and boycotts, hundreds of merchant ships will once again sail between Turkey and Israel.
And then, perhaps, Ankara will no longer have to explain why vessels linked to Turkish companies continue to call at Israeli ports while Azerbaijan is being criticized for maintaining economic relations with Israel.
Real diplomacy is not about accusing your allies of your own sins. It is about knowing how to find common interests.
