Chloe Maluleke and Dr Iqbal Survé|Published
On 21 October, Iran's Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade, Mohammad Atabak, and Andrey Slepnev, the Eurasian Economic Commission's minister in charge of trade, restated a shared ambition: more trade between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). According to the report carried by TV BRICS and Pars Today, Mr Atabak said Iran had the infrastructure and resources to support expanded exchanges. The union has submitted a list of products it wants, and Tehran has drawn up its own based on production capacity and domestic needs.
The statement was short on numbers and deadlines. Its significance lies in what it builds on.
The meeting follows a full free trade agreement that took effect in May 2025, replacing a temporary arrangement in place since 2019. Armenpress reported that the average customs tariff on EAEU exports into Iran would fall from 20 per cent to 4.5 per cent, with preferential conditions covering around 90 per cent of goods. Experts it cited projected that annual turnover could reach $12 billion.
Momentum has continued. The sides signed a three-year roadmap on cooperation in autumn 2025, and the Tehran Times reported that Mr Slepnev called the partnership a "qualitatively new level of interaction" at a summit in Kyrgyzstan. An Iranian outlet, Eghtesad Online, has reported 22 per cent growth in trade during the agreement's first year. I could not access the full report to verify the underlying figures, so that number deserves caution. The Eurasian Economic Commission also announced further steps to remove trade barriers on 15 October.
Why both sides want this
The logic is plain. For Iran, the union offers a customs area on its northern borders that does not depend on Western financial channels. For the EAEU, Iran offers a large market and a southern route to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
Russia dominates the picture. Bilateral Russian-Iranian trade rose from about $1.5 billion in 2020 to roughly $5 billion in 2023, according to figures cited by the Jamestown Foundation. Russia sells Iran far more than it buys, with exports of nearly $4 billion against Iranian exports of almost $1 billion.
The obstacles are not rhetorical
That imbalance points to the problem. Jamestown's analysis of ruble-rial trade identified a persistent currency mismatch, volatile exchange rates and Iran's dual official and market rates, which can penalise exporters. Traders still price deals in dollars and convert later, which breeds disputes. Efforts to link national payment systems and to settle in local currencies, which the Medialine reports now cover a majority of Iran-Russia transactions, ease the dollar problem but do not eliminate it.
Physical connections matter just as much. The Rasht-Astara railway, a link of about 160 kilometres between Iran and Azerbaijan, is meant to complete the North-South Transport Corridor. TASS reported its cost at €1.6 billion, with Russia and Iran jointly funding construction and practical implementation due to begin on 1 April 2026. Until it operates, much of the trade must travel by slower and costlier routes, regardless of tariffs.
Mr Atabak's own emphasis on "technical matters affecting trade" is therefore telling. Product lists and tariff schedules are the easy part. Certification standards, customs procedures, banking channels and freight capacity decide whether goods actually move.
What to watch
Three tests will show whether this is substance or ceremony. First, whether the two sides turn their product lists into concrete schedules. Second, whether trade broadens beyond Russia to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Third, whether the Rasht-Astara line is built on time.
There is also a structural caution. Trade shaped by sanctions pressure is only as durable as the politics behind it, and union members have their own exposure to Western measures.
The ambition is sound, and the legal framework exists. Delivery will depend on rails, payment systems and unglamorous paperwork.
Written by:
*Dr Iqbal Survé
Past chairman of the BRICS Business Council and co-chairman of the BRICS Media Forum and the BRNN
*Chloe Maluleke
Associate at BRICS+ Consulting Group
Russia & Middle East Specialist
**The Views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of Independent Media or IOL.
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