The attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis on Saudi Arabia have pushed the war in Yemen to a new level. The targeting of civilian infrastructure, including airports, which has killed at least a dozen people and injured hundreds, has left no room to maintain the “red lines” that previously outlined the limits of escalation.
This is a reckless gamble by the Houthis which is not in their interest. They are aware that the retaliation will be fierce, yet they continue to attack Saudi Arabia to fulfil Iran’s agenda that seeks heightened tensions before the United States midterms.
Given the motivation to escalate, the present situation has the potential to develop into two scenarios: A major region-wide operation against the Houthis or a war of attrition.
Scenario one: A united front against the Houthis
In response to the Houthi escalation, Saudi Arabia is striving to garner maximum international support while deepening its regional and international alliances. The aim is to come up with a united front capable of taking on what has become a regional threat.
Riyadh is certainly looking to its Gulf neighbours who, themselves, are impacted by the continuing conflict in the region. There is a collective realisation that everyone is in grave danger, not just Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, Gulf states – perhaps with the exception of Oman – will support Riyadh both directly and indirectly in the fighting in Yemen.
Pakistan and Turkiye are also likely to join the front, having signed with Saudi Arabia a defence agreement known as the Mecca Pact. The pact is to be ratified by the Turkish parliament in the next few days, opening the way for Turkish military deployment in support of Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, indirect involvement by Turkiye and Pakistan, along with logistical and intelligence support, appears to be already well under way.
A US intervention is also possible, although it seems unlikely before the US midterms, as military engagements in the Middle East remain unpopular among US voters.
A region-wide coalition can help support the counteroffensive of the forces loyal to the internationally recognised Yemeni government already under way. This could give the necessary push to retake the western coastal region, including areas beyond Bab al-Mandeb and Dhubab.
Such gains could ease pressure on Red Sea shipping and potentially shift the military balance in favour of the government. The opening of additional fronts across other Yemeni cities and governorates could stretch Houthi forces, disperse their resources, and increase the likelihood of further government advances.
Retaking Sanaa could also be on the horizon. The primary obstacle delaying the Yemeni government’s recapture of the city is internal discord among the various factions within the government itself, compounded by negative external interference that exacerbates these rifts and weakens the collective effort to confront the Houthis.
Recent measures taken by the government, specifically efforts to unify its decision-making and consolidate its military operations command, have yielded noticeable progress on the ground. However, achieving the ultimate objective of retaking Sanaa requires sustained effort and focused determination.
If government forces make substantial gains, that could force the Houthis to offer concessions in exchange for a pause in fighting. They have done that before. Their purpose would not be to seek peace but to get enough breathing room to regroup and eventually go back to fighting. Negotiators should keep that in mind when approaching talks with the Houthis.
Scenario two: A war of attrition
If the Saudi-led coalition and the Yemeni government succumb to internal divisions and disagreements, this may slow progress against the Houthis. This would allow the Houthi fighters to hold on to their positions while increasing their pressure on the strategic town of Taiz and maintaining the campaign against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia.
Such a development could further complicate the conflict, increase civilian casualties and displacement, and prolong the war without producing a decisive military outcome.
This will have a significant economic impact on Saudi Arabia and complicate the implementation of its development goals, as it would have to prioritise defence spending.
The rest of the Gulf economies will also be negatively impacted because Saudi Arabia plays such a central role in the region. What is more, losing ground to the Houthis would mean that the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz would also continue, disrupting energy exports from the region.
In this scenario, there will be “no victor, no vanquished” deadlock in Yemen, but Iran would emerge as winner. A war of attrition along the Red Sea coast would provide Tehran with significant breathing room, allowing it to alleviate pressure on its own war efforts.
This would enable Iran to use the Houthi card as leverage in the intermittent negotiations it conducts with the international community, emboldening it to raise the bar regarding its conditions and demands during those talks.
This means that the only way to resolve the crisis in Yemen is decisive military action led by the Yemeni government and supported by a region-wide coalition. For that to happen, the government has to get its internal affairs and its relations with allies in order.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.