Latin America’s political map has been redrawn with remarkable speed. Since April last year, center or far-right forces have won power in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru. In Argentina, President Javier Milei’s populist party secured a decisive victory in midterm elections last October. And in Brazil, the right-wing Senator Flavio Bolsonaro finished ahead of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in the first round of the recent presidential election 47 to 45 percent.
Should Bolsonaro prevail in the runoff on Sunday, Mexico will be the only large country in Latin America still governed by the left. However, for how long? With midterms set for June next year, some commentators think Mexico would soon be swept up by the regional political tide. I doubt it, although that does not mean the country will not feel the effects of a Bolsonaro victory in Brazil.
The case for contagion rests on the observation that voters are punishing incumbents for insecurity, corruption and stagnant living standards. However, a shared grievance is not a causal chain.
Mexico has long been out of sync with South American political cycles: It elected its first leftist government only in 2018, as the “pink tide” was ebbing. Today, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum’s approval rating remains high, thanks partly to the ruling Morena party’s vast cash transfer programs, and the opposition remains fragmented. While the midterms might well end Morena’s qualified majority in the lower house, a rightward swing propelled by regional forces appears unlikely.
The real risk to Mexico lies in Washington. A Bolsonaro victory would leave Latin America governed largely by leaders who regard US President Donald Trump as an ally and, in many cases, partly credit him for their electoral success.
Trump openly backed Milei ahead of Argentina’s midterms. He pardoned former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernandez, who was serving a 45-year prison term for cocaine trafficking, on the eve of an election Hernandez’s party went on to win. He endorsed new Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella. In Brazil, the US suspended consular services two days before the first round, prompting Lula’s campaign to request a probe into possible election interference.
As the outsider in the new Latin American order Trump is seeking to construct, Mexico stands to face his ire alone. The groundwork for a campaign of intimidation has already been laid. The US Department of State has designated Mexico’s drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations with which the US is engaged in “armed conflict.”
The US Drug Enforcement Administration has alleged that the Sheinbaum government has links to organized crime, and the US Department of Justice has indicted 10 current and former Mexican officials on charges of aiding narcotics trafficking into the US.
At last month’s UN General Assembly, Trump called Mexico “the epicenter of cartel violence” and a territory “controlled by enemy cartels.” The Mexican delegation, which did not include Sheinbaum, sat through the speech without protest. Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs Roberto Velasco Alvarez’s own address three days later barely touched the subject. It was a low point for Mexican diplomacy, but at least Brazil joined Mexico in refusing to join Trump’s anti-cartel coalition. Soon, Mexico might be on its own.
There is good reason to think that Trump would escalate his attacks. The Iran war has pushed his approval rating down to 33 percent, a new low. If, as seems likely, Republicans lose ground in next month’s midterms, a weakened Trump would be desperate for cheap and flashy foreign policy victories. In Mexico, he can concoct a narrative in which he “takes down” the “narco-politicians” who are supposedly poisoning Americans with fentanyl.
Trump’s arsenal is formidable, with tariffs, visa revocations, indictments of more politicians and even unilateral military action on the table. The US-Mexico-Canada agreement, which the US declined to renew in July, is now subject to annual reviews that hang over every investment decision in Mexico. The risk that the Trump administration would find ways to put its thumb on the scale during Mexico’s midterms — as it has done in Argentina, Brazil and Honduras — cannot be discounted.
Without Brazil on its side, Mexico would find itself with no major Latin American ally. Regional leaders might even applaud Trump. Against this backdrop, Mexico would find it increasingly difficult to address its stagnant growth and falling private investment, which partly reflects loss of faith in the rule of law following Morena’s controversial judicial overhaul.
Instead of loudly condemning US violations of Latin American sovereignty, Sheinbaum’s government should deprive Trump of a pretext to commit such violations in Mexico. This means restoring judicial independence and putting forward a verifiable security agenda that can withstand scrutiny. It also means investigating and prosecuting politicians linked to organized crime, beginning with those in Morena’s own ranks.
Investigating Andres Manuel Lopez Beltran — the son of Morena founder and former Mexican president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, Sheinbaum’s mentor — would be a good place to start. Lopez Beltran, who is seeking a seat in the Mexican Congress, is one of more than 50 Mexican politicians who have been stripped of their US visas over allegations related to fuel smuggling and tax fraud.
So far, Sheinbaum has rejected the opposition’s calls for an inquiry, but she can distance her government from Lopez Obrador’s circle without breaking with her mentor. Letting independent prosecutors investigate the allegations on Mexico’s terms would show that no one is above the law and affirm Sheinbaum’s authority. It would also deprive Trump of a convenient narrative.
Sheinbaum’s government has delivered a significant decline in homicides. The challenge is to show that the Mexican state, not the cartels, is in charge. At the same time, Sheinbaum should stop viewing her regional counterparts through an ideological lens and instead pursue pragmatic working relationships with them.
A Mexico perceived as the standard-bearer of a vanishing left would be far easier to isolate — and far more vulnerable to Trump’s wrath.
Guillermo Ortiz, a former Mexican minister of finance and Banco de Mexico governor, is treasurer of the G30.
Copyright: Project Syndicate