Fifteen years after withdrawing in 2010, Chevron has formally returned to Libya. In February 2026, the energy giant secured onshore Area 106 in the Sirte Basin through Libya's first international licensing round since 2007, signing a production-sharing agreement in August.
Chevron is not alone. TotalEnergies and ConocoPhillips recently concluded a 25-year agreement committing more than $20 billion to raise the Waha Oil Company's capacity toward 850,000 barrels per day. With national oil output climbing to 1.4 million barrels per day—its highest level in more than a decade—Libya's core economic engine is running again.
Step outside the energy sector, however, and the American commercial presence in Libya is practically non-existent.
While energy majors possess the legal infrastructure and risk tolerance that frontier markets demand, mainstream U.S. enterprises do not. Critical sectors central to Libya's broader reconstruction—including infrastructure, healthcare, logistics, technology, and consumer goods—see little to no meaningful U.S. participation. As Libya's macroeconomic stability and sovereign purchasing power recover, much of corporate America continues to treat the country as a strict no-go zone.
Pulse survey of 26 senior practitioners with extensive on-the-ground experience in North Africa
To understand this disconnect, the U.S.-Libya Business Circuit, an initiative of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations, conducted a pulse survey of 26 senior practitioners with extensive on-the-ground experience in North Africa.
The findings point to a severe misalignment between market realities and corporate engagement. On a scale of 1.0 to 5.0, respondents rated the pace of improvement in Libya's domestic business environment at an encouraging 3.7. Yet, they rated the overall health of U.S.-Libya commercial ties at just 2.4, and active U.S. private sector participation scored lowest of all at 2.0. In short, the market is moving forward while U.S. commerce stands still.
This commercial paralysis is driven by four structural barriers:
1. Severe information asymmetry
2. Compliance and sanctions uncertainty
3. Aggressive bank de-risking policies that stall legitimate payments
4. The absence of a practical institutional bridge for mid-sized firms.
Most American firms are avoiding Libya instead of assessing it.
International competitors are rushing into the vacuum
Meanwhile, international competitors are rushing into the vacuum, turning Washington's hesitation into a massive geopolitical opening. In late 2024, fifty French companies travelled to Benghazi for a business forum that yielded major infrastructure and desalination contracts, followed by another high-profile bilateral forum in Marseille in April 2026. Simultaneously, TotalEnergies is developing a 500-megawatt solar plant at Sadada, the largest in Libya.
Chinese companies are moving even faster
Chinese companies are moving even faster, converting economic footprints into strategic dependencies. Of the 91 foreign commercial agencies registered in Libya in the first half of 2026, firms from China accounted for 24—more than any other nation. The commercial positions, regulatory relationships, and supply-chain footprints established by European and Asian competitors today will be incredibly difficult for American enterprise to displace a decade from now.
Restrictive U.S. travel policy effectively grounds American executives
Compounding this disparity is a restrictive U.S. travel policy that effectively grounds American executives while their international peers flock to Tripoli and Benghazi. While European business delegations regularly travel to negotiate face-to-face, complete site assessments, and cultivate essential localized relationships, American executives remain severely constrained by strict Washington travel advisories. Lifting or strategically modifying these travel restrictions for U.S. citizens is no longer just a diplomatic talking point; it is a commercial necessity if American businesses hope to compete on a level playing field.
The appetite exists; the institutional infrastructure does not
The irony is that individual American interest remains exceptionally high. Among the practitioners surveyed, 96 percent stated they would participate in a structured fact-finding visit to Libya, and 85
percent expressed a willingness to serve on a bilateral commercial advisory board. The appetite exists; the institutional infrastructure does not.
To bridge this gap, Washington does not need to wait for a total political resolution. Active policy levers can immediately alter the risk calculus for American compliance departments.
First, the U.S. Department of Commerce should formalize a dedicated bilateral trade desk or structured commercial dialogue aimed at non-energy sectors. Second, the State Department, in coordination with the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), should issue an authoritative compliance reference guide to explicitly map out legally permissible trade boundaries. Finally, Congress should leverage bipartisan frameworks—such as the Global Fragility Act—to mandate and fund targeted market-intelligence clearinghouses.
The American energy companies signing multibillion-dollar agreements this year did not wait for perfect information. They moved before the picture was complete. Every month American enterprises spend waiting for flawless certainty is a month global competitors spend signing contracts and cementing influence. Libya will rebuild with or without American participation. The only question for Washington and corporate boards is whether they will build the economic bridges needed to secure a seat at the table, or content themselves with watching a critical geopolitical region from the sidelines.
Hani Shennib and Anas Bhairi are board members of the US Libya Business Circuit of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations.
The National Council on US Libya Relations is a 501(c)3 non-profit organization
Neither Dr Shennib nor Mr Bhairi have any financial or lobbying interests.