TEL AVIV—As Israel prepares to hold parliamentary elections on October 27 and the United States its midterm elections a week later, there is an increasingly evident paradox in the relationship between the two countries.
On one side of the ledger, the alliance has proven its full strength in recent years. That has included the security and diplomatic support of two US administrations of different parties. Both the Biden and Trump administrations backed Israel after Hamas’s October 7 attacks, and President Donald Trump led the effort to free the hostages taken that day. In the campaign against Iran, the two countries’ militaries operated almost as a single force and fought wing to wing. All of this was made possible by the historic achievement of the Abraham Accords.
On the other side of the ledger, tensions between the two countries are growing. Gaps are emerging between the two leaderships. In Israel, the strategic tier of the national security establishment has been hollowed out, and support for Israel is eroding across American society. The paradox is all the more acute because it comes precisely when the two countries need each other more than ever, amid great-power competition, where strong and deep alliances will be essential, and at the dawn of an artificial intelligence (AI) era, during which collaboration on frontier technology will determine which actors succeed or fail.
I write after spending many years witnessing firsthand the close intelligence, military, security, and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries, most recently as the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry’s Political-Military Bureau from 2022 to 2026. In the United States, I found not just professional counterparts but partners in purpose and values and true friends where there was no daylight between us on many issues. It is often said that relationships come down to people. But strategic relations between nations rely on strong, institutional anchors. And I now see cracks in those anchors.
Every coin has two sides, but I will confine myself to examining my own government’s share in the deterioration of the relationship—chiefly, via its rejection of hostage deals, delay in advancing “day after” plans for Gaza, and illusion that Iran’s regime could be toppled through air power and the Kurds. I raise these points not to relitigate the past but in the hope that Israel’s next government will learn lessons from these mistakes.
Once formed, that government must go beyond military cooperation with the United States and lead a diplomatic initiative in the spirit of Trump’s vision—including a political horizon on the Palestinian issue, shaped together with the Trump administration, and continued deep coordination on military, economic, and diplomatic moves against Iran. I also hope that the United States, whatever the outcome of the midterm elections, will see the formation of Israel’s next government as a strategic opportunity. All told, it’s time for a reset in US-Israeli relations that serves the interests of both nations.
Unprecedented cooperation…
The Biden administration’s response to October 7 will be remembered in Israel for generations: carrier strike groups, a presidential visit in wartime, a US-led coalition that intercepted Iran’s April 2024 attack, roughly $26 billion in supplemental assistance, and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery. Work on the “day after” in Gaza also began then, in full partnership with Israel.
The Trump administration took the partnership to new heights. In June 2025, the United States struck Iran’s nuclear sites; in October 2025, the president brokered an agreement that brought the living hostages held by Hamas home and set out a framework for the “day after” in Gaza. And in the 2026 campaign against Iran, offensive and defensive cooperation between Israel and the United States reached a level of operational and intelligence integration never seen before.
Israel has proven itself a strategic asset to the United States, even when the two governments have disagreed. It stood as a full partner of the United States in the struggle against Iran and its proxies—a regional and global threat. Israelis, for their part, should acknowledge that without American support, Israel would have faced severe strategic distress in its recent military campaigns. I will never forget the conversations, support, and camaraderie of those days—from the outbreak of the war through the release of the hostages to the campaign against Iran.
…but a widening gap
For all the cooperation and assistance during the Biden administration, the friction in US-Israeli relations at the time cannot be ignored—above all over munitions. The Biden administration’s May 2024 pause on the delivery of heavy bombs to Israel and the delays in approving further sales, however well-intentioned, were a mistake. It did not change Israeli conduct, served only Israel’s enemies, and set a dangerous precedent. Disagreements of this kind are best resolved behind closed doors.
In my view, a significant share of Israel’s challenges in the United States stems from the policies of its current government. Planning for the “day after” in Gaza—pursued in full partnership with our American colleagues since the Biden administration—was, regrettably, frozen at Israel’s initiative. This delayed the release of the hostages and left Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza bearing the costs of a protracted military campaign. Provocative statements and actions in the West Bank by the Israeli government have played into the hands of Israel’s critics and made it harder for its friends in the administration and Congress to stand by it; violence by Israeli extremists in the West Bank in particular poses a real threat to the values on which the alliance rests. Add to this the perception in the United States of the Israeli government’s alignment with one American political camp (the Republicans) and of the Israeli government’s moves to weaken the judiciary, which were seen by some Americans as anti-democratic.
Relations between the two countries’ leaders, meanwhile, have had their ups and downs. Some US-Israeli professional channels have lost the intimacy that once allowed for the quiet resolution of disagreements. On the Israeli side, the ability of professionals to shape the government’s decisions has weakened, as political considerations increasingly rise to the fore. Trump’s “America First” doctrine seeks to shift the US government’s focus from aid to trade, and within the president’s MAGA movement, voices portraying Israel as a burden on the United States are growing louder.
In the US Congress, nineteen Senate Democrats voted to block arms sales to Israel in November 2024; that number rose to forty (out of forty-seven) in an April 2026 vote to block the sale of bulldozers. Then there’s sentiment among the broader American public. In February 2026, for the first time in Gallup’s polling, more Americans sympathized with the Palestinians (41 percent) than with Israelis (36 percent); in March 2026, the Pew Research Center found that 60 percent of American adults view Israel unfavorably. The erosion in support is sharpest among the young and is occurring within parts of the American Jewish community as well.
Why a reset serves both countries
The importance of the United States’ partnerships with the Gulf states should not be diminished, but the 2026 military campaign against Iran showed how US bases in the region can become targets for Iranian strikes—and how Israel can act as a proactive partner that helps protect American forces. A renewed US-Israel alliance would bolster American credibility in the Middle East and anchor Israel firmly in the Western camp amid competition with China and Russia. Partnership with Israel—a living operational laboratory for military operations—can assist the United States in preserving its edge in that competition. Israel can be a model ally—a partner against shared threats that shoulders a growing share of its security burden and returns operational, intelligence, technological, and economic value to the United States, squarely in the spirit of “America First.”
For Israel, the United States remains the anchor of its national security. A reset would enable a managed transition in the bilateral relationship from aid to partnership. It is the only path to translating military gains into a stable regional order in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and to expanding the Abraham Accords.
A roadmap for the reset
The reset should rest on seven pillars.
1. Shared values and interests—and bipartisanship. Israel’s next government should place shared values and interests at the center of its dialogue with Washington, with democratic values as a practical commitment. That should include the independence of Israeli state institutions—above all the judiciary and the separation of powers—civic equality, and responsible handling of humanitarian concerns. Deep coordination with the Trump administration must continue. At the same time, Israel must preserve a bipartisan approach. It should maintain open channels of dialogue with Democrats, while avoiding identification with either US political camp, and it should invest in all streams of American Jewry—particularly young people.
2. A diplomatic initiative and strategic coordination. In the spirit of Trump’s “peace through strength” agenda, Israel should lead a structured initiative of its own that includes active partnership in the plan for Gaza, with full demilitarization of the strip and a governing alternative to Hamas; a political horizon on the Palestinian issue, designed with the Trump administration; an end to Israeli extremist violence in the West Bank, which threatens the values that serve as the alliance’s foundation; progress in Syria and Lebanon, including the disarmament of Hezbollah; continued deep coordination on Iran across military, economic, and diplomatic tracks; and the expansion of the Abraham Accords, with an emphasis on Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia.
3. Security anchors in the next MOU. The countries’ current memorandum of understanding (MOU), which runs from 2019 to 2028, provides $3.3 billion a year in foreign military financing and $500 million for missile defense. For the next MOU, beginning in 2029, the Trump administration is seeking to move from an aid model toward one based on trade and partnership. Israel can embrace this direction, provided the transition is jointly designed, gradual, and anchored. This means the full implementation of the current MOU through 2028; a phased transition over the decade, offset by greater investment in joint research and development and co-production; the expansion of the ballistic-missile-defense component of the MOU into a comprehensive air-and-missile-defense framework that includes laser and counter-drone systems; a pre-agreed mechanism for wartime emergency packages; and the preservation of Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge through transparent consultation and compensating measures for every sensitive regional sale. In the near term, a one-time supplemental package to replenish Israel’s munitions and interceptors, together with the accelerated delivery of new US fighter squadrons, would enable the transition without compromising readiness.
4. Israel as a regional security integrator. The US War Reserve Stockpile prepositioned in Israel should be expanded and diversified—a tangible guarantee for Israel and a secure regional reserve for the United States. Israel can serve as a hub of US Central Command’s regional air-and-missile-defense architecture, freeing American assets for the Indo-Pacific. As a regional hub, Israel can help build coalitions against shared adversaries—Iran and radical Sunni Islamism rooted in Muslim Brotherhood ideology. This role depends on the diplomatic shift described in pillar two.
5. A forward-looking defense-industrial partnership. The United States has gained far more from security assistance than is commonly acknowledged. Foreign military financing dollars are largely spent in US industry, supporting American jobs. Israel’s air-defense systems Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow, and Iron Beam were developed or are produced in cooperation with US industry. Lessons from Israel’s operational laboratory reach the US military in real time. A deeper industrial partnership would yield even greater returns: advanced technology, combat-proven experience across every domain, and Israel’s fast, innovative approach to development and fielding. Washington and Jerusalem should therefore modernize export-control and licensing arrangements designed for a different era—examining International Traffic in Arms Regulations exemptions—and streamline licensing for joint projects. They should also move forward on the US-Israel Defense Industrial Base Working Group established by the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which is assessing Israel’s inclusion in the National Technology and Industrial Base, and on the US-Israel FUTURES Act for defense-technology cooperation, which is included in the yet to be passed fiscal 2027 NDAA bill. The partners should also advance the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor and energy cooperation.
6. AI and space. Space has become a warfighting domain in its own right—from intelligence, communications, and missile-warning satellites to direct threats against space assets—and the two countries can complement each other there in early warning, in protecting space assets, and through Israel’s integration into leading American programs. But space is not only a national-security domain. Civil and commercial cooperation—in the spirit of the Artemis Accords, which Israel has signed—would strengthen both countries. The same is true of AI: Beyond its security applications in intelligence, air defense, and autonomous systems, it is an engine of growth in health, energy, cybersecurity, education, and industry. Hence the need for a dedicated bilateral framework for AI, quantum, directed energy, and space—spanning both security and civilian uses—including a joint AI center and secure access to advanced American models.
7. An implementation mechanism. Israel and the United States should establish a multi-year Strategic Dialogue co-chaired by the US national security advisor and the head of Israel’s National Security Council, with a working group for each of the pillars above and deliverables within twelve months. It should be built around the institutionalization of career professionals to guide strategy, rather than politicians.
The responsibility to act on this reset lies first with Israel. Its next government must take the steps outlined here, whatever the outcome of the US midterms. Washington, for its part, should see a new Israeli government that changes course as an opportunity to deepen the alliance and to make Israel neither an aid recipient nor merely a capable ally, but a model ally. The achievements and untapped potential of US-Israeli cooperation, together with the challenges of this moment, make deepening the partnership not just an opportunity but a necessity—so that the two countries can move forward together in an era of global upheaval and accelerating technological change.