How the Russian army is learning from Ukraine and NATO

The Russian army entered its full-scale war against Ukraine with a reputation as one of the strongest in the world, but the first weeks of the invasion showed that this assessment was wrong. The reasons were sought in logistics, equipment, training, and motivation, but most of the failures stemmed from an inability to make sound decisions on the battlefield.

The Russian army found itself in a war in which commanders had to operate in situations where orders from above were either absent or no longer reflected battlefield conditions.

This was when the fundamental problems with Russian military education became clear. For decades, it had trained officers to carry out tactical tasks and work with staff documents, but not to think and act independently.

In this respect, Russian and Western (NATO) military training systems differ in ways that go far beyond methods and training procedures. They reflect different command cultures and, consequently, different views of a commander's role in modern warfare, and we saw this firsthand in our study.

Initiative vs. hierarchy: Two opposing command philosophies

One of the core ideas of NATO's military doctrine is mission command, a command philosophy built on trust, a shared understanding of the mission, and disciplined initiative by commanders at every level.

A senior commander defines the objective, intent, and key constraints but does not attempt to prescribe every step their subordinates must take, leaving them free to choose how to accomplish the mission in response to the situation.

This allows decisions to be made at the level with the clearest understanding of conditions on the ground, without depending on constant instructions from above.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces have recently been moving more decisively toward this kind of command culture. This is clearly reflected in the Leadership Principles recently issued by Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief.

The principles identify an understanding of the commander's intent, initiative, responsibility, the development of subordinates, and the ability to learn and adapt as key leadership requirements.

Essentially, the goal is to build a culture in which a lower-level commander does not wait for detailed instructions at every step but acts on a clear understanding of the mission and takes responsibility for the outcome.

The Russian military tradition, by contrast, has historically followed the opposite logic: rigid centralized control inherited from the Soviet military school and rooted in the state's broader autocratic culture of governance.

Western researchers call this a top-down command system and argue that it leaves lower-level commanders with virtually no ability to make decisions independently. Its weaknesses were evident early in the full-scale war, including during the battle for Hostomel Airport, the crossing of the Siverskyi Donets River, and the deployment of Russian equipment at the Chornobaivka airfield.

Waiting for orders from above, units lost time or repeated actions that were clearly doomed to fail.

The NCO corps: Building trust within military units

No command philosophy can work without institutions to support it. For mission command, that institution is the professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps.

In NATO armies, NCOs serve as the backbone connecting officers with enlisted personnel. They train subordinates, pass on practical experience, maintain discipline, and carry out much of the day-to-day leadership.

NCOs also build the trust that mission command requires, which is why particular attention is paid to their training and expanded authority. The Russian army is far less suited to this model.

Duties assigned to NCOs in NATO armies have traditionally been performed in the Russian military by junior officers, primarily lieutenants commanding platoons. In this system, sergeants have little scope for leadership or mentorship. Their job is to follow orders and handle organizational matters.

This creates a problem for the Russian army when it comes to delegating initiative to lower levels: sergeants and junior commanders are not trusted to act independently in complex situations. This is particularly paralyzing for combat units when conditions change rapidly.

Learning from mistakes: NATO vs. Russia

The differences between NATO and Russian military training models are also evident in how they approach learning from mistakes. NATO places greater emphasis on critical thinking, operating amid uncertainty, and analyzing outcomes.

The main methodology is the After Action Review (AAR), a structured review conducted after a training exercise or operation. It revolves around four questions: "What was planned?", "What happened?", "What worked and what didn't?", and "What should change?" The essential condition for this approach is the ability to discuss mistakes honestly without fear of punishment, so that lessons can be learned and improvements identified.

The Russian system also has mechanisms for analyzing combat experience. Its biggest problem, however, lies in the logic of its top-down management system, which tends to punish "failures." This is why there is so much lying and embellishment in reports sent up the chain of command: admitting a mistake means facing punishment.

The result is distorted information reaching senior leadership, an unwillingness to take initiative at lower levels, and a growing fear of deviating from instructions — all of which directly contradict mission command.

Russian officers themselves acknowledge this problem. In 2023, the journal Military Thought (Voennaya Mysl) published the results of a survey of more than 100 artillery officers, most of them at the tactical level. About 81% had combat experience. Only 12% of respondents favored a policy of "intelligent initiative."

Among the obstacles, 40% cited "excessive micromanagement and commanders' distrust of subordinates," while only 30% supported a ban on punishing unsuccessful initiatives. The researchers also identified a problem with military education: the concept of "initiative" is absent even from the document governing educational activities at Russian Defense Ministry universities.

War breaks the rulebook

It would be convenient to reduce the differences in military training to the formula "flexible NATO vs. inflexible Russia," but the war in Ukraine has shown that reality is more complex.

The Russian armed forces are capable of learning and adapting their tactics fairly quickly under pressure. Even in Russia's public discourse, military analysts have openly reflected on the Russian military's key mistakes.

After suffering losses in 2022, Russian forces restructured their logistics in response to HIMARS strikes, changed how they used armored vehicles in response to the threat posed by FPV drones, integrated commercial (unmanned aerial vehicles) UAVs into reconnaissance on a massive scale, shortened the "detect-to-strike" cycle, and began using small assault groups more extensively.

These groups have created considerable problems for Ukrainian commanders by infiltrating the rear of Ukrainian forces.

Adaptation has also become visible at the personnel level. There have been more cases of junior commanders identifying the most experienced and motivated soldiers among their subordinates and informally transferring some responsibility to them.

Some principles resembling mission command are being absorbed less through doctrine than through the pressures of war itself.

The fastest changes are taking place in technology and specific combat procedures. Russia is developing command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR), training UAV operators, and transferring front-line experience into its higher education system.

Military educational institutions — including the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy, the Military Academy of Air Defense, the Military Academy of Communications, and the Military University of Radioelectronics — are adjusting their curricula, testing new equipment, and maintaining contact with graduates who have combat experience.

Particularly telling is that military education in Russia is no longer limited to professional military training but is increasingly penetrating the general education system. At the same time, its ideological and propagandistic component is spreading even into preschool education.

Of course, these "cosmetic changes" do not mean that the Russian army will become like Western armies. Its most fundamental difference remains its attitude toward service members. The value placed on their lives and expertise remains low.

The Soviet model continues to serve as the benchmark for a victorious army.

The Soviet command sacrificed 27 million people in the war against Nazism. The principle of "we won't spare any expense" — a Russian expression meaning that no price is too high — makes the system even more dangerous.

Russia could build an even harsher model of military training adapted to modern warfare, combining new technologies, total control, and a generation of ideologically conditioned soldiers whom it will readily throw into new wars.

Editor's note: Copyright, Ukrainska Pravda. This translated article has been republished by the Kyiv Independent with permission. The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.