Turkey and Pakistan's promise of rapid military support for Saudi Arabia faces a more urgent test after weekend attacks on Riyadh’s international airport killed 12 people and forced its closure.
Turning that commitment into effective protection will depend on what its partners can spare, how their forces operate alongside Saudi units and how far Ankara and Islamabad are willing to enter the conflict.
At an emergency meeting in Riyadh on 5 October, the three countries pledged to implement their collective defence commitments and rapidly deploy agreed forces and capabilities to Saudi Arabia, subject to their national legislation.
The decision marked a significant step for the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement they signed in August, but left troop numbers, equipment, missions, and deployment schedules publicly unspecified.
Their contributions also begin from different positions. Pakistan already has an established military presence in the kingdom and has reportedly supplied weapons and advisers to Yemeni government forces.
Turkey is considering additional defensive assistance while explicitly ruling out offensive operations abroad under the pact.
The immediate test is whether these commitments can address Saudi vulnerabilities quickly enough to matter - and whether protecting the kingdom can remain separate from supporting its campaign in Yemen.
What Riyadh needs
Saudi Arabia’s requirement extends beyond additional troops. In September, drones struck the East-West Pipeline south of Medina, causing injuries and damage and prompting a precautionary shutdown of the route carrying crude to Red Sea export terminals.
Riyadh said the drones originated in Iraq, but no group claimed responsibility, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq denied involvement. Earlier attacks on Eastern Province oil facilities had already raised concerns about Iran-aligned Iraqi factions, adding a northern threat to the Houthi challenge from Yemen.
The aviation threat escalated sharply over the weekend. An attack on King Khalid International Airport on 10 October killed 12 people and wounded more than 300, including Saudi and foreign nationals. On 11 October, the Saudi-led coalition said another projectile struck Terminal 4, causing a fire, while air defences intercepted a cruise missile nearby.
The airport remained closed that day. Neither weekend attack had been claimed at the time of reporting. The Houthis nevertheless renewed their warning against using Saudi airports and airspace, exempting Mecca and Medina.
The attacks followed earlier strikes that killed three Saudis, including a Saudia pilot, and a Sudanese national at Riyadh airport. Sustained protection of civilian infrastructure has become an immediate requirement.
“Saudi Arabia is primarily seeking to strengthen its air defences against Houthi drone strikes targeting critical infrastructure,” Sebastian Sons, an expert on Saudi Arabia, told The New Arab.
Sons expects Turkey to contribute equipment and technological expertise, while Pakistan could expand cooperation in training, capacity-building, and troop deployments. The potential division of labour reflects different strengths, although the governments have not publicly detailed their respective assignments.
For Riyadh, successful protection has economic as well as military consequences. Attacks on energy infrastructure and airports threaten business activity and complicate efforts to present the kingdom as a secure investment destination.
The WPC Energy Congress was still going ahead in Riyadh on 11 October, Saudi authorities said, despite the airport closure. Reinforcing defences could help Saudi Arabia sustain support for its Yemeni partners while reducing exposure at home.
The military campaign is also continuing. On 10 October, the Giants Brigades said they had repelled a Houthi attack north of Dhubab Airport near the Bab el-Mandeb, alongside Saudi-led airstrikes on Houthi reinforcements.
The coalition said it was working to dismantle the group’s ballistic missile network. Neither statement establishes that the Houthis’ ability to strike Saudi territory has been eliminated.
Turkey's available capabilities
Ankara’s contribution could initially draw on technical relationships already in place. According to reports, technical teams, air-defence systems, and electronic warfare equipment have been present in Saudi Arabia since last year. Turkish officials described plans for additional personnel and equipment, with further deployments dependent on parliamentary action.
Barın Kayaoğlu, a Turkish independent analyst and consultant, said the available options would depend on Saudi requirements. ASELSAN’s Korkut, an anti-aircraft gun system designed to intercept threats at close range, is one candidate.
“Some of those systems could be transferred over to the Kingdom,” he told The New Arab. Gun-based defences could help protect Saudi facilities against drones without relying solely on more expensive missile interceptors.
In early October, ASELSAN announced a $125 million export contract for weapon and electronic warfare systems. Saudi interest makes the Kingdom a possible buyer, although the announcement names neither the customer nor the delivery schedule. Ukraine is another potential destination, as Kyiv had received a small number of Korkut systems earlier this year for use against Russian attacks.
Kayaoğlu also identified MKE’s Tolga short-range air-defence system, as well as ASELSAN’s Gürz, which combines guns and missiles on a mobile platform like the Russian Pantsir-S1. For wider coverage, he suggested “the ALP-class radars and perhaps even the Hisar short-to-medium range air defence systems”.
The former would help detect and track threats, while the latter would provide interception beyond the reach of close-range guns. Such systems could reinforce lower defensive layers. Kayaoğlu cautioned that the longer-range Siper is not known to have anti-ballistic-missile capabilities.
Saudi interest in Turkish air defence also predates the current crisis. Around SAHA Expo 2026 in Istanbul, reports described Saudi interest in ASELSAN’s Korkut for low-altitude threats, proposed Kalkan surveillance radars linked to mobile command-and-control shelters, and a Roketsan proposal for six Hisar-O batteries to protect oil facilities and airbase corridors.
Availability also depends on personnel. “Some of it will relate to what and who can be spared to go to KSA,” Kayaoğlu told The New Arab. “Active-duty personnel are harder to spare; contractors or company personnel are much easier.”
Company technicians or recently retired personnel could support equipment sooner than a larger military contingent could undertake an operational mission. Still, in Kayaoğlu’s view, “showing the political commitment to a Mecca Pact partner is even more important than what and who is being sent”.
Kayaoğlu said a deployment of serving troops would require parliamentary approval, separately from ratification of the Mecca Pact. Existing bilateral agreements reportedly permit some technical assistance, while the unpublished pact’s implications for future authorisations remain unclear.
Ankara has drawn a public boundary around its involvement. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on 8 October that military delegations were assessing Saudi needs, particularly air defence, electronic warfare, and technical support, while ruling out sending Turkish troops abroad to conduct attacks under the agreement.
“Unless the Houthis decide to target Turkish civilian vessels transiting the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb, I do not see Ankara getting involved in Yemen’s civil war and opening a new front with Iran,” Kayaoğlu said.
The maritime domain could nevertheless offer scope for limited involvement. Surveillance, escort, intelligence-sharing and coalition coordination could support Red Sea security while maintaining a boundary between defensive assistance and offensive operations in Yemen.
Pakistan's head start - and its limits
Pakistan’s longstanding military relationship with Saudi Arabia gives it a different starting point. Reuters reported in May that Islamabad had deployed about 8,000 troops under the 2025 Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement, alongside a squadron of JF-17 light jet fighters, two squadrons of drones and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air-defence system. Sources told the agency that Pakistani personnel operated the equipment, financed by Saudi Arabia.
This gives Islamabad an existing air-combat, unmanned and ground-based air-defence presence, adding to those already stationed in the kingdom under earlier agreements. Reportedly, the pact could eventually allow for up to 80,000 Pakistani troops to support Saudi border security if required.
“Pakistan’s existing military presence gives it an established framework for cooperation, easing coordination and potentially allowing it to provide certain capabilities more quickly,” John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, told The New Arab.
“But an existing presence does not automatically translate into the capacity, much less the political authorisation, for a substantially larger deployment.”
Pakistan’s involvement reportedly extends to support for forces inside Yemen. In early October, Reuters reported four cargo-plane deliveries to Aden in September containing air-defence systems, light artillery, drones and counter-drone systems. A Pakistani official also said military advisers were working alongside Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni troops.
The publicly reported categories do not establish models, quantities, readiness or the advisers’ precise duties. But assistance to Yemeni forces raises a question that a deployment confined to Saudi territorial defence does not: whether Islamabad’s contribution facilitates operations inside Yemen.
“I think the distinction could become blurred very quickly,” Calabrese said. Pakistan may describe its mission as protecting Saudi territory and infrastructure, he explained, while support to Yemeni forces risks drawing it into the conflict itself.
Domestic decision-making has also changed since 2015, when Pakistan’s parliament voted to remain neutral in the Saudi-led intervention while pledging to defend the kingdom. Reuters reported on 8 October that the latest commitment to rapid deployment had proceeded without a parliamentary vote. That political contrast does not, by itself, establish how quickly further units could become operational.
Islamabad must also preserve relations with neighbouring Iran, its diplomatic channels and capacity to manage its own security challenges. Calabrese expects those considerations to discourage an open-ended commitment, even as Pakistan seeks to demonstrate solidarity with Riyadh.
What rapid support can change
Across both contributions, speed depends on more than transporting equipment. Operators, maintenance, ammunition, communications and arrangements for coordinating engagements must be available. Protection of selected facilities may be achievable before a wider network is established, but the announced pledge gives no public basis for assigning a firm timetable.
For Saudi Arabia, additional support could improve protection and coordination without delivering a decisive battlefield outcome. “However, even with increased external support, a decisive military victory over the Houthis remains unlikely,” Sons said.
That makes the partnership’s political effect important alongside its operational contribution. “Beyond their practical value, Turkish and Pakistani support carries symbolic weight, allowing Riyadh to demonstrate regional unity and solidarity with non-Arab partners,” he added.
Sons sees these relationships as part of Saudi strategic diversification, complementing its ties with Washington. The kingdom, he said, will continue seeking greater US engagement against the Houthis. That possibility became more explicit over the weekend: on 10 October, Trump said the United States was considering joining Saudi strikes. This remained a possibility rather than an announced intervention.
The first measure of success will therefore be whether additional systems and personnel assume defined defensive missions and reduce Saudi exposure to attacks.
How much further the partnership changes the war will depend on its partners’ willingness to sustain that support - and whether their efforts to limit involvement survive the demands of an expanding conflict.
Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors
Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi
Edited by Charlie Hoyle