On May 23 this year, as Serbian students staged a mass anti-government rally in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, a more modest gathering was underway in Kumanovo, 400 kilometres to the south in neighbouring North Macedonia.
As the students in Belgrade vented their frustrations at 14 years of rule by the Serbian Progressive Party, SNS, and its founder, then Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, the several hundred people assembled in Kumanovo, ethnic Serbs, wore t-shirts emblazoned with the SNS campaign slogan ‘Serbia Wins’.
The rally was organised by a local civic association called ‘Mir, Sloga, Stabilnost’ [Peace, Unity, Stability], a name uncannily similar to a 2022 SNS election slogan - ‘Peace, Stability, Vucic’.
“This gathering is being held with the sole purpose of showing support for the president of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic, so that he may persevere on his path toward peace, unity, and stability,” the association’s head, Maja Denkovska, told Serbian Newsmax Balkan.
Denkovska wasn’t asked about funding for the event, but 38 days earlier, according to Nova Ekonomija, her association was awarded 3,400 euros by the Serbian foreign ministry’s Directorate for the Diaspora, for Orthodox religious projects. Weeks later, the Directorate gifted it another 2,500 euros for an initiative to help preserve the Cyrillic script.
According to the results of this investigation, since 2023, Serbia’s Directorate for the Diaspora has disbursed at least 250,000 euros to Serb diaspora organisations in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia that BIRN has identified as publicly promoting the SNS, parroting Russian narratives, glorifying war criminals or echoing right-wing, ‘anti-gender’ rhetoric.
The findings appear to support warnings issued by Serbian civil society about the misuse of state funds to finance organisations close to the SNS, some of which have no premises, employees or visible activities.
Neither the foreign ministry nor the Directorate responded to requests for comment.
Denkovska declined to comment, citing ill health. But she has spoken repeatedly over the past year to the pro-government Serbian tabloid Informer, expressing wonder that anyone in Serbia could claim to be dissatisfied with their lot under Vucic and the SNS.
Indeed, in April last year, her association laid on free buses and sandwiches to take people from Kumanovo to Belgrade for a pro-government rally.
Genocide denier
Mir, Sloga, Stabilnost is not the only beneficiary in North Macedonia of the Directorate for the Diaspora’s largesse.
As head of the Community of Serbs in Macedonia-Bitola, Zoran Zugic regularly criticises the student-led protests in Serbia and the Serbian election monitor CRTA, and has promoted online content denying the 1995 genocide conducted by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica, Bosnia.
Since 2023, Zugic’s Community of Serbs in Macedonia – Bitola has received 21,300 euros from the Directorate.
He denied the money was received for political purposes.
“These are exclusively projects related to culture, folklore, the commemoration of historical dates, sports events, and the like – activities that have no connection to political developments,” said Zugic.
The Serbian Cultural Centre – Skopje, whose head, Vasilka Kitanovic, regularly posts SNS content, has received even more – 84,500 euros since 2023. Kitanovic did not respond to requests for comment.
‘Malignant influence’
In Serbia itself, the Directorate regularly funnels money to local organisations that claim to support the Serb diaspora in the region.
The Izrazajnost association, for example, received a total of 23,800 euros in 2023-2024 for two projects promoting the use of Cyrillic.
Izrazajnost is led by actor Milan Bosiljcic, who in 2023 was among a host of public figures who put their signatures to a statement of support for the SNS.
In 2024, the Directorate awarded 9,400 euros to an association co-founded by Bosiljcic’s daughter, Sara, called Jeremija, for the purposes of a language camp. The association’s first project, which was not funded by the Directorate, was conducted in cooperation with Solidarité Kosovo, an organisation founded by SNS member Arnaud Gouillon, who was head of the Directorate at the time.
Since 2023, the Belgrade Centre for Education and Youth Development, CEROB, has received almost 34,000 euros from the Directorate for diaspora youth camps.
In late 2023, the Centre for Investigative Journalism of Serbia, CINS, reported that SNS activists tasked with canvassing voters for their support were being paid in cash at CEROB’s Belgrade office.
A year later, CEROB representative Ognjen Kocevic was appointed by the Serbian government to the Managing Board of the Institute for the Evaluation of Education Quality.
The Directorate also awarded two grants totalling 13,600 euros to the Association of Students of Republika Srpska in Serbia.
During local elections in 2024 in Serbia’s second city of Novi Sad, members of the association were caught on camera working in an SNS call centre at the Novi Sad Fairgrounds, where party operatives used voter records to track turnout.
Last year, the Directorate gave 8,500 euros to the Association of War Veterans of Serb Lands 1990–1999, for summer youth camps. The association’s leader, Zeljko Vukelic, previously sparked public outrage for sending children aged 11 to 15 to military training camps in Russia in 2017, where children were taught to handle guns and hand grenades.
None of the associations mentioned above responded to requests for comment.
Political scientist Dusko Radosavljevic said the direction of funding reflects the SNS roots in the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party, which Vucic was a key part of through the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, right up until 2008 when he broke away and formed the SNS.
“It must not be overlooked that this regime has, from its inception, carried a distinct ideological marker – a far-right stance,” Radosavljevic said.
“This is a regime rooted in the Serbian Radical Party, one of the most abhorrent political creations in Serbia. It exerts a malignant influence fueled by disputes with neighbours, nationalism, and support for war crimes.”
Pro-Russian, anti-gender groups in Bosnia
In Bosnia, some of the organisations supported by the Directorate have participated in anti-LGBTQ+ and anti-gender campaigns, opposed legislation designed to protect women, engaged in historical revisionism, and promoted pro-Russian narratives.
One of them, Banja Luka-based Srbsko sabranje Bastionik received some 34,000 euros between 2023 and 2025 for six projects promoting Serbian national, religious and cultural identity and activities related to the former southern Serbian province Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008.
In August this year, Bastionik called on “patriots” to attend a memorial service following the death in prison of convicted Bosnian Serb war criminal Ratko Mladic, referring to him as “our general”.
For years, the organisation has participated in events designed to rehabilitate the World War Two leader of the Serb nationalist Chetnik movement, and last year it co-hosted a documentary film festival with Russia’s Kremlin-funded RT Balkan media outlet.
Another Banja Luka-based organisation, Jadovno 1941, received over 13,500 euros from the Directorate for a website dedicated to preserving the memory of victims of the Gospic-Jadovno-Pag complex of WWII-era concentration camps.
Both Bastionik and Jadovno 1941 agitated against an LGBTQ+ event in Banja Luka in 2023 and, in 2024, called for the withdrawal of a Draft Law on Protection from Domestic Violence and Violence against Women, claiming it would introduce “gender ideology” under the guise of protecting women.
The LGBTQ+ event was banned and activists and journalists were assaulted later that day; the bill was subsequently dropped and did not come before parliament again.
Neither Bastionik nor Jadovno 1941 responded to requests for comment.
Tanja Topic, a Banja Luka-based political analyst, described such funding as part of Belgrade’s interference in Bosnia’s political and social affairs, saying that support for organisations engaged in ideological and political campaigns serves to strengthen national identity and political loyalty.
“Government-organised NGOs have been present for years in the political life of both Serbia and Republika Srpska,” said Topic. “They operate according to the same model: as an extension of the authorities, promoting the same values and attacking independent civil society organisations under the banner of defending national interests.”
“The very act of funding associations engaged in ideological and political campaigns aims to foster indoctrination and reinforce national identity,” Topic said.
“The message sent by Serbia is hypocritical at best – while officially emphasising its respect for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade simultaneously finances ideologues and strategists for whom an independent Republika Srpska is merely a matter of time.”
“In doing so, Belgrade secures loyal and devoted citizens in another state, parts of which it already claims as its own.”
Milica Pralica of the Banja Luka-based NGO Ostra Nula, which advocates for human rights, social justice and a culture of remembrance, called for greater transparency in the allocation of such funds, their oversight and results.
“Bosnia and Herzegovina does not need yet another arena for political and ideological power struggles waged through civil society organisations,” Pralica said.
“What we need are transparent criteria, publicly accessible data, and equal accountability for anyone using public money, regardless of which country it comes from.”
“That is why I believe it is no coincidence that resistance to women’s and LGBT rights, nationalist narratives, historical revisionism, and specific geopolitical messaging continuously converge in the activities of certain organisations. Intertwining these elements allows various social issues to be framed as one grand battle in defence of an endangered identity.”