MANILA, Philippines – Before the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) summoned Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan over a remark that President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. himself perceived as a “threat,” the Chinese embassy made perfectly clear how it viewed the avalanche of criticism toward it from all corners of the Philippine government: with unmistakable bravado. 

In an October 18 post, a day before Jing was summoned by Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma Theresa Lazaro, the embassy said: “Some anti-China politicians talked about declaring the Chinese ambassador persona non grata (PNG). Over the past 30 years, anti-China forces have been repeatedly doing the same thing to threaten our embassy.”

“We are fed up with these old and low tricks. If they really want to do something, do it quickly and immediately, please. While diplomacy is based on reciprocity, we will not welcome them to China. Simple and fair enough.” 

The embassy’s public dare for legislators to pass persona non-grata resolutions has resulted in precisely that — the filing of resolutions calling on either Marcos to expel Jing or the DFA to recommend his expulsion, or for the executive to ask China to recall Jing Quan. 

These resolutions are symbolic. Congress cannot actually compel Marcos or the DFA to kick Jing out of the Philippines, although they can raise the public stakes further by calling for legislative hearings on the matter. 

But the resolutions tighten what little wiggle room Marcos has — domestically, bilaterally, or diplomatically — to find an elegant offramp for both Manila and Beijing for the current diplomatic row. 

That is, unless an expulsion of Jing — or at least calls for it — is what Beijing wants at such a delicate time for Manila. 

Muddling the issues

Taunting Philippine politicians publicly and causing a maelstrom on both social media and diplomatic spaces now obfuscate a core issue: that both countries have supposedly agreed on rules to follow in maritime spaces, based on international law. China has repeatedly disregarded these rules when it’s convenient. It muddles an already murky discourse — making it even harder to keep track of, and losing nuance.

It also tests how the rest of the world — Manila’s friends and allies included — would react to what would be a downgrade in bilateral ties between China and the Philippines. 

In a release on Lazaro’s summoning of Jing, the DFA said: “It is not the place of a foreign mission to publicly criticize or taunt Philippine officials and legislators who are acting within their mandates. As a democracy, the Philippines values freedom of expression and a plurality of voices, and it will not accept attempts by a foreign envoy to intimidate those who exercise them.” 

Yet, deeper and deeper into the gutter the Chinese embassy has gone. 

As of posting, the embassy has posted variations of the following:

• Declaring House lawmakers who called for the expulsion of Jing as being “on the list.” Pressed by the media to expound on what that meant, an embassy official said, “At least they are not welcome to China.” Does that mean they’re sanctioned the same way as Labor Secretary Francis Tolentino and Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr.? For this, China’s diplomats had no response. 
• Mocking several senators — including Senator JV Ejercito who had apparently once endorsed a China-made vehicle — for their comments against China. 
• The embassy has also sneered at the DFA itself, and Senator Francis Pangilinan. “Using thuggish, hooligan-style language to launch personal attacks on others — is this the calibre and standards of a Philippine senator? Is this the diplomacy and prudence that the DFA claims to uphold?” the embassy said in a post. 
• In responding to Senator Panfilo Lacson’s call for the DFA to “politely [ask China] to recall [Jing],” the embassy replied: “MESSAGE TO DFA: Holding Philippine high-ranking elected officials accountable for reckless, inflammatory remarks and constantly smearing and maligning a neighboring country and urging them to watch their words and handle matters diplomatically is about preserving bilateral relations. It is not a failure of diplomacy.” 

In a statement on Thursday, October 22, the DFA said the embassy’s “escalatory and undiplomatic tone and language used in the latest social media statements…erode mutual trust and confidence, and severely undermine the efforts to stabilize and improve bilateral relations.” 

“All diplomats are expected to conduct and express themselves in a manner befitting diplomatic envoys, especially on social media,” said the DFA. 

Less wiggle room for Marcos

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said little on the back-and-forth in Manila.

“To improve and develop China-Philippines relations serves the interest of both sides. We firmly oppose certain Philippine individuals maliciously lashing out at China and hurting bilateral ties. The Philippine side should rein in such irresponsible behavior of those politicians,” its spokesperson Mao Ning said on October 19. 

It’s assumed that the embassy and its diplomats understand that under the Philippine system, legislators belong to a separate branch of government. Neither senators nor lawmakers report to the DFA — at best, they consult. It’s Congress that deliberates and has oversight on the DFA’s budget, the same way it does the budget of other executive agencies, including Malacañang (and the Office of the Vice President). 

It would be far-fetched to consider that the Chinese embassy’s provocations are done without the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Chinese government’s permission or encouragement — whether it be passive or pro-active. It would be unthinkable for any embassy to have gone rogue from the wishes of its home office and government for this long a time — the harsh, sometimes uncouth statements from the embassy have been a hallmark of Jing’s tenure, beginning in late 2025. 

Before being assigned to Manila, Jing was deputy chief of mission of China’s embassy in Washington DC. Before that, he was a minister in the same post. He’s been described as an expert on US-China ties, above all. Jing was reportedly on call for Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump’s summits in Beijing and Washington DC. 

His assignment to Manila is by design. Bilateral ties between the Philippines and the United States have flourished under Marcos, especially when it comes to defense and security. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites have nearly doubled under his administration, and US foreign military financing allocations for the Philippines stands at $2.5 billion across five years until 2031, after a $500 million pledge in 2024. 

American weapons — the Typhon and the NMESIS — were brought in for use in the annual Balikatan wargames and have yet to leave Philippine shores. Trade and industrial ties — through the Luzon Economic Corridor and Pax Silica — are hoped to only grow between the two countries. 

Growing closer to the US has also meant expanding Manila’s strategic and security ties — countries that are also close partners of Washington, such as Japan. These moves have been unsettling for Beijing. 

In their media release on Lazaro’s summon, Jing defended his original remarks by saying he was only pushing for a “differentiated approach to handle the problems of various sectors, based on their own merits instead of linking one to another.” 

The Chinese ambassador added: “We should enhance dialogue, manage differences and deepen cooperation, create more good stories, good news. Let the good aspects prevail over bad ones. Otherwise we may easily fall into the situation of countermeasures and retaliation.” 

But kicking Jing out is the nuclear option, at least diplomatically. 

What follows could be reciprocal or disproportionate — from kicking out Manila’s ambassador to Beijing to imposing trade sanctions that they’ve already threatened to do in the past. Either outcome can only escalate tensions in the region. 

A history of tensions 

Manila and Beijing’s relationship has been tense for decades — especially post-2012 or after a standoff in Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) that ended with China having the upperhand. The relationship soured even more in 2013, after Manila took Beijing to court — and walked away victorious years later, with the 2016 Arbitral Award.

Then-president Rodrigo Duterte, who wanted closer ties with Beijing, set that award aside. Under Duterte, Manila was Beijing’s darling — even as it meant that little was said of the landmark award publicly and maritime units were extra cautious in the West Philippine Sea. 

Marcos did a 180 by making the 2016 Arbitral Award front and center in its maritime, defense, and foreign policy. On the defense side, ties are closest with nations that recognize and actively support the landmark ruling. 

A transparency initiative from 2023 to 2024 put Chinese harassment on the international stage — footage of the China Coast Guard (CCG) harassing its Philippine counterparts made the rounds regularly on the news and online. This helped rally support for the Philippines from allies and friends old and new — but did little to actually stop and manage Chinese harassment.  

The situation simmered in mid-2024, after a tense confrontation at the foot of the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin (Second Thomas Shoal), which resulted in the loss of one Filipino soldier’s thumb and damage to military equipment. 

Between 2024 and early-2026, incidents sprang up here and there — to include aerial confrontations and numerous maritime confrontations. But things boiled over again in 2026, or just as Jing got his feet wet as the new envoy to Manila. 

As his embassy’s rhetoric grew bolder, so did incidents in the West Philippine Sea. 

The CCG approached the BRP Sierra Madre in July 2026, supposedly to check if construction had taken place. Jing claimed that under a provisional arrangement, the details of which are confidential, the Philippines is not allowed to bring construction materials. Lazaro, who was undersecretary for bilateral affairs when the temporary arrangement was made in 2024, said this was not the case.

In late September 2025, a resupply mission to Ayungin was reportedly hindered by the CCG. Weeks later, a medical evacuation for a soldier with a ruptured appendix was stalled for hours because the CCG refused to let the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) get closer to the BRP Sierra Madre. 

The July incident happened just as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a quick trip to Manila for the ASEAN Foreign Ministers meetings. Beijing accused the Philippines of, somehow, orchestrating a confrontation that led to the injury of one soldier. 

Manila in the spotlight 

The September and October maritime incidents, plus this new word war, happens just weeks before Teodoro hosts counterpart defense chiefs, including Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun, in Cebu. The Philippines, by mid-November, concludes its Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chairmanship with the bloc’s 49th Summit. 

At the Summit, the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea will surely be taken up — and potentially the aspiration for it to conclude by 2026 or the end of Manila’s chairmanship. Signs indicate that a COC acceptable to the diverse bloc and China is far from reality. 

The summit will also follow a rather tense time for domestic politics — in the weeks prior, Vice President Sara Duterte’s defense team is expected to present their case before the impeachment court. Duterte has also been accused of having financial ties to China through her husband’s company.

Her claim is that her supposed political persecution, to include the China ties claim, is turning the Philippines into a “troublemaker” in the region. Beijing has called Manila a “troublemaker” in the past, too.  

There are issues beyond the Philippines that ultimately affect the domestic situation — among them, an oil crisis exacerbated by Manila’s sole treaty-ally’s actions against Iran and on the critical waterway that’s the Strait of Hormuz. 

It’s uncanny timing — diplomatic tensions between China and the Philippines rise just before Manila hosts a bloc with varying degrees of comfort and a wide range of approaches in handling a swashbuckling superpower neighbor like Beijing, and just as Marcos must oversee tense weeks in domestic politics. 

Then there are issues way, way beyond Manila’s control. 2026 has seen the highest military expenditures across the world in history. We’re looking at the highest number of conflicts worldwide since the last world war. The United States is occupied by its war against Iran, and US President Donald Trump has seemed to truly put the brakes on their aid of Ukraine. The latter is a worrying point for Europe, which has in turn grown weary of its traditional ally, Washington. 

As rhetoric between Manila and China escalates, one can only wonder what the only other world superpower is thinking.  – Rappler.com