On 5 October, Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces stopped a van with two people on board at the Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint.
When searched, authorities discovered and then seized about 780 kg of explosives, including TNT and Composition C-4 plastic.
The two people arrested were reportedly linked to Hezbollah. They were tasked with transporting the cargo from the Bekaa region to Beirut.
The reported involvement of Hezbollah members in the explosives seizure prompted a wave of accusations from the group’s political rivals, with some suggesting they could be used for internal political assassinations.
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea called the seizure “the most dangerous incident in years”, saying the weapons were probably meant for use inside Lebanon.
Kataeb leader Samy Gemayel wrote they were probably intended for a new wave of assassinations like those between 2004 and 2008, including that of former prime minister Rafic Hariri in 2005.
Lebanon’s prime minister, Nawaf Salam, also noted that C-4 had been used in previous assassinations and promised a full investigation.
However, on 15 October, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah acknowledged that the vehicle and its cargo belonged to the group. He denied allegations of an assassination plot and stated that the explosives are part of the capabilities Hezbollah uses against Israel, demanding the return of the shipment.
On the same day, US Secretary of State Marc Rubio reportedly called Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun, urging him not to return confiscated explosives to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s demand for the return of the explosives has further strained its relationship with a government that has banned the group’s military activity and is pushing to disarm it.
Israel's occupation creates openings for Hezbollah to rebuild
The discovery of explosive materials comes as Israel continues to occupy swathes of southern Lebanon and launch near-daily strikes despite a US-brokered ceasefire agreed in June.
Hezbollah has halted its attacks since then, but the seizure of explosives points to efforts to rebuild its military capabilities as the risk of renewed US-Iran conflict threatens to reignite the Lebanese front.
It is not uncommon for Hezbollah to use ceasefire windows to rebuild its capabilities following a conflict with Israel.
Between the November 2024 ceasefire that ended the Israel-Hezbollah war linked to Gaza and March 2026, reports indicate that the group has rebuilt its command structure and rearmed with assistance from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group (ICG), said that Israel’s continued occupation and attacks in Lebanon also contribute to the conditions that enable the group’s rebuilding.
“While it might be true that Hezbollah continues to operate militarily, despite the Lebanese government wanting to have a state monopoly over arms, it would be much harder for Hezbollah to do that if Israel were more willing to grant actual concessions as part of its negotiations with Lebanon and to create a viable and fair security arrangement between the two countries,” he told The New Arab.
The US-brokered framework signed in June between Lebanon and Israel has yielded limited results. Lebanon demands an end to Israeli attacks and occupation, the release of detainees, and the return of the displaced. Israel ties these conditions to Hezbollah’s disarmament, which the group rejects.
Israel has continued its military operations in southern Lebanon, occupying more than 600 square kilometres of Lebanese territory while conducting near-daily airstrikes, artillery fire, and home demolitions.
It has mostly levelled 48 of about 60 occupied southern Lebanese towns and villages. In September, Israeli forces took control of the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge near Nabatieh. They previously captured Beaufort Castle and crossed the Litani River.
Lebanon’s Health Ministry says more than 4,300 people have been killed since 2 March, following Hezbollah’s entry into the wider US-Iran war. Nearly 9,000 have been killed since 2023. Almost 330,000 people remain internally displaced.
Nicholas Blandford, a non-resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programmes, told The New Arab that daily shelling and drone surveillance are ongoing, along with efforts to prevent reconstruction south of the Litani River, even outside the occupied zone.
“So in effect, the Israeli occupation extends far beyond where they are physically deployed. It's been quite intense over the last month,” he said.
Israel is also escalating threats to expand its southern Lebanon occupation. Last week, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz warned that Lebanon would lose Nabatieh and the Litani area to permanent Israeli control if Hezbollah joins Iran in attacking Israel.
A renewed Iran war could draw Lebanon back into conflict
In fact, US President Donald Trump is weighing fresh strikes against Iran, with Israel reportedly pushing for renewed hostilities. Iran is likewise preparing for war, and the conflict in Yemen further fuels regional escalation.
RANE’s lead MENA and defence analyst Freddy Khoueiry explained that repeated interceptions of weapons transfers in Syria and recent seizures of Hezbollah-linked material inside Lebanon show that the group is "clearly attempting to reconstitute parts of its military capability" to rebuild supply lines and replenish stock.
“Hezbollah is likely attempting to restore enough capability to at some point defend against a potential Israeli preemptive campaign and at the same time preserve the option to participate in another regional conflict involving Iran,” he told The New Arab.
For example, Khoueiry explained that seized TNT and C-4 could be used in explosive-drone payloads, rocket and missile warheads, and roadside bombs, mines and demolition charges against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon if conflict resumes.
Dual-use items like fibre-optic cables for drones could enter Lebanon through standard commercial channels, providing Hezbollah with an alternative route to Syria.
Hezbollah may be prioritising experimenting with and expanding the use of low-cost, fibre-optic-guided FPV drones, heavily deployed against Israeli troops in southern Lebanon before the June ceasefire, as they offer a cheap, effective, and hard-to-intercept option.
On the ground, the presence of Israeli troops in southern Lebanon may give Hezbollah an opening to use guerrilla tactics, such as small units staging hit-and-run attacks from familiar terrain. Its drone operations there could also expand the pool of trained drone operators.
Wood said that while Israel has vast military superiority, Hezbollah, this year, “has still managed to make a nuisance of itself”, demonstrating that “while it can't win a military victory over Israel, it can still inflict casualties”. Hezbollah drone attacks have reportedly killed at least 12 Israeli soldiers.
However, what Hezbollah’s role would be if the US and Israel resume strikes on Iran remains to be seen.
Blandford said that Hezbollah’s involvement would depend on Iran’s ability to absorb renewed US and Israeli attacks.
“The Iranians may conclude that if they can absorb fresh Israeli and US strikes, they don’t need to involve Hezbollah,” he said. However, if Iran deems additional pressure necessary, it may activate Hezbollah to engage Israel along the border, stretching and diverting Israel's resources.
Khoueiry further explained that Hezbollah’s weakened capabilities and fragile domestic position may limit its initial involvement, though opening a Lebanese front could pressure Israel and strengthen Hezbollah’s and Iran’s negotiating leverage.
“Hezbollah could specifically seek to link pressure on Israeli military presence inside of Lebanon and potentially northern Israel again to demand an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, while Tehran could again attempt to incorporate the Lebanese front into a broader regional ceasefire or negotiating framework,” he said.
However, other kinds of pressures are also likely to shape Hezbollah’s calculations. The Shia community, estimated at 32% of Lebanon’s population, has borne much of the war’s human cost during the war. Last week, Hezbollah announced plans to financially help families in Lebanon whose homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable.
Polls diverge on Shia support for Hezbollah’s weapons, with a May poll finding that most respondents opposed disarmament and a September survey finding that most favoured placing their weapons under state control, reflecting the complexity of the group’s relationship with its constituency.
Wood said that Hezbollah weighs the suffering of its constituency but, at the same time, also weighs its deep alliance with Iran.
The group also argues that disarmament would leave the Shia community and Lebanon “wide open to Israeli abuses,” and at times, it “has used those factors to justify its decision to enter conflict in Lebanon, in the knowledge that the Shia will first and foremost pay the price”.
Blandford also argued that if Hezbollah loses Shia support, “then the game is over.”
“It doesn't matter how many weapons or how much money the Iranians give Hezbollah; if they haven't got the support of the Shia community, it's finished.”
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights
Follow him on X: @DarioSabaghi
Edited by Charlie Hoyle