Since 2011, Libya’s peace initiatives have struggled to connect political agreements to the institutions and security forces needed to implement them. The Aug. 30 agreement between the Government of National Unity and the eastern-based General Command offers a route toward elections, although armed networks have retained the capacity to undermine political commitments.
Facilitated by Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, the process included meetings in Rome and seven rounds of negotiations in Tunis. The agreement sets out a 24-month path toward presidential and legislative elections, addresses the High National Elections Commission board’s reconstitution, and seeks to resolve outstanding constitutional and legal obstacles.
The format itself carries a strategic advantage: Direct negotiations bring the principal centers of power into a structured exchange, connecting political commitments more closely to the authority needed to implement them.
For the Government of National Unity, the achievement has been to articulate a coherent negotiating position from within western Libya’s diverse political landscape, where competing institutions, armed formations, and municipal interests complicate collective decision-making. Its delegation’s ability to negotiate an agreement demonstrates that political plurality need not preclude effective representation.
The eastern camp’s more centralized, authoritarian military structure presents a different challenge. Although it appears to offer a unified chain of command, competing interests within Khalifa Haftar’s family and the ambitions of rival siblings complicate the relationship between formal authority and political action.
The 4+4 agreement in Libya offers a route toward elections, but political unity depends on enforceable commitments.
Hafed Al-Ghwell
Direct negotiations make these responsibilities clearer on both sides, providing a framework in which the capacity to reach an agreement can be tested against the ability to uphold it.
Elsewhere, progress on financial arrangements has demonstrated the possibility of practical cooperation. American engagement, including efforts by US special adviser Massad Boulos, have helped support a unified financial spending agreement across the divide creating a foundation for the subsequent political initiative.
Nevertheless, the legislative response has exposed a serious flaw. The eastern-based House of Representatives endorsed the 4+4 agreement on Sept. 14, following an Aug. 31 statement of support by 103 lawmakers. On Oct. 5, however, the High Council of State rejected the agreement and associated measures, arguing that these bypassed constitutional requirements and institutional consensus.
This dispute deserves attention beyond accusations of political obstruction. Libya’s rival institutions derive claims to legitimacy from competing legal interpretations, and bypassing one chamber risks creating another contested transitional arrangement. Tetteh, of the UN Support Mission in Libya, continued to defend the agreement before the UN Security Council on Oct. 14, while signaling plans to engage the 4+4 participants in developing a broader political mechanism.
The diplomatic opening therefore remains consequential because its durability depends on whether electoral commitments acquire institutional legitimacy and practical enforcement.
However, subsequent sabotage allegations have made that test more challenging.
Drone attacks in August and September targeted oil storage, electricity, and water infrastructure in western Libya while political negotiations were advancing.
At Zawiya, roughly 50 km west of Tripoli, attacks hit a refinery capable of processing 120,000 barrels per day; a damaged tank held about 4.5 million liters of gasoline. The complex connects to the 300,000-barrel-per-day Sharara oilfield, linking extraction, transport, and domestic fuel supplies. A separate attack on the South Zawiya substation contributed to major outages. General Electric withdrew technical personnel from a nearby power plant, leaving more than 700 megawatts of its 1,300-megawatt capacity unavailable. Attacks on desalination infrastructure also threatened water supplies.
Naturally, the consequences have extended into everyday life. Oil revenues finance public salaries and subsidies, while electricity failures disrupt hospitals and businesses and fuel shortages raise transport costs. With inflation reportedly above 14 percent, further interruptions threaten already strained households. Tetteh reported that 30-40 percent of subsidized fuel was diverted into smuggling, with losses estimated above $4.4 billion. Subsidies intended to keep fuel affordable can therefore enrich networks exploiting state institutions and cross-border trafficking.
Armed groups also extract concessions by threatening pipelines. September blockades involving the Petroleum Facilities Guard, a separate security actor, reportedly caused 1 million barrels in lost production and about $100 million in losses. Such disruptions demonstrate how armed networks can interrupt national revenue and force political concessions. The 4+4 agreement cannot guarantee reliable oil, electricity or water supplies while other groups retain the ability to attack or close essential infrastructure.
The Government of National Unity announced in September that it had arrested five Libyan and foreign nationals over attacks on oil storage facilities in Tripoli and Zawiya and the Zawiya power station. Authorities linked the alleged cell to Omar Al-Majarhi of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade and alleged connections to Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the eastern-based Libyan National Army.
International reporting subsequently brought the sabotage investigation into direct focus within Libya’s diplomatic negotiations. In an Oct. 3 report, The Guardian cited sources in the Government of National Unity alleging that suspects detained over the attacks were working for Haftar. The allegations threaten to complicate both the US-backed unification initiative and the parallel UN-sponsored 4+4 process.
The report also quoted Walid Al-Lafi, the Government of National Unity’s communication and political affairs minister and head of its 4+4 negotiating delegation, defending the process as a route toward elections, while insisting that political negotiations must not excuse violations or disregard the rights of those affected. His position captures the central dilemma facing Tripoli: preserving a diplomatic channel capable of advancing elections, while ensuring that the pursuit of an agreement does not place allegations of attacks on civilian infrastructure beyond investigation and accountability.
For Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, continuing negotiations without accountability risks alienating citizens, while abandoning discussions before the evidence is tested could benefit those seeking division. Preserving the process therefore requires credible investigations and consequences for proven wrongdoing.
The 4+4 agreement offers a route toward elections, but political unity depends on enforceable commitments. Investigations, institutional legitimacy, and reform of the security sector must advance together if Libya is to protect the infrastructure which sustains its citizens and public finances.
Hafed Al-Ghwell is senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center in Washington and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies.
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