Why Netanyahu is making the Iranian regime’s overthrow a personal promise - analysis

Amid all the speculation about renewed military confrontation with Iran before next week’s elections or just after the US midterms, one shift in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric is clear: he moved from promising to create the conditions for the Iranian regime’s overthrow to pledging to bring it down.

“The regime must fall, and I will bring it down,” he said on Sunday in a briefing with journalists.

“Our plan is a very comprehensive and very determined plan to bring about the fall of the regime. That is my plan. That is the directive I have given all the security agencies, and that is what will happen.

On Tuesday, at the opening of the academic year at Tel Hai University in Kiryat Shmona, Netanyahu expanded on that commitment and explained the rationale.

“We must complete the elimination of the Iranian regime; that is the primary objective,” he said. “I have spoken about this with President Trump more than once, including the day before yesterday (Sunday).”

His argument was that any agreement or accommodation leaving the regime in power would leave it determined to pursue a nuclear bomb and rebuild its network of proxies surrounding Israel.

Even a regime that is “battered, wounded and beaten,” he said, would try again to produce nuclear weapons and reconstruct its regional axis.

“Therefore, the only way to prevent this is to bring down this regime, and then the elimination of Hezbollah will follow.”

Israel has long made clear that it would welcome the fall of a regime committed to its destruction. What stands out now is Netanyahu’s explicit, personal commitment to bringing that fall about.

Consider what he said in June 2025, during the 12-day war.

“The matter of changing the regime or the fall of this regime is first and foremost a matter for the Iranian people. There is no substitute for this.”

Speaking to Kan television at the time, Netanyahu drew a clear distinction between a possible outcome of the war and its declared objectives. Regime change “could be a result, but it’s not a stated or formal goal that we have,” he said. Both he and the IDF stressed that the campaign’s purpose was to dismantle Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

His position subsequently evolved.

During the war that began on February 28, Netanyahu differentiated between what Israel could accomplish militarily and what the Iranian people would have to do themselves. At a March 12 press conference, he described preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and threatening ballistic missiles as the campaign’s purposes, alongside “another goal” of creating the conditions for Iranians to remove their rulers.

The distinction was consequential. Israel could strike the regime’s capabilities and weaken its grip. The Iranian people would have to seize the opportunity.

Now the language is more categorical: “I will bring it down.”

So what changed? Why is Netanyahu personally promising an outcome he previously said Israel could help the Iranian people achieve?

Part of the answer lies in the distinction he is drawing between damaging Iran’s capabilities and ending the threat it poses.

Israel can destroy centrifuges, hit missile factories and kill commanders. But if the regime survives, Netanyahu argues, so will its determination to rebuild. Another successful military campaign may buy Israel time, but it will not spare the country another campaign down the road; only overthrowing the regime can do that.

This helps explain the rationale. It does not, by itself, explain the timing.

For that, look at the two political clocks ticking in the background: Israel’s election next week and the remaining time in Trump’s presidency.

The electoral logic is clear. One of Netanyahu’s central campaign themes is that he has changed the Middle East and must remain in office to complete the task.

An Iran that has been weakened but remains dangerous fits neatly into that argument: much has been accomplished, much remains to be done, and changing leaders now would put those gains at risk. At Sunday’s briefing, he explicitly linked finishing the job to the election.

This also gives him an answer to an uncomfortable question. If the campaigns against Iran were as successful as he maintains, why is another confrontation looming?

His answer is that military success has brought Israel closer to its destination, but the destination has yet to be reached. The regime’s survival explains the continuing danger; its overthrow offers the promise of finally removing it.

For a public that wants to see an end to more than three years of wars, that is a powerful proposition. Netanyahu is offering the prospect that the sacrifices of recent years can produce a fundamentally different security reality, one in which Israel is no longer required to fight the same enemies every few months.

It also places his opponents in a difficult position. They can question his ability to fulfill the promise, but few Israeli voters need convincing that the fall of the Iranian regime would be welcome. The political argument shifts toward who can deliver that outcome, and whether Netanyahu’s confidence is justified.

In presenting his security doctrine on Sunday, Netanyahu warned that a future American president could be hostile to Israel and stressed the importance of the coming years. The implication is that he sees the remaining Trump years as a window of opportunity Israel cannot assume will remain open under the next administration.

That adds urgency to his argument. If Israel has weakened its enemies and has a supportive president in Washington, Netanyahu’s case is that it should use that combination to secure lasting results.

Yet an opportunity to act does not necessarily translate into an ability to achieve the desired outcome. And a conversation with Trump about bringing down the regime does not establish that the American president has signed on to that objective.

The same distinction applies to Israel’s military capabilities. The ability to destroy facilities, eliminate senior figures, and disrupt a country’s defenses is something we have all seen. The ability to translate all of that into regime change is something else entirely.

Netanyahu does not need to disclose operational plans to explain the basis for his confidence. But there is a legitimate question about what would make another effort succeed where earlier blows failed to produce an uprising capable of toppling the ayatollahs.

The prime minister’s rationale for wanting the regime gone is clear, and the election helps explain why he has moved its overthrow to the top of his rhetorical agenda. What remains missing is an explanation of how he intends to deliver on what increasingly sounds like a campaign promise, one whose feasibility he has yet to demonstrate.