Israel must set red lines on Turkish presence in Syria to avoid confrontation, think tank argues

Israel needs to draw more limited red lines on Turkish activities in Syria instead of the more aggressive approach it has taken since the old Syrian Assad regime fell in December 2024, the Institute for National Security Studies think tank argued.

On August 17, Israel struck an emerging Turkish position at the Abu al-Duhur base in Syria, leading to a high-profile diplomatic conflict between Israel on one side and the US, Turkey, and Syria on the other side.

In addition, on Friday of last week, the IDF targeted a vehicle near the Lebanese-Syrian border carrying Yusuf Ali al-Hassoun, who may be associated with Iran terror managers.

In repeated position papers since early 2025, INSS has warned that staying in Syria indefinitely without engaging in dialogue with Damascus about long-term security arrangements could lead to forfeiting many of the security gains that the IDF achieved upon the fall of Assad.

At the time, the IDF destroyed most of the Assad regime's military's higher-profile threats at sea, on land, and in the air, while also taking over a significant buffer zone in southern Syria to make it harder for any potential hostile jihadist force associated with the new Syrian government to initiate an invasion.

Authored by former senior IDF intelligence advisor and current INSS Head of Syria research, Carmit Valensi, and Amal Hayek, another INSS researcher, the most recent think tank report recommends that Israel walk a complex and nuanced tightrope in Syria, which splits "restoration of Syrian infrastructure and the establishment of a Turkish presence" into multiple components.

"A distinction should be made between technical assistance, training, and the rehabilitation of facilities for the Syrian state, on the one hand, and the establishment of independent Turkish command-and-control infrastructure, on the other," stated the think tank.

Israel has confirmed with Valensi that the report still holds following the most recent events in Syria, which includes the statement regarding deployment of systems in northern Syria: "From an operational standpoint, there is little practical difference between the deployment of Turkish radar, electronic warfare, or air defense systems in northern Syria and their deployment in southern Turkey or northern Cyprus."

"Their coverage ranges are similar, and the presence of such systems in northern Syria therefore does not in itself constitute a red line warranting the use of Israeli force," the position paper contended.

According to INSS, these same principles of nuance apply to the maritime domain: "The Turkish navy enjoys an inherent advantage in the eastern Mediterranean, and a limited presence along the Syrian coast would not fundamentally alter the balance of power."

This INSS position clashes with the current position of the navy, which wishes to be more aggressive in confronting Turkish naval expansion in the Mediterranean, including growing Israel's naval fleet from six to eight over future years.

Part of the INSS recommendations stems from an analysis that even if Turkey helped build Syrian leader Ahmad al-Sharaa's regime, "the relationship between Ankara and Damascus is therefore more complex than is sometimes perceived in Israel and is not free of tension."

"Evidence of this can be found in a series of structural changes recently implemented by Damascus in the ranks of the Syrian army, indicating an intention to reduce the autonomy of these forces and the extent of Turkish influence over them," wrote INSS.

For example, "As of August 2026, the Turkish military presence in Syria is undergoing a process of reorganization. Ankara is gradually downsizing some of the smaller outposts and facilities it established during the years of war – particularly in areas where the security situation has changed – and transferring authority and responsibility to Syrian state institutions."

Israeli security officials generally say these are cosmetic changes designed to fool the West, but some Mossad officials have expressed openness to testing out whether Syria's new regime may choose stability over conflict with Israel, and INSS warned that being perceived as not giving the Syrians a chance could paradoxically endanger Israeli national security.

After all of the above advice for Israel to come to terms with a more restrained approach against Syria and Turkey, INSS does still believe in red lines.

Its view is that central and southern Syria are critical areas and that "While Turkey justifies its presence in northern Syria as necessary to prevent threats to its territory, the establishment of Turkish bases farther inside the country, in central Syria, and even more so in the south, is not dictated by such security needs."

Further, INSS said that such a Turkish presence "would also bring potential friction closer to the Israeli front and constitute a problematic shift in the regional balance."

In addition, INSS stated that Israel must avoid the "Entrenchment of terror proxies in southern Syria. Israel should focus on thwarting terrorist elements, particularly Hamas, and preventing them from enjoying freedom of action or safe haven under Turkish or Syrian auspices in the southern region adjacent to Israel’s border."

In other words, INSS would be less tolerant of jihadist elements, especially Hamas, getting anywhere near Israel's border in southern Syria, versus Turkey growing its presence in northern Syria.

Bringing all of these views together, INSS stated that, "Turkey’s presence and influence in Syria are an established reality that is unlikely to disappear through the use of military force alone."

In that sense, "Israel’s challenge is not to eliminate Turkish involvement altogether, but rather to contain and balance it."

Moreover, "Relying exclusively on military force and striking targets of marginal operational value, without a parallel diplomatic track with Damascus, jeopardizes Israel’s security interests and could drag the parties into a direct confrontation that neither side desires."

This last statement by INSS engages the debate about whether the target radar which the IDF struck in Syria was truly a game-changer in terms of tracking Israeli aircraft, or whether other nearby existing radars are already carrying out the same detection activities.

"Israeli decision-makers must therefore combine focused military deterrence with direct and indirect dialogue, utilize deconfliction mechanisms, and clearly define the areas in which Israel is prepared to allow Syria to rebuild its capabilities, before the situation deteriorates into dangerous regional escalation," said INSS.

Next, it stated, "blanket Israeli opposition to any process of Syrian military rehabilitation could prove counterproductive, pushing Damascus toward greater dependence on Ankara."

Moreover, INSS wrote, "the broader regional and diplomatic context should be taken into account: Damascus is currently drawing closer to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and gaining growing legitimacy from the United States and European countries."

In early 2025, Valensi and several other national security officials suggested that Israel must draw up a list of conditions, such as demilitarized zones in Syria, that could lead it to withdraw from some or all of the buffer zone.

When the IDF first took over the buffer zone in Syria, multiple IDF officials told the Post during a visit to the new security zone that the military's presence was very temporary and would end once it was clear that the new Syrian leadership was not trying to invade Israel.

While Sharaa's background is as a jihadist and some of his associated forces have perpetrated multiple massacres against Syrian Druze and Alawites since taking power, there has been no hint of action against Israel for nearly two years.

"Israel’s actions are increasingly perceived as seeking to destabilize Syria, and in this context Israel is at times even compared to Iran. In this framework, greater attention may be directed toward the issue of the Golan Heights, as recently raised by [US Ambassador Tom] Barrack, while regional, and particularly international, pressure could intensify for Israel to withdraw to the lines established under the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement, possibly even without significant political concessions in return," concluded INSS.

This raises the threat that while Israel has held the Syrian buffer zone to both be safer and as leverage to gain security concessions from Syria, a failure to make any concession offers for the last two years could eventually lead Trump, who now heavily supports Sharaa, to force a withdrawal with few pluses for Israel.