Political radicalism sits uneasily within the paradigm of mainstream politics. Interestingly, this phenomenon has increasingly manifested among the middle classes.
The lineage of both left and right ideological extremes can be traced to two historical junctures. Left-wing radicalism finds its genesis in the 18th century French Revolution and right-wing extremism in the ascent of Nazism in 1930s Germany. In both instances, the working classes served primarily as foot soldiers. They were mobilised by middle class concepts and aspirations. The French Revolution was animated by the theories of ‘enlightened’ middle-class intellectuals and Nazism was built upon convoluted race theories conceived by middle-class thinkers.
In 18th century France, radical philosophies emerged from an ascending and fledgling middle class that felt its economic and social progress impeded by the remnants of the ancien régime, such as decadent monarchs, landed nobility and an exploitative clergy. These were overthrown through bloody upheaval, driven largely by downtrodden mobs. However, when this triumph’s middle-class architects attempted to translate their radical philosophies into governance, they plunged the nation into further turmoil.
This instability was checked by the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte, who established a dictatorship. The resultant political trajectory finally matured into the secular democratic system that endures in France till today. The maturation was a synthesis of clashing ideas, crystallised by an overwhelming need for moderation and stability in a country that had been turned on its head.
From revolutionary France to contemporary Pakistan, radical movements have repeatedly demonstrated how the pursuit of political absolutism can become an instrument of self-destruction
By the 1930s, Europe’s middle class was expanding its influence within this evolving arrangement. But the arrangement was suddenly unsettled by the expansion of socialist movements following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. As socialist ideologies gained political traction among the growing working classes, the middle class began to experience severe insecurity. They felt they were being squeezed between entrenched elites and increasingly active working class constituencies.
In Germany, this middle class anxiety manifested as hostility toward democracy. It began being blamed for Germany’s economic ruin, military humiliation and the perceived infiltration of communism. To the middle classes, communism threatened the socio-economic hierarchy through which their own aspirations were sustained.
As a result, in 1933, a significant portion of the German middle class cast its ballots for Adolf Hitler’s radical far-right Nazi party, viewing it as a bulwark against communism. Many middle class intellectuals, professionals and jurists aligned themselves with traditional economic and religious elites to elevate a fanatic to power. But Hitler’s ensuing radical agenda plunged Germany into catastrophic warfare and widespread devastation, underscoring the destructive capacity of radicalism when integrated into mainstream statecraft.
Political radicalism in mainstream politics often operates through a self-consuming dynamic, ultimately destroying the very leaders and movements that champion it. According to American political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, when radical movements enter the political mainstream, their rejection of political norms invites counter-mobilisation and their own downfall. Radical actors trigger a chain reaction that eventually dismantles their power, fractures their movements, and leaves them vulnerable to judicial and political prosecution.
Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest that the main problem with bringing radical ideas into mainstream politics is that they simply do not work with normal governance or the art of working together. Governing effectively requires making deals and knowing when to compromise. Radical political figures who refuse to compromise or work within institutional rules eventually undermine their own ability to govern.
They view political rules and traditions not as guidelines, but as traps set by their ‘corrupt’ rivals. Their strict ‘no-compromise’ attitude makes it nearly impossible to build stable alliances. Moderate voices inside the party are slowly pushed out or silenced. This leaves the leader surrounded only by yes-men and extreme loyalists, destroying the party’s ability to think pragmatically or adapt when a major political crisis hits.
On a social level, political radicalism creates deep divisions in society and leaves the public exhausted. Indeed, tapping into anti-establishment anger can be an effective way to turn economic frustration into massive street rallies, but keeping that radical momentum alive requires the constant sustaining of the outrage. This leads to protest fatigue.
According to the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, radical populism splits society into hostile camps, turning normal debates over policy into dramatic ‘us versus them’ battles. Over time, average citizens, the more thoughtful voters, and the business community grow weary of the continuous turmoil. The country becomes politically exhausted and economically fragile.
The researchers Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan concluded that when society begins to crave stability, radical politics rapidly loses its broad electoral appeal. Its practitioners become isolated. When radical leaders urge their followers to confront state authorities directly, public sentiment gradually begins to move toward the desire for order and security, legitimising the state’s countermeasures.
In 1972, the British psychologist Irving Janis demonstrated that radical movements are driven by collective arrogance and a charismatic leader’s illusion of invincibility. Such leaders often develop “hubris syndrome”, mistaking mass rallies for absolute mandates. They believe they are immune to legal or institutional limits and begin to couple their personal political survival with the destiny of the nation itself. This prompts them to make constant strategic blunders.
A modern illustration of all this is Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). PTI entered mainstream Pakistani politics by mobilising public discontent against established political parties. Khan put forward a radical agenda that mostly attracted the middle classes. However, after bumbling across his three-year government, and losing parliamentary support in 2022, he and his party escalated their anti-establishment rhetoric to unprecedented levels, framing the struggle for Khan’s political survival as a ‘national liberation’ movement.
This radical route culminated in the violent events of May 2023, and November 2024, where party supporters targeted state and military installations. The state responded with crackdowns, mass arrests and judicial trials. Khan’s strategic reliance on populist radicalism and uncompromising confrontation resulted in his imprisonment, and then his party’s gradual organisational paralysis, demonstrating how mainstream radicalism provokes its own undoing. PTI’s undoing now seems complete with the sidelining of its one remaining provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. What’s more, the party’s core middle class constituency followed it all the way till it crumbled into a political black hole.
Radical populists destroy their own political longevity by rejecting formal and informal political norms, and confusing their irrational bullheadedness as an uncompromising commitment. The German sociologist Max Weber warned of a mindset where leaders prioritise absolute moral purity over pragmatic political outcomes.
Weber argued that political figures driven by radical moral conviction inevitably produce catastrophic results and trigger their own downfall, whereas enduring statesmanship requires an “ethic of responsibility”, grounded in compromise, foresight and restraint.
Published in Dawn, EOS, October 25th, 2026