When discussing the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, we often forget the resolution that established its presence and its role in south Lebanon. As the end of its mandate approaches, we are seeing a divide between those who want to extend its role and those who are pushing for something different. It was UN Security Council Resolution 1701 that gave this authorization. The objective of this resolution, which was decided following the war of 2006, was to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty over all of southern Lebanon, from both Israel and Hezbollah. This has failed.
The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL should have ensured that the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River was free of armed personnel, weapons and military infrastructure other than their own. This means that Hezbollah should have been disarmed, which in turn would have allowed for the end of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. Lebanon could then have established a stable security environment that would not allow Hezbollah or any other armed group to operate independently of the state. The ultimate goal should have been, or could have been, reaching lasting peace along the border.
It is clear that this never happened. Hezbollah is still entrenched in the south of the country and still poses a threat to the Lebanese state. In the 20 years since the resolution passed, southern Lebanon has experienced several major escalations. These happened in 2010, 2015, 2019 and again in 2020, followed by 2023-2024, which escalated into a major war. Finally, 2025-2026 has seen continued strikes and renewed large-scale hostilities. There are probably more than that but these are the incidents that are the most remembered.
The ultimate goal of UNIFIL should have been, or could have been, reaching lasting peace along the border
Khaled Abou Zahr
Unfortunately, UNIFIL has not changed anything about the situation in the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah has retained military capabilities and infrastructure south of the Litani River, meaning the army has been unable to establish a full state monopoly on weapons and security. This is despite the 2025 decision of the government to implement a plan to disarm Hezbollah and for the army to take full control — and despite the recent US-brokered mechanism to take control in pilot zones. All that UNIFIL has done is monitor and report violations. It has lacked the capacity or perhaps the mandate to enforce full compliance.
So, what will happen when UNIFIL’s mandate comes to an end at the end of this year and it withdraws in 2027? When looking at the entire situation, are Lebanon and France right to push for an extension to avoid a security vacuum? Should this withdrawal not be used as an opportunity to have the army extend its presence and take full control over the entire Lebanese territory? And should we not ask, as UNIFIL has been incapable of achieving its goals, how its withdrawal will really impact the situation? The latest clashes have shown that as long as Hezbollah hijacks decisions of peace and war for Lebanon while keeping its infrastructure, nothing will change.
I also wonder what is the objective of the proposal expressed by at least 10 EU countries to contribute to a future mission focused on supporting the Lebanese army. If the Lebanese state does not have the capacity or the will to disarm Hezbollah or take control of the south of Lebanon, how can this situation change? The US and other countries have supported the Lebanese army with billions of dollars, yet nothing has changed.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has proposed three smaller successor options, ranging from about 1,980 personnel to 5,525, to monitor the Blue Line, support de-escalation and assist the army. While no decision has been made, there should be an objective to align all goals in support of genuine control of the territory by the Lebanese state.
As long as Hezbollah hijacks decisions of peace and war for Lebanon while keeping its infrastructure, nothing will change
Khaled Abou Zahr
Some compare this to the chicken and the egg: should Israel withdraw first and Hezbollah then disarm or should it be the other way round? If we look back at Resolution 1701, its essence was the disarmament of Hezbollah. UNSC Resolution 1559 of 2004 also pushed for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the dismantling of Hezbollah. The Lebanese state and its allies should focus on how Lebanon can take back its sovereignty and disarm Hezbollah and all other armed groups, not only in the south but throughout the country. This is the only way to pave the road for long-lasting peace and stability for Lebanon.
The Lebanese lost control of the south to Hezbollah and Iran, who have in turn lost it to Israel for no reason other than the Iranian regime’s hegemonic expansionist plans. It is easier said than done but the state needs to rally the support of the Lebanese population to use the end of the UNIFIL mandate to impose a new reality in the south.
Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is the CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.
Khaled Abou Zahr is the founder of SpaceQuest Ventures, a space-focused investment platform. He is CEO of EurabiaMedia and editor of Al-Watan Al-Arabi.