On April 7, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave a speech at Johns Hopkins University in which he effectively offered to build the equivalent of the Tennessee Valley Authority for North Vietnam on the condition that Hanoi cease supporting the insurgency in South Vietnam. On the helicopter ride back from the speech, Johnson leaned across to an assistant, put his hand on his knee, and said of Ho Chi Minh, the North Vietnamese leader, “Old Ho can’t turn that down, Old Ho can’t turn that down.”
Ho did turn Johnson down. Today, the incident is taught in political-psychology courses to illustrate how presidents can naively think that transactional politics, commonplace in states and cities, will work on the global stage, only to find out that nationalism, ideology, and rivalry matter more.
Donald Trump has fallen into the same trap with Vladimir Putin, apparently believing that the right economic incentives will persuade the Russian leader to make peace. This approach is not working. Instead, it’s closing off the one realistic pathway to end the conflict with Ukraine, and making the war likelier to expand and worsen.
Early in his second term, Trump was surprised that Putin would not end the war quickly with a freezing of the territorial lines and a promise that Ukraine would not join NATO. Rather than seeking to improve Ukraine’s position on the battlefield or apply leverage against Russia through sanctions, Trump decided to convince Putin that peace would be financially rewarding. Trump pulled his Ukraine envoy, Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, off the negotiating team after the Kremlin complained that he was too favorable to Ukrainians and replaced him with his friend Steve Witkoff, a real-estate tycoon. The Russian financier Kirill Dmitriev would be Trump’s conduit to Putin.
[Robert F. Worth: The magician of the Kremlin]
Witkoff and Dmitriev worked out a deal almost a year ago that included a full lifting of sanctions, joint U.S.-Russian business ventures, and even Russia’s readmission to the G7 (turning it into the G8), but it foundered on Putin’s demand that Ukraine cede territory on the battlefield. Witkoff and Dmitriev continued their efforts.
The latest version emerged in the past week as U.S.-Ukraine relations reached their lowest point since the Oval Office bust-up in February 2025. Trump and Putin struck an agreement in which Russia would provide diesel fuel to the United States and global markets. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky slammed the arrangement, saying that it was “not fair and honest” and that it looked like “a happy-birthday present for Putin.”
An infuriated Trump called for Zelensky to be replaced and said that he was harder to deal with than Putin. In the days that followed, Kyiv accused Washington of curtailing intelligence cooperation, including by withholding information on incoming ballistic-missile strikes (the administration denied this). The Financial Times reported that the administration is considering returning some of the frozen assets to Russia as an incentive for a partial cease-fire. Trump then waived sanctions on Russia under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, saying that doing so was in the national interest of the United States. On Truth Social, Trump posted that he was in negotiations to end the war and didn’t “want to do anything that will drive, foolishly, Russia away from the bargaining table.”
As U.S.-Ukrainian relations seemed to nose-dive, the administration tried to convey a larger rationale behind its decision making. A senior official told The Washington Post’s David Ignatius that because a Ukraine deal was proving difficult to negotiate, the White House would enlarge the problem and negotiate a regional deal. This would include provisions to supply energy to Europe through a new pipeline, with profits to be shared between Ukraine and Russia, and the resolution of Moscow’s differences with European countries.
This proposal is, in effect, the Johnson plan. The naivete behind it would perhaps be excusable if Putin were a new leader with no track record, but he is a known quantity. Ukraine is his obsession, his white whale. He wants to subjugate it and has proved that he will pay an enormous price to achieve this goal.
The immediate diplomatic problem that Trump needs to solve is that Putin will not settle for anything less than the surrender of additional territory by Ukraine, which is something no Ukrainian leader can accept. Putin stands little chance of taking this territory by force: The front line is largely static, thanks to the saturation of the area with drones. However, the Russian leader has two hopes.
One is to break Ukraine this winter with a brutal air offensive that would destroy its energy grid and deliver misery to millions. Maybe such pressure would cause Ukraine’s front line to collapse or lead Kyiv to accept Moscow’s demands at the negotiating table.
The other prospect is to escalate Russia’s shadow war against Ukraine’s European partners. Moscow is already linked to assassination plots, arson, and the planting of explosive-laden drones in airports. A number of European leaders, including Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and French President Emmanuel Macron, have warned that Russia is considering hitting Eastern European states with drone and missile attacks that it would later deny. Putin hopes that this shadow war will weaken European governments and bring to power parties that will cut off aid to Ukraine and pressure it to capitulate to Russia’s demands.
[Read: Russia’s real strategy in Europe]
If Putin succeeds in these two gambits—weakening Ukraine over the winter while stoking unrest in Europe—he will be confident that Russia can grind out a bloody victory over the next couple of years.
Putin seems to think that time is on his side. Trump’s concessions reinforce that perception. But if Trump can change Putin’s expectations about the future, a diplomatic deal might become possible. In particular, Trump must convince Putin that the war will not get any better for Russia, and that the deal he can get now is better than the one he can get later.
This means doing everything possible to ensure that Ukraine survives Putin’s winter campaign: supplying Kyiv with as much air defense as possible, providing advance warning of incoming missiles, encouraging allies to seize Russia’s sovereign assets to provide Ukraine with economic relief, and helping Ukraine impose costs on Russia.
It also means helping Europe deter Putin from escalating his shadow war against NATO members. This is difficult but doable. Europe needs to convince Putin that increased attacks, especially any that result in casualties, will deepen Europe’s and the United States’ involvement in the Ukraine conflict. For instance, Europe could say that if Russia launches missiles or drones against NATO members, a European coalition will place air defenses in western Ukraine. Trump could tell Putin that if Russia keeps harassing Europe, he will clear the way with Elon Musk for Ukraine to use Starlink to hit military targets inside of Russia.
If one of Russia’s attacks resulted in mass casualties, such as the downing of a civilian airliner, the allies could designate Russia a state sponsor of terrorism. When I served at the National Security Council in the Biden administration, we communicated this to the Russians after they plotted to place flammable devices on airliners carrying DHL packages. We made clear that such a designation would likely lead to the closure of the Russian embassy in the United States. They stopped the plots.
Helping Ukraine survive the winter and deterring Russian attacks on Europe will help keep diplomacy alive. But to close the deal, Trump needs to convince Putin that his window of opportunity is closing. Here, Trump’s political weakness could work to his advantage.
Putin surely fears that Trump’s successor—if a Democrat or a Republican other than J. D. Vance—will be more favorable to Ukraine. A new administration will likely increase U.S. support for Ukraine and rebalance any deal made in the Trump years, possibly linking sanctions relief to Russian withdrawal from all of Ukraine.
Trump could turn this prospect into leverage. He can tell Putin that the opportunity for a favorable deal is real, but that it may not last forever. Only he can deliver it. If Putin keeps fighting, he will not make territorial gains, Ukraine will survive and retain the capacity to strike inside of Russia, Europe will become more involved, and the favorable terms will expire.
Then Trump needs to get serious about revising the offer so that it is acceptable to Ukraine. At a minimum, that means a freezing of the territorial lines, and no legal recognition of the occupied territory.
Trump wants to be remembered as the president who ended the war in Ukraine, but unless he changes course, he may instead be remembered as the president who gave Putin the confidence to widen and prolong it. Trump has spent nearly two years trying to convince Putin that peace will be more rewarding than war. To get a cease-fire, he must now convince him that war will be more costly than peace.